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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation examines workplace issues and events that shaped men’s health, 
and the healthcare services in support of them, in northern Ontario’s resource extraction 
industries. Between 1890 and 1925 there were important transformations in the hardrock 
mining sector including: technological innovations and refinements of the materials and 
devices used to extract ores; the healthcare mandated and legislatively prescribed but 
challenging to deliver to frontier workspaces; and how the complex interactions of the men, 
their work, their communities, wartime demands and collective bargaining combined to 
construct new definitions of masculinity. 
 Using quantitative data from the Ontario Bureau of Mines on the numbers of annual 
accidents and fatalities, a clearer understanding emerges that reveals how workingmen’s 
bodies were understood over time. Together with newspaper accounts, the reports of 
coroners’ juries, personal papers, doctors’ memoirs and popular histories, the role of work 
and workplace conditions clarifies how health was managed or how it suffered as the 
exploitation of the provinces natural resources began in earnest. The impact of World War 
One caused a wholesale change in the scale and importance of the mines and the men that 
worked them. This was seen in their solidarity, strength and successful strike immediately 
after the war and in fewer accidents and fatalities. The pace of change however faded in the 
post-war era. The gains that were made were kept and men’s health and safety never again 
saw the alarming losses as those enumerated here. 
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    Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The Peasant and the Worker
1
 
 
And now let your thought go,  
And let them see the sights 
Of the underground, where in holes stir. 
 
Like worms through tunnels they crawl 
And heavy rocks pull to the daily sun. 
During their life they dig their grave 
Passing their entire life in darkness. 
 
No one cares for the poor people,  
Especially when they are miners. 
Only when someone loses his life 
The newspapers make a little noise.  
 
But everything subsides, and so does this lament, 
As does anything human pertaining to the poor, 
And when crying widows 
Count the bodies lifted from the dark caverns. 
For this no one’s head aches 
And the world sleeps quietly as before. 
       S. Mahovlich (1922) 
# # # 
In September 1892, at the Blezard mine in Northern Ontario, five miners were 
killed instantly when a ten-ton rock spontaneously released from overhead and crushed 
them. Two others working nearby were injured. Even in an industry acknowledged to be 
dangerous, the accident was shocking. Ontario’s Bureau of Mines director, Archibald Blue, 
                                                 
1
 Jaworsky, B. Lamps Forever Lit: A Memorial to Kirkland Lake Area Miners. Calgary. Cambria Publishing. 
2001. p. 57. This source is a popular history featuring a compilation of mining deaths and the circumstances 
surrounding them. It focuses on Kirkland Lake, and nearby mines, between 1900 and 1996. The poem is by a 
Croatian miner about the death of a fellow Croat. There is, however, no additional information provided 
about the author.   
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and the area’s Mine Inspector, Alan Slaght2, attended at the site and conducted an 
investigation. A coroner’s jury was convened and found the cause of the deaths to be both 
unknown and unknowable.
3
 Consequently, no blame was assigned. In the absence of 
competing evidence or testimony, the matter and the men were laid quietly to rest. This 
incident, among many others, moved me to question the nature and experience of work 
among men along Ontario’s resource extraction frontier. I wanted to understand the people, 
locations, hazards and rewards, the gendering of workspaces, legislative sensitivities and 
the response of workers, companies and medical professionals to the work environment, 
and finally, how changes were negotiated over time. 
This dissertation explores the work and health of men principally employed in 
northern Ontario’s hardrock mining industry, between 1890 and 1925. It employs three 
principal axes of analysis in order to examine how working men’s health and identity were 
shaped by a complex interplay of the following: definitions of masculinity (crafted by 
working men of diverse ethnic backgrounds, the provincial government, frontier physicians 
and upper-class mine owners); notions of appropriate occupational healthcare (demanded 
by workmen, managed by companies, delivered by doctors and imagined by the Ontario 
government); and of technological changes in the workplace (many of which made work 
conditions more dangerous). This dissertation investigates these three dynamic and 
evolving influences as they intersected to define the daily work and experiences of 
labouring men. The study begins in 1890 when the provincial government reorganized its 
Mining Act and in the process empowered mining inspectors in new ways. The study ends 
                                                 
2
 Slaght was a retired Baptist minister with no previous experience, education or training in mining. The 
character of his work was general and he adapted to mining as needed, as did most other bureaucrats of the 
time. Smith, P.  Harvest from the Rock, A History of Mining in Ontario. Toronto. Macmillan of Canada. 
1986. p. 93. 
3
 Second Report of the Bureau of Mines 1892. Toronto. Warwick and Sons. 1893. pp.255-257. 
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in 1925 just before mining revenues began to waver and prior to the collapse of the stock 
market in 1929. I point to two significant turning points, one in 1905 when technologies 
transformed mine processes and materially changed the underground work environment 
and the other in 1915 at the confluence of World War One’s outbreak and the introduction 
of new worker compensation legislation. Although this study centres on mining and mining 
records, I have, where and when possible, tried to include parallel situations in lumber 
camps and railroad construction communities as they were also a part of Ontario’s resource 
frontier. 
 My dissertation seeks to understand how technological changes in mining work, 
and the occupational risks that accompanied them, helped shape definitions of masculinity 
and healthcare in Northern Ontario mining communities after 1890. My work explores the 
attitudes of government and bureaucrats to masculinity, healthcare and technology within a 
dynamic legislative and regulatory framework; the position of employers to these same 
issues but through the needs of profit-oriented private enterprises; the involvement of 
contract physicians who were contractually bound to the companies but practically focused 
on the health of the workers; and the miners who engaged the circumstances and challenges 
of their work. The ways in which these interests competed or cooperated over time are 
examined. 
The foundational literature for this dissertation begins with Ian Radforth’s 
Bushworkers and Bosses: a Social History of the Northern Ontario Logging Industry, 
1900-1980.
4
 He examines the work and workers associated with timber limits, one of the 
richest natural resources of the province. He looks at the men who worked at the many 
                                                 
4
 Radforth, I. Bushworkers and Bosses: a Social History of the Northern Ontario Logging Industry, 1900-
1980. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1987. 
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winter camps and the types and styles of technologies that developed over an eighty-year 
span. My work agrees with and expands on Radforth’s but my research antedates his study 
and adds legislative, regulatory and quantitative data about the dangers of mining work and 
the ruggedness of the men who undertook it. Unlike logging, mining was not seasonal. Its 
permanent workforce – comprised of both immigrants and English-speakers – negotiated 
frontier work conditions through all four seasons and miners managed their health and 
healthcare within their northern communities.  
 The prominent paternalistic role of Ontario’s mining legislation marks a key 
difference from Radforth’s but confirms the arguments of H.V. Nelles in The Politics of 
Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941.
5
 
According to the stipulations of the British North America Act the provinces were 
responsible for, and the stewards of, both the labour and natural resources under their aegis. 
Consequently, the development of these areas was politicized and Nelles addresses the 
implications on Queen’s Park. The other side of the equation, however, was the effect of 
the government’s attitudes, policies, and regulations on the men working underground. My 
study looks at how the government, arguably the principal animator of the resource 
economy, used the Mine Act to interpret and enforce its wants and responsibilities on the 
workers and what can be known directly and indirectly from the data contained in its 
voluminous Annual Reports. I interrogate the numbers and the values behind their data to 
suss out how their interests affected the identity, health and masculinity of the men. In 
doing this I extend Paul Craven’s focused analysis of the Canadian government, an 
                                                 
5
 H.V. Nelles in The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-
1941. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1974. 
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“impartial umpire”, in the decade immediately prior to World War One.6 Like Nelles, 
Craven’s work emphasizes the gross economic impact rather than the health and safety of 
the workmen, where the heavy lifting was taking place.   
 To further understand the role and presence of government in Ontario’s resources I 
include Brian Palmer’s data, which help profile not only how resource work was 
legislatively gendered but also how government agencies monitored the value of materials.
7
 
My study confirms that much of the demanding physical work was considered either 
undesirable or unsuitable for the dominant British ethnicity: white British males. The type 
and style of work and labour prompted the immigration of an array of European ethnicities. 
Donald Avery documents the roles of “dangerous foreigners” and how immigrants (long 
term and short term) contributed to the resource economy and labour activism.
8
 Avery’s 
work covers almost the same period as mine but I concentrate on the north and on the 
changing identities and health of miners rather than on labour radicalism. This difference 
situates miners beyond labour movements and so a new image of the worker is created.  As 
Bryan Hogan’s book title Cobalt, the Year of the Strike 1919, suggests, it is situated in one 
northern mining community immediately after World War One as he captures the struggles 
of newly organized mine workers.
9
 Although valuable in many ways, I had to expand 
Hogan’s work, both before and after 1919, to question the ideas and attitudes that 
compelled the men to successfully challenge the working and living conditions in the north. 
                                                 
6
 Craven, P. Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
1980. 
7
 Palmer, B. “Use of Census Manuscript Data for Historical Research.” Histoire Sociale/Social History. 
XXVIII. 56. November 1995.   
8
 Avery, D. “Dangerous Foreigners” European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada 1896-
1932. Toronto. McClelland and Stewart. 1979. 
9
 Cobalt: The Year of the Strike. Cobalt. Highway Book Shop. 1978. For a similar comparison in pre-
Confederation British Columbia see also Perry, A. On the Edge of Empire; Gender, Race and the Making of 
British Columbia, 1849-1871. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 2001. 
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  Beginning with Harold Innis’ “staples theory” and including observations from 
Donald Creighton, Arthur Lower, Albert Tucker among others, the Canadian resource 
economy has attracted the attention of historians for a long time. These earlier studies paid 
little attention to occupational health. Subsequent scholarship has been more attentive. 
Nonetheless, the literature on occupational health is sparse. Studies of events in British 
Columbia, like the Frank Slide or disasters in the coal mines of the Crow’s Nest Pass, have 
been captured and interrogated by Jeremy Mouat’s Roaring Days10 and Karen Buckley’s, 
Danger, Death and Disaster in the Crow’s Nest Pass.11 Nova Scotia’s coal mining industry 
has been studied extensively by Robert MacIntosh, Donald McLeod, Steven Penfold, and 
others.
12
 These studies focus largely on social backgrounds and reactions to mining 
disasters rather than the day-to-day occupational dangers that I address. I wanted to 
understand why the fatalities among Ontario’s hardrock miners increased annually despite 
greater provincial governance, increasingly detailed regulations, and ever-newer extraction 
technologies.  
To do this I engaged the studies of Fudge and Tucker in Labour Before the Law; 
The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada 1900-194813 as well as Work on 
                                                 
10
 Mouat, J. Roaring Days, Rossland Mines and this History of British Columbia. Vancouver. UBC Press. 
1995. 
11
 Buckley, K. Danger, Death and Disaster in the Crowsnest Pass Mines, 1902-1928. Calgary. University of 
Calgary Press. 2004. 
12
 See McIntosh, R. “The Boys in the Nova Scotian Coal Mines 1873-1923. Acadiensis. Vol. 16. Issue 2. 
1987. pp. 35-50.  Macleod, D. “Colliers, colliery safety and workplace control: the Nova Scotian experience, 
1873 to 1910.” CHA Hist. papers, 1983: 226–53; Penfold, S. “Have You no Manhood in You?”: Gender and 
Class in the Cape Breton Coal Towns, 1920-1926.” Acadiensis XX111. 2 (1994) pp.21-44; Frank, D. 
“Organized Labour and the Making of Public Policy in Twentieth-Century New Brunswick”, Journal of New 
Brunswick Studies/Revue d’études sur le Nouveau-Brunswick, Issue 2 (2011) McKay, I. “The Realm of 
Uncertainty: The Experience of Work in the Cumberland Coal Mines, 1873-1927.” Acadiensis 16. 1986. 
13
 Fudge, J. and Tucker, E. Labour Before the Law, The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada 
1900-1948. Don Mills. Oxford University Press. 2001. 
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Trial; Canadian Labour Law Struggles.
14
 Both of these texts see workers contesting the 
conditions and safety of work in addition to securing the right to collective action, although 
in those studies mining received only cursory attention. Eric Tucker’s independent work 
Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health and 
Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 offers a more sustained discussion of miners.
15
 He 
used a legal framework to understand what constituted “dangerous” work, which mining 
was axiomatically acknowledged to be. Beginning with the principle of “assumed risk” – a 
nineteenth century baseline for accident and labour-related jurisprudence – I investigate 
how and why this legal precedent was eventually replaced in the mines. I add to his 
analysis by auditing the attitudes behind the laws, and assessing the implementation of 
regulations that guided the province’s mine inspectors who were in charge of protecting 
and promoting miners’ health.  
 This dissertation also extends our scholarly knowledge by focusing on occupational 
health in Ontario’s north. The idea has been included tangentially, not directly, by Jayne 
Elliott in her look at the chain of Red Cross hospitals from the post-World War One period 
to 1984. Her dissertation “Keep the Flag Flying” Medical Outposts and the Red Cross in 
Northern Ontario 1922-1984 begins as this one concludes.
16
 Her examination of the “… 
shifting responsibilities for health care … as hospitals transformed from  largely privately 
supported facilities into institutions increasingly funded and controlled by government” 
does not engage the dynamic relationships among the bureaucrats in the field although 
                                                 
14
 Fudge, J. and Tucker, E. Work on Trial, Canadian Labour Law Struggles. Toronto. The Osgoode Society. 
2010. 
15
 Tucker, E. Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health and 
Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1990. 
16
 Elliott, J. “Keep the Flag Flying” Medical Outposts and the Red Cross in Northern Ontario 1922-1984. 
Ph.D. Thesis, Queen’s University. 2004. The Introduction is the section that applies most directly to this 
dissertation but it focuses on women and nursing more than on men and workspaces. 
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Elliott’s understanding of the need for “outpost” hospitals is valuable. There was little 
coordination among competing provincial departments, so miners continued to organize to 
try to gain some benefits or improvements in their workplaces and the company-owned 
boarding houses. Moreover, the facilities Elliott considered were not necessarily dedicated 
to men or situated in the camps. Although, the bulk of my work predates Elliott’s, I confirm 
the paucity and remarkably nuanced nature of medical care in remote Ontario communities.  
In the same vein, scholars have not yet produced any specific studies of “contract 
physicians” who, as the phrase indicates, were legally bound to render all necessary 
medical services to company workers whether the result of illness or accident. Jacalyn 
Duffin’s consideration of Dr. Langstaff’s medical practice remains one of the few that 
documents the life of a rural physician in nineteenth century Ontario.
17
 My work accords 
with Duffin’s but complicates it because I distinguish the resource frontier from rural 
(agricultural) communities. Although are both non-urban, the isolation of the resource 
camps posed significantly more problems, vis-à-vis health, than the even the poorest of 
road systems in farming communities. Langstaff’s emphasis on travel and access was 
exacerbated dramatically in the northern wilderness; this is seen in Dr. Clifford Smylie’s 
autobiography, Northern Doctor.
18
 Sasha Mullaly’s Unpacking the Black Bag19 comes 
closer to the remote frontier experiences of the mines of Northern Ontario. She 
demonstrates, as I do, that often physicians were valourized more for their efforts to get to 
a patient than for their technical expertise once they arrived. Mullaly studies how 
                                                 
17
 I am familiar with John Norris’s article on country doctors in British Columbia and some of his findings 
accord closely with mine. Although he does comment on doctors as coroners he relies almost exclusively on 
complex statistical analyses. Norris. J. “The Country Doctor in British Columbia 1887-1975. An Historical 
Profile.” BC Studies. No. 49. Spring 1981. pp.15-39. 
18
 Smylie, C.H. Northern Doctor: Memoirs of Clifford Hugh Smylie, M.D. Cobalt. The Highway Book Shop. 
2002. 
19
 Mullally, S. Unpacking the Black Bag: Country Doctors and the Social Transformation of Rural Medicine 
1900-1950. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 2009 
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practitioners lived and worked in the Maritime provinces and focuses more on the 
physician than the patients. This dissertation therefore builds on Ontario’s medical history 
by evaluating the presence and impact of physicians on the occupational health of workers. 
I wanted to know how doctors mediated the complex middle ground populated by workers, 
mine owners, government legislators, technologies, and geographic isolation. 
 As I interrogate aspects of occupational health and occupational medicine I am 
equally interested in a third axis of analysis – the role of masculinity. I look at the various 
perceptions of the men doing the work and how their identities were generated; sometimes 
in the public imagination, sometimes from legislation, sometimes by management, and 
sometimes by the men themselves. Nancy Forestell’s article “Bachelors Boarding Houses 
and Blind Pigs” and her doctoral thesis “All that Glitters is Not Gold" confirm the rugged 
masculinity that was popular in the public mind.
20
 Using the Timmins/Porcupine area over 
a ten year span - 1909 to 1920 - she looks at the social masculinities of labourers outside of 
work, not on-the-job. Her work reflects the broader sense of rugged masculinity described 
in Gail Bederman’s Manliness and Civilization21 and in Ava Baron’s “On Looking at Men, 
Masculinity and the Making of a Gendered Work Class History”.22 My study interrogates 
the competing strains of masculinities found in and around resource extraction 
communities as I analyze how these masculinities changed over time. Valerie Burton’s 
“The Myth of Bachelor Jack”23, contributes to this by encouraging the deconstruction of 
                                                 
20
 “Bachelors, Boarding-Houses, and Blind Pigs: Gender Construction in a Multi-Ethnic Mining Camp, 1909 
– 1920” in A Nation of Immigrants. Ed. Iacovetta et al. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 2002. 
21
 Bederman, G. Manliness and Civilization; A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States 
1880-1917. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1995. 
22
 Baron, A. "On Looking at Men: Masculinity and the Making of a Gendered Working-Class History," in 
Ann-Louise Shapiro, ed., Feminists Revision History (New Brunswick 1994). 
23
 Burton, V. “The Myth of Bachelor Jack: Masculinity, Patriarchy and Seafaring Labour" in Jack Tar in 
History: Essays in the History of Maritime Life and Labour. Edited by Colin Howell and Richard J. Twomey. 
Fredericton, 1991. pp. 179-198. 
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stereotypical myths – in my case about miners – and other resource workers. Many of these 
men have been characterized or constructed solely by a normative muscular, Paul 
Bunyanesque, masculinity rather than by quieter, more nuanced masculinities that 
interacted with and reacted to various ethnicized and job-related male behaviours. Craig 
Heron’s “Boys Will be Boys”24 looks at this in Hamilton and how it was manifested 
socially - in the company of women - whereas my study concentrates on miners in evolving 
homosocial-to-heterosocial communities in the resource extraction sector. In part I do this 
by acknowledging Joy Parr’s breadwinner masculinity and the very elastic “contact zones” 
shared by blocs of ethnic workers, government administrators, physicians and business 
owners.
25
 Then I expand Parr’s evaluation of “breadwinner” masculinity, notwithstanding 
the fact that her study is situated in two urban, industrialized towns while mine is spread 
over a much broader range of remote, frontier camps.
26
 Nonetheless, there was a point at 
which miners, like the craftsmen of the Knechtel furniture factory, became breadwinners. 
This challenges the muscular masculinity stereotype of the late nineteenth century.
27
  
                                                 
24
 Heron, C. “Boys Will Be Boys”: Working-Class Masculinities in the Age of Mass Production. 
International Labour and Working Class History. Vol. 69. 2006. pp. 6-34. 
25
 Parr, J. The Gender of Breadwinners; Women, Men and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950. 
Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1990. Pratt, M.L. “Arts of the Contact Zone”. Profession. Modern 
Language Association. 1991.pp. 33-40. 
26
 Parr, J. The Gender of Breadwinners. Parr compares women working in the Penman textile plant in Paris, 
Ontario to the men in the Knechtel plant in Hanover, Ontario in the nineteenth century.  
27
 Bederman, G. Manliness and Civilization, a Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United 
States1880-1917. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1995. Bederman  uses Theodore Roosevelt’s 
example to highlight the muscularity of manliness near the turn of the century: “Men needed to take up the 
strenuous life and strive to advance civilization … [by fighting].”(171) The work of Ava Baron in 
“Masculinity, the Embodied Male Worker, and The Historian’s Gaze” International Labour and Working 
Class History. Cambridge University Press. (2006), 69: 143-160 offers helpful analytical threads on worker 
masculinity including risk-taking behaviours and physical dynamism that overrode ethnic, cultural and class 
differences. In her earlier work she sees apprenticeship as a way of linking manly work with family 
responsibilities and this idea supports my findings also. “Acquiring Manly Competence: The Demise of 
Apprenticeship and the Remasculinization of Printers’ Work” in Meanings for Manhood Constructions of 
Masculinity in Victorian America. Ed. Carnes, M.C. and Griffen, C. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 
1990. Craig Heron’s Working in Steel; the Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935.Toronto. McClelland & 
Stewart. 1991. paralleled my research in that steel factories were, in a sense, an extension of mine production: 
smelting and milling operations were the final processes. Heron concludes, as I do, that as equipment became 
11 
 
 My research indicates that the role of breadwinning masculinity in northern Ontario 
mining communities has been under-reported, overshadowed by a more exciting profile of 
manly ruggedness. Notwithstanding the all male composition of the workforce, many 
miners supported families living far away and breadwinner masculinity grew as mining 
camps and communities matured. These men lived quietly and modestly and sent a portion 
of their earnings back to wives and family members.
28
 Moreover, my study locates 
masculinity in the work itself as a form of occupational masculinity that is not limited to 
class or ethnicity but rather to the place and styles of work performed.  
Then, building on Robert Connell’s ideas29, I see alternative masculinities in 
physicians, business owners, family men, and expressly in a new, patriotic, warrior 
masculinity that appeared during World War One. Jonathan Vance’s Death So Noble points 
to the significance of patriotic masculinity.
30
 This is revealed in the memorials and statuary 
dedicated to the Great War soldiers of which miners were an important part. 
Technology was another element that challenged the characteristics of traditional 
mine work. Particular jobs reflected particular masculine traits. All miners – regardless of 
ethnicity – were expected to behave in manly ways: occupational masculinity is the term I 
have adopted for this. All miners needed to be unafraid of darkness, loud noises, heavy 
work and privation. And hardrock mining skills were particularly valuable in the trench 
warfare of World War One. I use the work of Jonathan Vance and Desmond Morris to 
compare war-work with mine-work and draw parallels between the two.
31
 Miners qua 
                                                                                                                                                    
more sophisticated the skill sets of the workers became more valuable but these changes affected the rugged 
nature of masculinity for working miners.  
28
 Fitzpatrick, A.  
29
 Connell, R.W. Masculinities.2
nd
 Edition.  Cambridge. Polity Press. 2005. 
30
 Vance, J. Death So Noble; Memory, Meaning and the First World War. Vancouver. UBC Press. 1997. 
31
 Vance. J. Death So Noble. Morris, D. When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World 
War. Toronto. Random House. 1993. See chapter four “Doing Your Bit.” Morris notes the influence of 
12 
 
patriots became extensions of the soldiers in the trenches, as men, and – more importantly – 
as Canadians.
32
 I argue that this change altered the perceptions of Mine Inspectors who 
began to use language that interpreted miners more benignly.
33
  
 By animating my study with three key questions in three discrete periods, I explain 
how the relationships among workers, government, and doctors intersected and how 
perceptions changed. This study reveals points of convergence and divergence that grew, 
matured and coalesced around World War One. To interrogate these ideas, however, the 
importance of the mining economy of that time needs to be understood. 
 
A Brief History of Mining in Ontario 
Historians acknowledge that Ontario’s natural resources have played significant 
roles in the development of the province economically, geographically and 
demographically. Among the riches of the forests, waterways and metals, mining attracted 
substantial attention from investors, bureaucrats and legislators, but no academic study has 
yet charted the industry’s early years. Popular histories and industry data do confirm that 
extracting precious metals presented unique challenges in the years between 1890 and 
1925. Unlike the rich coal seams in Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, the 
ores of gold, silver, cobalt, copper and nickel were locked in Ontario’s pre-Cambrian 
granite and had to be extracted using “hardrock” or “metalliferous” techniques and 
                                                                                                                                                    
mining magnates on the enlistment of miners from Ontario. “Montreal mining promoters recruited Borden’s 
Armoured Battery from Cobalt and Haileybury.” P.50. 
32
 The communities around the Mond or Garson mines donated both money and machine guns to the army in 
defense of “liberty and humanity”. The Northern Miner, September 11. 1915. p.7. 
33
 The Accident Reports during the war years (1915-1919) offer less harsh understandings of dead and injured 
miners. They are found to be complicit in their own accident far less often.  
13 
 
technologies. And these were undertaken enthusiastically and profitably across the frontier 
landscape of New Ontario. 
The financial value of mining production grew dramatically during the thirty-five 
year span of this study. The aggregate total of the metal ores in 1904 was $5 million; by 
1908 it was $17 million; it jumped to $34 million in 1912; and it peaked at $80 million in 
1918 when World War One came to a close. In the post-war period, production remained 
steady but prices fell back to pre-war levels so revenue in 1924 was still a healthy $52 
million.
34
 The size, spread and importance of the mining economy was integral to the 
prosperity of the province. Mining offered new revenue streams and opened up new 
geographical areas and developed jobs at sites which matured into settled communities. 
The western boundary of Ontario had been reset in 1885, and with it the “new North” was 
cast. The southern boundary of this “New Ontario” was imprecise but was generally 
understood to be a casual, meandering line from Ottawa through Sudbury to Sault Ste. 
Marie. The provincial boundaries were formally set in 1912. By 1925 northern Ontario was 
home to railroads, communities, and a vibrant resource economy. Mining played a key role 
in this geographic expansion though, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the total 
population of the northern region made up less than 7% of the province’s total population 
of just over two million.
35
 
The process for opening a hardrock mine was long-established. Locating the ore 
bodies was usually the work of individual prospectors who ranged widely across the 
wilderness of New Ontario. The hardscrabble men who took on this lifestyle looked for 
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rock features and outcroppings that bore rich veins worth staking a claim on. The 
individual prospector walked, camped, canoed and snow-shoed across untamed and 
unexplored acres anywhere from Rat Portage to Cobalt. Access was treacherous and it 
challenged the bodies, emotions and finances of those who attempted it. The geography 
was as raw and dangerous as the weather. The remoteness and isolation of the sites were 
harsh and enduring. The early prospectors lived transient lifestyles alone, surviving on 
what could be carried or gleaned from the land. The chances of striking it rich were small 
but ever-alluring for the fortune hunters whose only assets “were usually his initiative and 
his willingness to brave the hazards and hardships of the trail.”36 The term “grubstake” 
grew out of prospecting. The legendary Noah Timmins – a store owner from Mattawa, 
Ontario who eventually made a fortune in northern Ontario mining -- was famous for 
agreeing to provide certain prospectors with enough food (grub) and supplies in exchange 
for a share (stake) of the claims they filed.
37
 
In some cases, successful prospectors struck gold and then formed syndicates for 
penny mining stocks that drew quick attention and caused “rushes” at those sites. The 
spectacular successes of prospectors like Fred LaRose
38
 and Benny Hollinger were the 
exception rather than the rule but their stories fueled the dreams of hundreds of others. 
 LaRose was a blacksmith on the Temiskaming & Northern Ontario railroad, (T.& 
N.O.)
39
; he sharpened drills and saws for the construction and survey crews and prospected 
in his spare time. He was illiterate but had a great deal of prospecting experience, energy 
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and ambition. In September 1903 he found some pink rock which he melted down in his 
forge. He could not identify the metallic residue but believed it to be valuable; it was 
confirmed to be silver and he promptly sold portions of his claims to financiers like 
William Trewethey and Noah Timmins.
40
  
Benny Hollinger was also a tool-sharpener working at the Copper Cliff mines in 
Sudbury until he went to investigate the commotion around Cobalt in 1905. He prospected 
near an old pit and found a vein of gold. As Phillip Smith’s popular history recounts of 
Hollinger’s initial claim: “The quartz stood up about three feet out of the ground and was 
about six feet wide, with gold splattered over it for about sixty feet along the vein.”41 
Within months, Hollinger sold an option to the Timmins brothers and M.J. O’Brien for 
$165,000.00. The Hollinger mine has continued to yield millions of dollars in gold ever 
since.  
Beyond the fortunes of the individual prospector and private companies, the Ontario 
Bureau of Mines also got involved in searching out ore bodies to be exploited and Larder 
Lake – sometimes called Canada’s forgotten gold rush – is one of the best examples of this. 
In 1904 the Bureau hired a University of Toronto geologist named Dr. W. Parks to evaluate 
and survey a previously unexplored area near the Quebec border. His findings were 
published in 1905 and 1906.
42
 When they appeared, there was a rush to strike it rich. By the 
end of 1907 more than 4000 claims were filed in this small area but the province controlled 
registrations and growth to avoid the chaos that had been experienced elsewhere. This kind 
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of prospecting continued until the late 1920s and early 1930s at which time geologists and 
aerial surveys brought professional knowledge and new scientific techniques to bear. These 
new and sophisticated methods ostensibly ended the individual experience – and luck – that 
had characterized earlier prospecting generations.  
 Mining companies had been present in northern Ontario since the 1860s and by the 
1920s were familiar with the landscape and how to negotiate it. Investment was both local 
and foreign. For example, M. J. O’Brien was an investor from the Ottawa Valley whose 
railroad building ventures brought him into the mining business of Cobalt. International 
investors joined with Canadian ones. The 1888 Ontario commission into the “Mineral 
Resources of [Ontario] and the Measures for their Development … led to the conclusion 
that more than one-half of the capital invested in mining operations in Ontario is 
American”.43 Moreover, British interests in Cobalt area mines (Coniagas, Trewethey, King 
Edward and Cobalt Silver Queen) motivated the 1916 Royal Commission to Inquire into 
and Report on the Unrest in the Mining Industry at Cobalt.
44
 Shareholders wanted to make 
sure that ore supplies would not be interrupted during World War One.  
Men and machinery had to locate to the ore bodies and that meant erratic and 
sporadic growth over an expanse of more than 250 million acres. The northern part of 
Ontario was opened up by the sea-to-sea rail network that was part of the federal 
government’s National Policy. From the east-west orientation of the transnational CNR and 
CPR lines grew a web of north-south rail spurs that serviced mining and logging camps. 
Engineers and surveyors scoured the landscape for routes through remote, isolated areas. In 
the process they found ores that prompted further investigation and sometimes important 
                                                 
43
 Smith, P. Harvest from the Rock. pp. 75-78. 
44
 Royal Commission Appointed to Investigate Unrest in the Mining Industry in the Cobalt District. 1916. 
Published in Labour Gazette XVI. October 1916. 
17 
 
financial investment. Place names like Calamity Gulch, Ragged Chute, Stoney Lonesome 
and Silver Centre reveal something about the character of early finds.
45
 Hundreds of 
potential sites sprang to life but quickly and quietly faded away. In the Temiskaming area 
alone almost two hundred places disappeared or were subsumed by other settlements. They 
were, however, evidence of the presence and pursuit of the seemingly limitless natural 
resources as train cars transported raw materials to smelters for processing, then returned 
with stores for the workmen. 
Sustaining mine camps grew into settlements, which matured – often haltingly -- 
into towns and established municipalities with families and schools and elected officials. 
Sudbury, Timmins, Cobalt, Haileybury, New Liskeard and many others began as “camps” 
which, by 1925 were permanent communities. They were usually towns of single industry, 
and while local stores or the lumber mills situated near the mines provided some 
employment, it was mining that drove the economies of these settlements.  
                         
Figure 1.1 Mapping of claims (Manitouwadge)
46
 
 
Figure 1.1 reveals the density of the claims staked over one small area. As they 
were excavated and assayed, camp populations grew rapidly. The men who worked the 
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mines used techniques and technologies that, in 1890, were about to undergo dramatic 
changes. Until late in the nineteenth century, it was still the custom for two men to operate 
a manual hand drill; one twisted the bit while the other struck it repeatedly with a heavy 
sledge hammer; they exchanged positions every five minutes or so. The holes they bored 
were filled with “black powder” (later dynamite or gelignite), which was tamped into place 
with a long wooden dowel (to avoid sparks), then secured by (usually paper or cotton) 
wadding. A fuse was inserted into the charge and that fuse was joined to a network of 
charges that were all connected to a main fuse. After the men retreated a safe distance, the 
main fuse was lit and the blasts occurred in a prescribed sequence so as to release the 
largest volume of ore from the vein.  
 
Figure 1.2 Cross-section of a hardrock mine
47
 
This illustration of an early twentieth century silver mine shows how, over a small section of land, 
hardrock ore bodies were explored using vertical shafts and horizontal cuts. 
After the shaft was vented of toxic gases, the men returned and raked through the 
rock debris called “muck.” These rocks were further reduced using hand sledges in order 
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for it to be shoveled onto a tram which rolled to a pit where the contents were dumped. A 
windlass or elevator raised the muck to the surface where it was sorted and stamped 
(crushed) and then the ore was loaded onto a train car for transport to the nearest smelter. 
Back in the mine, the walls and roof of the stope (rock face being worked) were “scaled”. 
This meant making the worksite safe using long metal bars to tap and probe for pockets of 
gas or loose rocks. This was designed to reduce incidents of spontaneous releases or falls of 
rocks called “rockbursts”.48 Once completed the cycle began anew.  
 At the dawn of the twentieth century new power sources led to the introduction of 
new devices and techniques which increased production, noise and dust levels. Electricity 
improved the lighting systems above ground as well as in the main mine shaft. Electricity 
also powered bellows to vent the toxic gases (black or white “damps”) that built up 
following a blast. Electric water pumps exhausted the ever-present pools of water that 
seeped in from aquifers. At the same time, pneumatic tools drilled more holes, deeper and 
faster. New explosives – especially Dynamite – dramatically accelerated the release of ores 
and production. However, these innovations also increased rates of accident and death, in 
part because protections for miners lagged behind the new devices surrounding them. 
Miners working deep underground continued to use candle-light well into the first decade 
of the twentieth century. Head protectors – euphemistically called helmets – were 
constructed by laminating layers of cardboard that quickly softened when wet. Gloves, 
boots, jackets and eye-wear were all the responsibility of the individual; nothing required 
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them to buy or wear protective gear until the 1908 revisions to the Mine Act but 
enforcement of the regulations was discretionary and inexact.  
 
The Cast of Characters at the Resource Frontier 
The records of the Bureau of Mines reported that the number of men employed in 
mining grew steadily from the outset. Between 1900 and 1915 the ranks doubled from 
about 10,000 to 20,500. The ethnic composition of the workforce was widely mixed 
overall. There were, however, dense concentrations of specific ethnicities at some sites. Ian 
Radforth looks at the Finnish population that worked in and around Fort William and Port 
Arthur.
49
 The town of Espanola, just west of Sudbury, was named for the heavy population 
of Spanish resource workers in that area.  It seems there were far more foreigners engaged 
in mining than in logging.
50
 Government records reveal that while the largest bloc of 
miners was English-speaking - the marker used to identify ethnicity - they did not comprise 
an overall majority. Anglophones represented forty to forty-five percent of the mining 
population; the rest were from a broad assortment of countries: Germany, Austria, France, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Poland, Russia, Galicia and more. Most were alone and 
dubbed “sojourners”: they came to work for a short time, save and return home. Some, not 
many, brought their wives and children with them; others had their families join them after 
getting established here.  
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Very few of the workers I look at were functionally or occupationally literate.
51
 The 
inability to read was a matter of significance as were the conflicting and competing 
language skills. There was no lingua franca. Gesturing and shouting were the primary 
methods of communication. The workplace and the province were governed in English, 
which was inaccessible or only vaguely useful to the majority. This complicated what was 
already dangerous work. Communicating with co-workers was essential to the health and 
well-being of all those working around explosives. Mine inspectors recognized this early, 
as did social reformers like Alfred Fitzpatrick. He founded the Ontario Reading Camps 
Association which evolved into Frontier College. 
Working men were joined at the resource frontier by agents of the provincial 
government who worked for the Ontario Bureau of Mines, a division of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources. Despite the growing number of statutes on the books, the industry 
remained one of the most dangerous. A report from the Charlton Commission in 1890 
noted: 
The [Ontario Mine] Act contains no provision for the health and safety of miners, and 
although no law can ensure workmen against the occurrence of accidents or the effect of 
foul air, it is none the less necessary that every possible precaution for their health and 
safety should be taken.
52
 
 
Despite its prophetic nature, the observation was not acted on for a decade.  
Following an egregious jump in fatalities, the Bureau of Mines initiated a 
comprehensive study of accidents in 1908. Chief Mines Inspector E.T. Corkill called for a 
re-visioning of safety in the industry. This galvanized mine owners to seek collective 
protections in a new, government operated compensation agency. It resulted in the creation 
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and implementation of the Workers’ Compensation Act of January 1, 1915. The Act 
contributed significantly to reshaping how miners were perceived.
53
 Early jurisdictional 
disputes and conflicts of interest among government officials were largely overcome with 
the onset of World War One.   
Contract physicians – members of the medical profession who lived at the frontier 
and hired to supply and administer healthcare to mining and lumber camps - play a key role 
in this study. Doctors bid on contracts that were tendered by mining companies. These 
were prized sources of income because they were paid monthly in cash. It was an early 
system of socialized medicine but the subscribers – the miners - were excluded from the 
administrative apparatus. I examine the doctors’ relationships to the camps, the men and 
the local townspeople. 
Like the men they served, doctors spent a lot of time traveling. Their comments 
suggest that accessing a camp – particularly in winter – was sometimes significantly more 
difficult than the treatments rendered.
54
 
Dr. Jones he had it hard going back up here 30 and 40 miles to those camps in rough winter 
weather with a team [of horses] and then he [also] had, I don’t know what you call it, on 
four wheels, and the [mining] company gave him permission to use the rails you see. They 
gave him permission to use that in the track. Your feet made it go, until they got a motor on 
it and that worked better.
55
 
 
The masculinity of a contract physician was therefore, more a product of his risk-taking 
than his technical, surgical or pharmacological skills. As urban doctors were celebrated for 
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their educational backgrounds and public associations so frontier doctors were heralded for 
their hazardous exploits.
56
  
In the early twentieth century the Ontario Medical Association began lobbying for 
more autonomy. They did not want their contract members beholden to corporate interests. 
They wanted to be independent of their commercial paymasters. In sparsely populated 
towns the doctors supplemented their incomes with municipal and provincial appointments, 
acting as Health Officers or working in health-related positions.
57
  They dealt with 
epidemics of cholera, diphtheria and smallpox. Doctors qua health officers were important 
elements in the forging of new municipalities. Camps, settlements, hamlets and other 
marginal populations had to adopt policies and procedures before they could be recognized 
and thereafter benefit from provincial support. Medical services in each community were 
necessary but sometimes hard to come by. The vicissitudes of frontier health care 
frequently paralleled the fortunes of the mines.  
Using newspaper accounts, the Canadian Medical Association Journal and the 
Journal of the Canadian Medical Association I examine how legislation, economics and 
World War One factor into how doctors related to miners and their families.
58
 Over time, 
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the relationship changed and the various reasons for those changes are measured against the 
importance of the resource economy, the healthcare of the workforce and developments in 
medical technologies.
59
  
In the same years that the Ontario Medical Association began agitating for greater 
professional autonomy, so did labour unions seek to organize mining in Ontario’s north. 
Serviced towns with families and children, schools, libraries, neighbourhoods and 
recreational facilities promoted organized collective action.   
The Western Federation of Miners (WFM), a militant American union, first 
appeared in Ontario circa 1905. Brian Hogan’s thesis is helpful in describing the failed 
Cobalt strike of 1907 and the twelve intervening years before the successful strike in 1919. 
His work reveals the united voice of the men. Union representation began to give miners 
more a self-generated, “bottom up identity”, rather than one imposed on them from the “top 
down.” In this regard, the research Larry Lankton provided was insightful and my 
conclusions confirm his in key areas.
60
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With the advent of unions, miner resistance changed. “High-grading” – stealing 
nuggets of pure (high grade) silver and gold – was a common practice among individual 
miners. It was one form of resistance to the conditions of work and pay. High-grading was 
widely reported because the companies were ardent about publicizing every prosecution. 
Some mine owners used “gold squads” to protect their interests.61   
 
Site Research 
 In order to understand and interpret some of the assumptions and values behind the 
primary and secondary sources, it was important to visit various mine sites across Northern 
Ontario. Although hundreds of them have disappeared, a few remain, mostly as tourist 
attractions. Many of the exhibits have been sanitized by being brought into line with 
current building, fire and safety codes. However, once underground, the drifts, shafts, 
stopes and winzes are largely unchanged. They remain examples of what frontier work 
conditions were really like. The scarred walls, low roofs, cold temperatures, penetrating 
dampness, distance to work stations and disorienting sounds continue to be unaffected by 
time. Below ground today there are extensive lighting grids, improved ventilation systems, 
emergency safety areas, and communication devices that provide a sense of confidence, 
most of which were unavailable a century ago. Today, there are no opportunities to traverse 
the areas wearing a laminated cardboard “helmet” sporting a candle to light the way. There 
are no one or two-tap drills or sledgehammers to wield in confined spaces. But the sense of 
what was physically required remains intense. 
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The time I spent underground fueled my historical imagination and inspired new 
questions about the walls and roofs that still bear the original drill and pick marks. Ceilings 
are quite low; walking erect is awkward and dangerous. Temperatures are cold, just a 
couple of degrees above freezing. Standing pools of water are still commonplace as 
seepage from walls and ceilings was constant in the places I visited. The dampness is 
numbing after hours of being hunched-over in chambers that were by turns either 
cacophonous or tomb-like. Darkness underground is palpable, at times suffocating and 
disorienting. Sounds echoed randomly, making their sources indistinct and unreliable. 
Sharp edges along rock-faces snagged clothing and bruised shoulders. Partially buried or 
submerged rails compounded problems moving along corridors. The starkness of the work 
environment was a revelation. Above ground, original on-site accommodations for miners 
have long since disappeared; victims of weather and the casual construction techniques of 
the late nineteenth century.  And while efforts to construct replicas of historic mining towns 
– such as in Timmins – are inevitably shaped by contemporary concerns like building 
codes, existing historic sites nonetheless convey the hardships that early twentieth century 
miners endured. 
 Getting to Ontario’s mines is still a demanding process despite manifold 
improvements. Today’s highways parallel original train lines and confederation roads but 
do not reflect any of the rigor demanded of resource workers in the nineteenth century. One 
hundred kilometers by car now takes sixty minutes – or less – along smooth, paved roads. 
The same distance was at least a three day walk during summer in frontier times and often 
took a week or more in winter. Notwithstanding the benefits of progress, I was still able to 
sense the struggles that must have challenged those who traversed narrow trails on foot, 
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while laden with a tump-line
62
 containing all of one’s possessions. The remoteness and 
isolation of mine, lumber and rail camps, was daunting. These were not occupations for the 
faint of heart or the physically infirm.   
 I also found a surprising number of small, mine-related museums across the north. 
The Thelma Miles Historical Museum in Matheson, the Northern Ontario Mining Museum 
in Cobalt, and the Bruce Mines Museum in Bruce Mines (to name but a few) proudly 
feature important pieces of their history. The curators and managers of these facilities 
enthusiastically encourage investigation in their areas. Many neighbourhood cemeteries 
provided further testimony to the dangers that confronted workers every day. And 
memorials like those in Kirkland Lake and Reesor Siding pay homage to the lives that were 
lost in the resource sector.
63
 Collections in small repositories make no claim to 
comprehensiveness but do contain ephemeral data that invite specific, if limited historical 
analysis. In places, then, I turn to the tools of microhistory to learn how a small, perhaps 
isolated, incident can reveal new conclusions or challenge old ones. 
 
Archival materials 
Archival materials found in local repositories, along with materials held in the 
Archives of Ontario, formed the basis of the research for this study. I used unpublished 
letters, memoirs and writings, as well as published autobiographies. Archival collections of 
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miners and doctors provide rare glimpses into the attitudes of men working at remote 
northern sites.  
I also read local newspapers like The Temiskaming Herald/Speaker, The Sudbury 
Star, The North Bay Nugget, The Port Arthur News, The Sault Star to understand the 
activities of camp men both on and off the job. These reports offered insights into business 
dealings, community events, sporting activities and occasionally some criminal activities. 
Organizational records, like those of the Canadian Medical Association Journal and 
the Journal of the Canadian Medical Association, located physicians and healthcare 
practices in the communities I was studying. The insights and comments of doctors on how 
they practiced and whom they practiced on, revealed a great deal about the isolation of the 
sites and the limitations surrounding contract doctors. 
Access to primary research materials for this dissertation was, in some instances, 
limited. The files of the WCB are not yet open to researchers so their contents remain 
unknown. Similarly, union files addressing matters of miner health and safety are not open 
or accessible. Low literacy rates among workers meant there was little preserved of their 
first-person accounts. Fortunately, however, a couple of frontier physicians recorded their 
experiences and through them we can know the conditions of work and the nature of 
injuries and accidents that had to be treated. I have therefore used some alternative primary 
sources to analyze the thematic focus of this study. Some of the most revealing evidence 
comes from the verdicts and recommendations of coroners’ juries, which were empanelled 
to investigate mining-related deaths. I have used them to reveal the voices and concerns of 
co-workers at the mines. They offer unique insights into the conditions of work and the 
responsibilities that attached to workers and management as well as to how changes took 
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place over time. I also found reports like that of the Meredith Commission (1912) helpful 
in hearing the voice of miners testifying before a Royal Commission. Brian Hogan’s 
examination of the 1919 strike in Cobalt concentrated on the strike but there were no 
significant sources that detailed complaints related to workplace conditions in the camps at 
the end of World War One.  
While union records for the area are sparse before 1919, The Northern Miner was a 
valuable resource. It advocated for the industry and, over time it began to champion the 
causes of health and safety for the men. 
The corporate records of mining companies gave up little information about the 
workforce. The archival materials I examined focused largely on financial concerns and ore 
content. There was a disappointing lack of data on the men and their health.  
The Ontario Reading Camps Association, later Frontier College, was a surprisingly 
fruitful archive. Their teachers worked among the men throughout the day and afterwards 
as well. Their contents gave me insights into the conditions of work, attitudes of the men to 
work, how they spent their off-hours, and what they did with their money. 
Every spring the Bureau tabled its Annual Report at Queen’s Park.64 These reports 
detail a wealth of qualitative and quantitative data and include photographs, maps, graphs, 
charts, production rates, dollar values, fatality summaries, and the findings of coroners’ 
juries. The government reified and classified how each “accident” or “incident” was 
considered and relied on their own inspectors to make the determinations. My analysis of 
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 These reports begin with the results of 1891 and proceed in an unbroken line thereafter. As the industry 
changed so did the nature and focus of the reports. In this study, I used them up to and including 1926 and 
occasionally make reference to later years. I have also relied on the Health Act (1899) “Regulations for the 
Sanitary Control of Lumber, Mining and other Camps, Sawmills and other Industries situated in Unorganized 
Districts” to see how the two government bureaus negotiated their relative responsibilities between 
themselves and the workers they were responsible for. 
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the ever-changing legislation reveals how it informed the conditions of work, the 
occupational safety of the men, the mechanization of the mines, and concepts of 
occupational masculinity. Using notes, poems and correspondence of miners, doctors, 
companies and newspapers, I offer alternative interpretations of these homosocial work 
environments, especially as they evolved from transient camps into established 
communities.
65
 
As research on this project progressed, it became clear that the extensive records 
maintained by the Ontario government would anchor much of this research. Voluminous 
reports from the Bureau of Health (1880) and the Bureau/Department of Mines (1891) 
provided a wealth of technical, financial, geological and ideological data.  
The thousands and thousands of pages that government records occupy required 
close study to see how they manifested underlying attitudes and philosophies as well as the 
ways the government managed the ever-evolving workplace. Although cumbersome, these 
tomes revealed a great deal about changes in workplace operations, normative masculine 
behaviours for miners and, how the range of ethnicities involved in mining were perceived 
by politicians at Queen’s Park. I have tabulated figures from these reports into tables and 
charts to better represent the totals and facilitate comparisons over time. The province 
collected and published data that are used to explain how and why the identities of miners 
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 “Angus Bell’s Memoirs of Railroading” Lakehead University General Archive. 123-126D. “William Bell 
Frue’s Correspondence when [he was] Superintendent of the Silver Islet Mine”. Thunder Bay Historical 
Museum Society.
 
B 25 Silver Islet Mining Company fonds. Copy in the author’s possession. The Canadian 
Pacific Railway Company correspondence and fee schedules for contract physicians. Archives of Ontario. 
MV7170, MV7169, CPR-Surgical fees Schedule 1905 and 1912, 1913. “Rhymes of the Miner; An Anthology 
of Canadian Mining Verse. Ed. E.L. Chicanot. Gardenvale, P.Q. Federal Publications Limited. 1937. Byrne, 
J.J. Autobiography of J.J. Byrne. Toronto. T.H. Best Printing. 1971. 
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were initially envisioned, later reconstructed and ultimately changed over four and a half 
decades.  
Information for the Annual Reports of the Bureau of Mines was accumulated by the 
Bureau’s Inspectors during the January to December calendar year, commencing in 1891. 
The facts and figures were reviewed then shaped to address political and ideological 
concerns, before being published the following spring. The size and focus of each report 
reflected changes in activities, growth and government perceptions.
66
 The underlying 
architecture of these records, singly and collectively, contributed to the public’s 
understanding of the industry and of the men who worked in it. Bruce Curtis captured this 
type of governance in his analysis of census materials: 
… the most consistently executed census of population depends on a particular imaginary 
of human beings in virtual time and space. It disciplines empirical social relations in order 
to capture them in the confines of its grid.
67
 
 
For the purposes of this study, the mining data of the province are seen as constituting an 
annual “census” of one sector, resource extraction industries. Ultimately, the archives 
reveal that bureaucratic perceptions of the men who toiled in the mines informed the 
“empirical social relations” of the work sites as well as popular understandings. 
The Bureau’s records are candid in places. Government inspectors created and 
sustained public perceptions of miners as careless, reckless and witless. This is not offered 
as criticism but as a recognition of the effects of copying verbatim, British legislation 
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 The first Annual Report from 1892 (referencing 1891) was a modest 272 pages. By 1897 it was almost 500 
pages; in 1905 it was 938 pages and in 1927 it was 1100 pages. The sizes of the reports reflected not only 
growth in mining but also the kinds of data the province wanted collected.  
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 Curtis. B. The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875. 
Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 2000. p.14. The results of the state’s assumptions as they related to 
specific segments of the population was also seen in health matters as revealed in the works of Michael Bliss 
in Plague, A Story of Smallpox in Montreal. Toronto. Harper Collins. 1991 and Geoffrey Bilson’s A 
Darkened House, Cholera in Nineteenth Century Canada, 1832-1871. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 
1980. In these cases the governments supported claims that cholera and smallpox victims likely led immoral 
or dissipated lives and that their afflictions were divinely inspired retribution. 
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concerning coal mining and coal miners. An example from October 30, 1900 illustrates 
this.  
A miner, named John Bishop, suffered a broken leg below the knee. The accident 
was investigated, reviewed and analyzed by an Inspector as follows: 
The injury was caused while working in the pit of [the Helen Iron Mine]. A lump of ore, 
which his companions above were dislodging, [rolled] down the side of the pit and [struck 
Bishop] in the leg…. The men shouted a warning to Bishop, but he ran the wrong way and 
towards instead of away from the rock. He had full knowledge of what was being done in 
the pit … and paid too little heed when the cry came, so that no one was to blame but 
himself.
68
 
 
This commentary discloses a prevailing bias against the worker. Remarks like this were 
commonplace and the ensuing “verdicts” all but inevitable. The presumptions behind the 
language were meaningful. They suggested that blame could not be assigned because the 
circumstances were prima facie “accidental.” Add to that the legal precedent of “assumed 
risk” and miners were all but guaranteed to be found69 complicit in, whatever 
circumstances they met. The conditions of the mines were rarely challenged because “risk” 
was immanent. Therefore the disorientation of sounds – and alarms more broadly – in mine 
environments was not taken into Bishop’s account. (Did his co-workers speak the same 
language? Why would he run in the direction he did? None of these questions was asked.) 
Declaring that “no one was to blame but himself” assigned exclusive liability, and all of the 
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 Report of the Bureau of Mines 1901.Toronto. L.K. Cameron. 1901. p.47. 
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 Although miners are the focus of this study, the concept of “assumed risk” applied to labour generally. 
Judicial decisions citing assumed risk on the part of workers are evident in manufacturing and transportation 
record also. See Fudge, J. and Tucker, E. Labour Before the Law. The Regulation of Workers’ Collective 
Action in Canada 1900-1948. Don Mills. Oxford University Press. 2001. Chapter two: “Courts and 
Conciliation” pp. 16 – 50. 
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attendant financial problems, to Bishop. That, in turn, absolved the employer of any 
obligation to provide redress or support.
70
  
What the statistical record failed to reveal, however, was why the government opted to 
include some categories while omitting others. The ethnicity or nationality of each miner 
killed on the job was determined by native language. This classification was made despite 
the fact that English-speakers were the only bloc that died in greater-than-average numbers. 
There appears to be a intention to make ethnicity important in death tolls regardless of the 
predominance of fatalities among English speakers. Similarly, the Bureau distinguished 
statistically between deaths occasioned “above ground” and “below ground”. It is 
speculated that deaths at the surface were understood to be “industrial accidents” whereas 
those underground were more properly “mining accidents.” The Annual Reports never 
identify any causal factors or distinctions for separating them in this fashion.  
 On January 1, 1914, the newly created WCB took responsibility for investigating 
and recording a broad range of workplace accidents and fatalities. The case files of these 
incidents and the findings of Bureau staff were not available during my research although 
their Annual Reports were. The contents of the reports contain accounts of sometimes 
gruesome, accidents and fatalities as well as statistical summaries. While that information 
provides a great source for historians to study in order to determine the range of perils 
workers faced, the summaries were not exclusive to mining. More importantly, for the 
purposes of my analyses, the WCB did not configure its findings in ways that accorded 
with those previously established by the Bureau of Mines inspectors. Therefore, I decided 
not to use their summaries here. To do so would have complicated and confused the 
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 In the 1890s there was little or no consideration given to chronic health conditions. The legislation and 
regulations were focused on singular, acute incidents, not health matters related to long term exposures to 
toxins or accumulations of airborne particulates like those now associated with “miner’s lung”.  
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analysis I was making. When these data become available more appropriate comparisons 
will be possible.  
The records of the Meredith Commission (1912) provided a background for the 
enactment of workmen’s compensation legislation that took effect January 1, 1915. The 
Commission – dedicated to revisioning Ontario’s mechanism for addressing workplace 
injuries and deaths – held a hearing in Cobalt in December 1911, to hear about issues of 
miners’ health and safety. The Commission acknowledged mining to be a “hazardous 
occupation” which prompted a suggestion that it might need separate consideration from all 
other Ontario industries.
71
 Occupationally specific health conditions were also a deep 
concern made complex by questioning how to adjudicate responsibility for the source of 
chronic health problems.
72
 Of the twenty-seven sittings of the Meredith Commission, only 
three were held outside of Toronto: the fact that one of these was held in the north signified 
the importance of health and healthcare that surrounded the mining industry. The Bureau of 
Mines Reports and the Meredith Commission provide a window on the persistent dangers 
miners faced and the impact of new technology on mine safety.  
As I began research for this dissertation I hoped that the archives would yield first-
hand accounts of miners. This was, unfortunately, never realized to any significant degree. 
Only an occasional letter or anecdote
73
 offered insights into the thoughts of the workmen. 
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 Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Minutes of Evidence; third sitting, Cobalt Miners, Dec. 14, 1911. 
p.179. 
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 Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Minutes of Evidence; third sitting, Cobalt Miners, Dec. 14, 1911. 
p.195-196. The argument was that it was too hard to determine at which facility a transient miner might have 
contracted a work-related disease if the “… man works two months and then leaves and works somewhere 
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 We Lived a Life and then Some; The Life, Death and Life of a Mining Town by Charlie Angus and Britt 
Griffin. Toronto. Between the Lines. 1997 is the type of source that cites miners’ perspectives but no 
extensive private diaries or detailed accounts of men who lived and worked in Ontario’s mining communities 
came to light. The authors tell readers: “Only through the stories and local lore can one address the intangible 
dimensions of what makes a community endure.” (p.2.)  
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Their lack of literacy, coupled with long hours and lack of access to writing instruments 
and postal services explain why little documentary evidence survives.
74
 A further constraint 
involved heavy ethnic concentrations at specific sites. I found that the diverse ethnic 
backgrounds of the men working at resource extraction meant that personal records in 
English were seldom a priority. Arthur Lower observed: “While naturally [frontier 
workers] are rough and scarcely more than literate, they are by no means stupid or dull.”75 
The paucity of first-hand accounts meant by resource workers meant that I had to rely 
primarily on newspaper accounts, published poems and popular songs to hear the men’s 
voices. As Lower suggested:  
… there are many degrees of "hardness" and if a man can make a living in the southern 
Canadian Shield, there is no reason why he should deteriorate to any very great extent, for 
the country is an extremely healthy one and the climate is not particularly harsh. A severe 
environment may have merely the result of limiting numbers.
76
 
 
This is the proverbial silver lining of the hardrock miners’ environment. 
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 Lack of access refers to postal services which had to be negotiated and paid for by the members of each 
camp. It often proved to be contentious as workers did not want to take a day of their time to walk to a town 
to mail a letter or pickup something. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
Early Mining Strategies:  
Thawing Dynamite and Blasting Ahead 
 
(1890 – 1904) 
 
Introduction 
 Between 1890 and 1904, Ontario’s northern resource frontier developed 
dramatically, as mining and lumbering companies sought to explore the region’s abundant 
natural wealth. One source of such wealth came from metalliferous or hardrock mining of 
precious metals and minerals.
1
 This term is used throughout this dissertation to distinguish 
the mining of precious metals and minerals from hardrock the coal-mining practices that 
were common in British Columbia, Nova Scotia, South Africa, England and Spain. This 
chapter examines the mining economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in order to understand the workplace dangers miners faced, the medical services available, 
and the nature of occupational masculinity that emerged in the early years of Ontario 
mining. To explore these themes, the chapter first explores the evolution of the mining 
industry between 1890 and 1904 and the legislation that governed it.  
 
Mining in Ontario’s Resource Frontier 
After Confederation, Ontario’s politicians and civil servants focused on attracting 
capital and the business interests of Anglo-Canadians and Americans to exploit the natural 
resources of the northern region, which included all the land west to Keewatin and north to 
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The most valuable metals were gold and silver but there was also a great deal of copper, cobalt, iron, nickel, 
molybdenum being mined. Minerals like corundum, magnetite, calcite, labradorite, analcite, mica, and 
hornblende, among a host of others, were also taken from the ground but for more limited applications than 
the heavier metals. 
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James and Hudson Bays.
2
 The 1885 Boundary Dispute substantially increased the 
geographic area that comprised Ontario’s north. Businessmen assembled the money, the 
men and the materials to harvest lumber, metals and minerals as well as to construct the 
(road, rail and water) transportation routes that were coincident with these interests.
3
 From 
corporate headquarters – usually in Toronto – companies introduced methodologies and 
technologies that delivered profits as quickly and as cheaply as possible.
4
 Business owners 
realized that government legislation facilitated the exploitation of raw materials as the CPR 
noted in its 1899 promotional pamphlet, The Goldfields of New Ontario: 
The [Ontario] Mining Laws are remarkably liberal and give every opportunity for the 
development of legitimate mining enterprises, being favorable both to the small operator 
and the capitalist and any amendments likely to be made to [the laws] are sure to be in the 
direction of greater liberality. Any person may explore for minerals on any Crown lands 
and previously staked out or marked or otherwise occupied and not withdrawn by Order-in-
Council.
5
 
 
 The young government, overseer of a seemingly unlimited repository of ores, 
enacted legislation, licensed prospectors, certified corporations, prescribed minimum 
operating standards and levied taxes in an attempt to develop and expand the industry 
further. Legislation governing mining in Upper Canada/Canada West began with The Gold 
Mine Act of 1864 and it went through various incarnations and permutations each year until 
the General Mining Act of 1869 was passed to encompass all mining activities in the 
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 H.V. Nelles has captured the spirit of province’s efforts to administrate the natural resources as well as their 
relationship to business interests in The Politics of Development; Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in 
Ontario1849-1941. Toronto. Macmillan of Canada. 1974. Chapter one: “The Frontier of Monarchy” is 
particularly helpful in understanding how mining interests were addressed and accommodated by early 
provincial governments. See pp.1-47.  
3
 The Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines for 1900 begins with a comparison of the capitalization of Joint 
Stock Companies since Confederation. For the first twenty-five years (1868-1893) the combined 
capitalization of all these enterprises totalled about $47 million. In 1899 alone it almost reached $97million. 
Report of the Bureau of Mines 1900. p.5. 
4
 The 1895 Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines legislated the introduction of diamond drills in order to 
accelerate the recovery of ores that were being located in ever-deeper veins.. See pages 172 – 174 passim.  
5
 The Gold fields of New Ontario [microform] comprising the Lake of the Woods, Rainy Lake, Seine River, 
the Manitou and Michipicoten districts: reached only by the Canadian Pacific Railway (1899). Canadian 
Pacific Railway. March 1899.  
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province rather than separate pieces of legislation for individual precious metals. By this 
point the Bureau of Mines was located within the Department of Crown Lands.
6
 The laws, 
regulations and rules that were enacted in these years were largely copied from long-
practiced, legally tested and codified, British mining legislation.
7
 As the Second Annual 
Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines admitted: 
The fourth part of the [Ontario Mines] Act [1892] is chiefly designed to provide for the 
health and well-being of miners through a proper and careful observance of regulations for 
the working and management of mines; but as these follow pretty closely the British 
Mining Regulations any enumeration of their features would be superfluous here.
8
 
 
Despite high-minded intentions, government officials did not anticipate the need for 
overseeing the companies in detail.
9
 The 1892 Bureau of Mines Report concluded  
The [Chief Mines] Inspector, whose duty it is to look after their enforcement, finds that 
owners and officers of mines are with rare exceptions desirous of doing liberally all that the 
regulations require, and it does not appear that the employed classes have a grievance under 
them for which legislation could effect a cure.
10
 
 
Indeed it was often easy for the government to ignore labour conflict in hardrock mining 
because with no miners’ union to represent them until late in 1905, unhappy workers voted 
with their feet. Complaints were individual rather than collective.
11
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 See Smith, P. Harvest from the Rock. p.92. “The bureau [of mines] was made part of the Department of 
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8
 Second Report of the Bureau of Mines 1892. p.229. 
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 Initially, Ontario’s first comprehensive Mine Act provided for only four mine inspectors based in Toronto 
and their mandate was vague. 
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 Second Report of the Bureau of Mines 1892. p.229. 
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 See the “Introduction” to Labouring Lives, Work and Workers in Nineteenth Century Ontario. ed. Paul 
Craven. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1995. Craven acknowledges that labour was alienated from the 
means of production. (p.5.) but it was more than that. Because of the remoteness of the mines, the hours of 
work, and the numbers of immigrants in the industry, early miners were also disenfranchised. They did not 
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With government and businesses both eager to develop the resource base, 
metalliferous mines dotted the landscape of frontier Ontario by 1904. For the most part, 
they were situated in out-of-the-way locations: they were difficult to access, had minimal 
services, and offered austere living conditions. For example, the map below depicts the 
Harold Lake Gold Mine west of Fort William/Port Arthur (present day Thunder Bay). 
 
Figure 2.2.  An 1899 map of New Ontario
12
 
                       Bonheur Station     
    Harold Lake 
It was typical of where a precious metal mine was found at the time. To get to Harold Lake 
a miner had to travel from the Lakehead of Lake Superior (a trial to reach on its own) to 
Bonheur Station,
13
 about one hundred fifty kilometers by rail. This leg was direct and 
uneventful, especially in summertime. There were, however, no tracks running south from 
Bonheur, and the Harold Lake camp was still a challenging, fifty kilometers distant. 
                                                                                                                                                    
have a voice in the government. Similarly, Germinal, the novel by Emile Zola, describes the tensions between 
mine workers and owners in Europe.   
12
 The Gold fields of New Ontario [microform] comprising the Lake of the Woods, Rainy Lake, Seine River, 
the Manitou and Michipicoten districts: reached only by the Canadian Pacific Railway (1899). Canadian 
Pacific Railway. March 1899. Library and Archives Canada. RG299.  
13
 Bonheur Station no longer exists. It was about twenty kilometers east of present day Ignace, midway 
between Thunder Bay and Kenora, then called Fort William/Port Arthur and Rat Portage respectively. 
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Insects, heavy bush, bogs, hills, crags and waterways had to be negotiated and, depending 
on the season, the trek could take between three and five days on foot.  
Mines established at Rat Portage (present day Kenora) and Rainy River were 
especially remote. This was equally true of myriad other mine sites that were set up in 
long-forgotten places like New Klondike, Scotty Springs, Whitewood Grove, Heaslip and 
Judge, to name but a few.
14
 Figure 2.1 reveals the frequency and regularity of “whistle-
stops” along the CPR line. Each station maintained a tenuous connection, directly or 
indirectly, to resource exploitation. They processed ore samples, handled supplies, 
provisioned men, and offered respite. In addition to the claim at Harold Lake, which was of 
comparatively modest proportions, three other, significantly larger “Gold Fields” are 
identified: Wabigoon, Rainy River, and Rat Portage. Other maps reveal similar findings 
across the eastern portions of what was called “New Ontario.” Dobie, Boston Creek, Larder 
Lake, South Lorraine, Bessemer, Silver Islet, and dozens of others, featured the same types 
of seclusion and inaccessibility.
15
 Until and unless a mine became profitable on a 
sustaining basis, there were few families, amenities, or comforts available. Sudbury and 
Timmins were exceptions to the rule. Production at these camps and others, like Kirkland 
Lake, Cobalt and Elliot Lake, eventually brought about municipal incorporation and 
thereafter access to federal, provincial and municipal representation and services.  
The absence of Confederation roads, corduroy roads,
16
 or rail spurs meant that all 
equipment and supplies had to be dragged in on sleds, suspended on tump-lines or carried 
on back-packs. Materials (drills, explosives, construction items etc.) and food supplies were 
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 Taylor, B. Place Names of Temiskaming. New Liskeard. White Mountain Publications. 2000.  
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 For a detailed look at mining sites in late nineteenth century Ontario see Gentilcore, R.L. Ontario’s History 
in Maps. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1984. passim. 
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 Corduroy roads were usually little more than trails that used a foundation of logs fixed transversely in 
place. They had a characteristic rib and swale profile which earned them the “corduroy” moniker. 
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heavy and awkward, and added additional days to the trip. The men employed by fledgling 
companies were usually paid for the time it took them to walk in (three days maximum 
unless otherwise agreed) but not for their time to walk out if they quit.
17
  
Weather conditions complicated matters. It is not enough to simply identify mine 
locations on old maps to understand their isolation. Indeed, during heavy snowfalls and 
spring flooding, remote mines were completely cut-off; there was no chance of getting in or 
out regardless of the emergency.  
Northern Ontario camps, whether for mining, lumbering, canalling or railway 
construction, shared common characteristics: small populations
18
; geographic settings that 
were removed from major transportation arteries; a fluid workforce; limited or no political 
organization or representation; usually a single industry that was controlled by outside 
interests; and a community of mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds. While it was common 
for particular camps to be dominated by one ethnic group – Russians, Poles, Spaniards, 
Italians – none comprised an overall majority in the mining industry.19  
 
Health, Illness and Injury in Northern Hardrock Mining   
The early years of exploration and the rapid expansion of Northern Ontario’s 
hardrock mining industry meant that working men faced a range of health risks and 
injuries. The harsh physical environment posed physical risks for men simply trying to get 
to the mine sites. Travelling through the remote districts of Northern Ontario, the men were 
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 Business prospectuses and advertising listed labour rates at $1.75 to $2.25 and board per day for miners; 
labourers $1.75 and wood-choppers ninety cents to $1.10. The Harold Lake Gold Mines Company Limited 
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 For more on frontier settlements and their compositions see Tronrud, T.J. “Frontier Social Structure: The 
Canadian Lakehead, 1871 and 1881.” Ontario History.  Vol. LXXIX. Number 2. June 1987. pp.145 – 165. 
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challenged by a range of often dangerous conditions: freezing, getting lost, being attacked 
by wildlife or other men, fatal falls, insect bites, poisonous plants, giardia, broken bones, 
drowning and lacerations.
 20
  Documenting the frequency with which men died or were 
seriously injured by these factors is difficult. None of the government’s annual reports 
referred to lost or missing men, though there is little doubt that getting to mine sites posed 
serious health risks: the landscape was as immense as it was disorienting. Mining and 
logging companies were sometimes alerted to unexplained disappearances when wives 
inquired after the whereabouts of missing spouses. For example, in May of 1890 Mrs. Jos. 
Boivine wrote to the Gillies Brothers work camp saying: “Last week I received the sum of 
$8.00 only. But my husband told me that I was to get $10.00 a month. Where is he? Will 
you kindly let me know about his pay for I can’t do with any less than $10.00 each 
month.”21 Later that season Mrs. Jess Shane wrote the company with a similar request: “i 
now rite to let you no that i received your twenty dollars on my husbent's account on the 
twenty 5 of July and he is not come here i remain your frind  mrs Jessey Shane.”22 
There was in fact little information for company officials, or the fledgling Bureau of 
Mines, to evaluate to determine if a missing man had walked off the job of his own 
volition, died of natural causes in the wilderness, was murdered by a co-worker, or got lost 
and perished accidentally.
23
 As late as 1911, the coroner’s office was reporting on such 
accidents. When Donald McCrae died returning to camp:  
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 See “The Jam on Gerry’s Rock” a lumberjack song. It is reproduced in Maude Groom’s The Melted Years. 
Temiskaming Printing Company. New Liskeard. 1971. Although folkloric it accurately indicates how 
common such fatalities were. In this instance “six fine youths” and their foreman were swept away when a 
logjam suddenly released. 
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 Archives of Ontario F150-12-1-11 
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Ontario. Accession #RG4-32 File 1912 #40 
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… McCrae's dead body was found ... some 5 mi North of Tug Point on Rainy Lake on the morning 
of Dec. 27th, 1911. McCrae in company with two other men had started for a logging camp north of 
Rainy Lake. Reaching the Cherry Island stopping place some 16 mi N. of H. F. the two decided to 
remain while McCrae kept right on, saying that he could reach the Cascades stopping place that 
night. He traveled only some 5 mi farther when apparently he became exhausted. An empty 
whisky(sic) bottle was the only belonging found. He was quite insufficiently clothed. There were 
no marks of violence and the Conclusion upon view is that he died from exposure while asleep 
during the night of December 26th. (The body was not entirely stiff when found on A.M. of Dec. 
27th so he had not been dead long before he was found.) No jury was convened.” 
 
Once miners arrived at the work site they faced primitive living conditions.  
Housing at mine sites always began with tents, then shanties, then rough cabins. 
Eventually, if the mine was profitable, rail cars, wooden dwellings, or an amalgam of any 
or all of these kinds of shelter were introduced. By 1905, only Sudbury and Timmins were 
constituted as significant municipalities in the north with basic services and building and 
health codes. Almost all other mine sites were basically “sleep camps”. They provided the 
barest creature comforts needed to attract or retain a workforce. Angus Bell, who worked in 
mining and logging camps during the late nineteenth century, described the methods by 
which rudimentary accommodations were built. He explained that at the outset, the men 
lived in tents while trees were felled and logs were hewed. The craftsmanship was rarely 
expert.  
[In January 1900, near Rainy River] I was sent along with Billy Jack to build a fire outside 
to heat water and mix up clay to plaster the chinks between the rows of logs that formed the 
walls of the camps and [a] lot of this clay promptly froze and crumbled off. But no one 
worried much about that.
24
 
 
At these sites the accommodations were cold, crowded, and smelly. The bunks of 
miners and shantymen were referred to as “muzzle-loaders” because the men slept 
perpendicular to the walls.
25
 This style of construction gave rise to uncorroborated stories 
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of men’s hair, or socks, being frozen fast to log walls on frigid winter mornings.26 Living 
conditions were hard. Doug Baldwin’s study of silver miners notes “… lodgers were 
sometimes forced to sleep in eight hour shifts”27 or else they might not find any sleeping 
accommodations at all. Miners often slept in their clothes, which were dirty and sweaty, on 
mattresses that were rarely, if ever, laundered. Pine bough mattresses, of the kind found in 
lumber camps, were likely to be infested with insects. Shanties and cambooses – which 
featured unreliable doors and open roofs – were shared with rodents like chipmunks, 
squirrels, mice, voles, and rats.
28
  
Decent hygiene was also difficult to find, despite the men’s best efforts. Angus Bell 
recalled building outhouses near their camp but admitted that: 
… no one ever spent much time [in] it. For one thing in summer the flies took unfair 
advantage of one and in the winter it was too cold. In that case [when there was no “small 
building”] you just took off into the bush on any one of several main trails, then branched 
off on your own. The distance you went before you branched off depended on the urgency 
of the trip.
29
 
 
Hygiene was not limited to toileting facilities or to living conditions. The men shared 
freshwater supplies with animals and with other men. If located downstream from another 
camp then contamination of water supplies from bacteria like gardia was possible, perhaps 
likely. Given these realities outside and inside miners’ housing, it was not surprising that 
infectious diseases were hard to contain. Outbreaks of diphtheria, smallpox and 
tuberculosis (commonly referred to as phthisis) spread quickly. Crowded living conditions, 
like those shown in the image, facilitated the contagions more than the worksites, which 
were not nearly so densely populated. 
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Figure 3.2 This unidentified camboose is typical of an early work camp with an open roof, crowded 
seating and a large fire at the centre. 
30
 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to know if miners contracted these diseases more frequently than 
workers living elsewhere in Ontario. When the miners did get sick, however, they lacked 
the attendance of family, friends or even paid attendants to care for them. If a miner fell ill, 
everyone else went off to work. Thus recovering from even common infectious diseases 
was made more difficult.
31
 At the first appearance of smallpox, for example, men fled the 
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 First Annual Report, Provincial Board of Health (1882) contains the following letter to local doctors: 
Dear Doctor, -  
The Board has directed me to send you a copy of a circular about to be addressed to the Clerks of 
Municipalities and to request you to use your influence to obtain a prompt and careful consideration of its 
contents, and such action upon it as you think may be secured. 
The Board counts largely upon the cooperation of medical men in advocating, and interesting the 
people in such sanitary reforms and systematic action as will tend to lessen the death and sickness rates, and 
as a consequence, the misery and poverty in the Province. 
 
Trusting that you will oblige the Board by a hearty response, 
                  I have the honour to be, 
                         Yours truly, 
                                 Peter H. Bryce, Secretary 
The Board of Health focused its attention on urban areas and recruited doctors to act as Health Inspectors 
when circumstances required. It was not until about 1905 that Health Inspectors were credentialed separately.  
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sites without warning but unknowingly took the infection with them and spread the disease 
among others. Due to the remoteness of the camps quarantines were next to impossible to 
police effectively. The Provincial Board of Health had been appointing local health 
inspectors since 1882, but these officials focused on urban areas far more than remote rural 
work sites.  
For miners living in camps, poor nutrition did not seem to be a particular problem. 
Good food in abundant quantities was integral to keeping a remote workforce intact.
32
 
Angus Bell deals with cooking and dietary information on page one of his unpublished 
memoirs. He remembers the pancakes, oatmeal porridge, toast, soups, roasts of beef, 
vegetables and “evaporated apple pie” even before he deals with the location and names of 
the companies or any of his co-workers.
33
 Alcohol, though, might jeopardize a miner’s 
health. Despite legislation to the contrary, there were always a large number of illegal 
drinking establishments at or near the camps. They were called “blind pigs” and offered 
homemade alcoholic drinks.
34
 While drink clearly offered psychological relief – and was 
often used for medicinal purposes – alcohol was also responsible or present when violent 
altercations erupted. For men living in remote regions of the north, drink sometimes 
provoked tragedy in innocent circumstances. “On July 22, 1894 Rory McDonald of 
Vankleek Hill, Ontario died on the CAR line, two miles east of Maxville (north of Ottawa). 
His body was strewn along the tracks. He and a friend had been imbibing freely … and 
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stretched out beside the tracks for a nap. It was believed that while sleeping, McDonald 
rolled onto the rails. He left a widow and four children.”35 
But it was the work itself that posed the greatest risks to men’s health. Some of 
these occupational health problems manifested in relatively minor strains, and soreness. For 
example when the camp doctor arrived at a camp near Sudbury a passel of patients with a 
litany of complaints assembled quickly: 
As soon as a working gang saw the doctor’s rig coming, down went axe, pick and shovel 
and all made a bee-line for the doctor; their needs were numerous and urgent. Belladonna 
plasters were most popular; they were always in demand for [a] sore back, sore side or sore 
chest. They stuck them on like undervests. The plasters were grateful and comforting in 
cold weather..
36
   
 
At other times the injuries were significantly more severe and led to death or debilitation.  
Table 2 presents data compiled from the Ontario Bureau of Mines “Annual Reports”. 
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Table 2.1: Schedule of Ontario Mining  
Accidents & Deaths 1892 – 190437 
 
Year 
Accidents 
Slight/Serious  
Annual 
Deaths 
Cumulative 
Totals 
        
1892  - - 5 5 
1893  13 3 8 
1894  7 7 15 
1895  14 2 17 
1896  2 3 20 
1897  21 1 21 
1898  10 5 26 
1899  11 14 40 
1900  14 17 57 
1901  30 13 70 
1902  12 10 80 
1903  16 7 87 
1904  4 7 94 
                     Slight/Serious    154 
The chart indicates that it was not until 1899 that the annual death toll reached double 
digits. Statistically, over the first thirteen years the Mine Act was in place, deaths averaged 
out to about seven per year: approximately one every two months. Miners were usually 
killed singly or in pairs; it was rare for one accident to claim multiple lives. Whenever such 
an event did occur, it was considered alarming.
38
 Statistical evidence of specific injuries 
suggest under-reporting because the Bureau of Mines was not always clear as to what was 
included. Nonetheless, the qualitative evidence presented in the annual Bureau of Mines 
reports reveals that miners faced five kinds of life-threatening workplace hazards. 
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The first related to general conditions inside the mines. It was dark, wet, cold, 
dangerous, cramped, and noisy. For example, at the Shakespeare Mine in August 1904: “… 
six men lost their lives … by asphyxiation or poisoning or both, from inhaling the “smoke” 
or gases, in the underground workings, resulting from a previous blast of dynamite.”39 In 
mid-March, 1898 a veteran miner named John Dunphy fell forty-five feet down the main 
shaft at the Mikado mine. He was left in complete darkness following a blast and had no 
matches with him. The fall kept him off work for six weeks.
40
 At the same mine, on July 
12, 1900, the Bureau of Mines noted that John McGuire: 
“… was seriously hurt … in the act of driving in a spike, about 18 inches from the mouth of 
the winze leading to the next level below, his foot slipped and he fell down some 50 feet in 
the winze, breaking his arm and sustaining a compound fracture of the leg.
41
 
 
McGuire was off work for months. And at the Foley gold mine in May of 1896 August 
Johnson suffered severe injuries after falling seventy-five feet, off a ladder, at the Foley 
mine shaft. “His skull was fractured, his head otherwise badly cut and his left leg broken 
just below the hip joint.”42 The myriad risks that attended mining environments were ever-
present. 
Mine lighting, as previously mentioned, was by candles which were affixed to 
workers’ hats or set on small ledges in the rock walls using a piece of clay, or held by bent 
wire-holders with sharp hooks at the end.
43
 Lighting was shadowy at best and if the candle 
went out the miner was stranded in a palpable, unremitting and impenetrable darkness. 
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Figure 2.4 Helmet with Candle circa 1895.
44
 
            
The “helmet” pictured above offered little protection for a miner’s head. This particular 
version was several layers of canvas laminated together and covered with a heavy paint or 
tar, though others were made of cardboard or leather. The hats quickly softened through 
heat or sweat and they regularly caught fire. Although candles had proven inadequate and 
unsafe in mining operations, and despite the acknowledgement of mine inspectors in 1894, 
of a pressing need for efficient mine lighting, hand and hat-held candles persisted. The 
Bureau of Mines reported:  
The problem of illuminating [by electric lighting] underground workings on a large scale, 
either by a fixed light or temporarily for purposes of making [scaling] examinations has not 
yet come to the front in this province, for the reason that operations at any considerable 
depth are few in number. It would offer some difficulties, among which would be the 
smoke caused by blasting nearly always present in the atmosphere below ground when 
workings are continuously carried on; but if the development of the industry makes the 
progress which is hoped and looked for, mining companies and proprietors may find it 
necessary to give this matter their serious attention.”45 
 
Horse-operated windlasses and bellows-styled pumping systems remained common, less 
expensive, alternatives but they were also far less efficient than electrical devices. 
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In mine shafts, stopes, and drifts sounds are exaggerated. They echo off walls in 
ways that distort and disorient them from their source. Seeing or hearing something clearly 
beyond a couple of feet was difficult, sometimes impossible. Tools and machinery were 
raised and lowered by cables and pulleys that were scrabbled together according to the 
talents of the men and the materials at hand. Warning systems, if used at all, consisted of 
the most elementary call-and-response techniques – depending on the depth of the shaft – 
or by attaching bells to whatever was being moved. Rudimentary warning systems often 
failed: 
at the Evans mine on  the 26th of April [1892] which resulted in serious injury to Andrew 
Sorin an employe[sic] of the Canadian Copper Company. According to the statements of 
two fellow-workmen [Sorin] was engaged as a machine helper in sending machinery down 
the shaft being at the time on the fourth level and having heedlessly stepped out into the 
shaft the cage came down upon him. It was found that he was badly injured in the spine and 
upon the advice of his medical attendant he was sent to the hospital at Toronto for 
treatment. According to the statements of the men at work with him every necessary 
precaution was taken to prevent accident, and the usual necessary signals were given before 
the cage was lowered.
46
  
 
Entering and exiting a mine shaft took place via ladderways that were usually 
cobbled together from lumber felled at or near the camps. The quality of the conveyance 
relied entirely on the craftsmanship of the workers. There was no standard for constructing 
a ladder, nor was there any maintenance stipulated for them afterwards.
47
 Ladderways were 
invariably wet, muddy and, in winter the rungs near the surface would be covered with ice. 
Suspended by ropes; they were not necessarily secured to the shaft’s walls in order that 
they could be raised during blasting. Although the regulations prohibited underground 
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workers from ascending or descending the shaft by any other means, ladders could prove 
treacherous after a twelve-hour shift. For Axel Carlson, these conditions proved fatal: 
Axel Carlson, night foreman of the Sultana
48
 gold mine lost his life on 21 April, 1896. It 
was his practice to descend into the mine ahead of the gang of men of whom he was in 
charge, [to check for the presence of gases] and on this occasion when the latter climbed 
down the ladders at midnight to resume work they found Carlson lying at the bottom of the 
shaft with his neck broken and quite dead. No one was with him when the accident took 
place and there were no witnesses of the occurrence, but it is presumed that by a regrettable 
slip or mischance he missed his footing at some point in the last thirty feet of the ladderway 
and was precipitated to the bottom.
49
 
             
 
Figure 2.5 Photograph from Cobalt Mining Museum reproduced with permission. 
 
About six weeks later, on June 5
th
, 1896, at the same mine, Charles Westman also died as a 
result of a fall down the same shaft, allegedly for the same reason. After some negotiating, 
a coroner’s jury was convened,   
…which viewed the body and adjourned to the Sultana mine where the shaft was inspected 
and the evidence of the men taken who were present at the time the fatality occurred. The 
verdict of the jury was that Westman met his death through an accident caused by his own 
carelessness and that the management of the mine was in no way responsible.
50
 
 
                                                 
48
 The Sultana Gold Mine was west of Kenora in the Lake of the Woods district. 
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Given these risks, some miners preferred to hitch a ride in the bucket – also called the skip 
– rather than risk injury or death by falling from the ladder to the bottom of the shaft. 
Workers often learned, though, that riding in buckets was not always a safe alternative. 
James Teppet died on October 28
th
, 1898 after hitching a ride on the skip. Inspector Bow 
investigated the death on February 1, 1899. 
Golden Star Mine, October 28
th
, 1898: ... scene of a fatal accident: which befel(sic) a miner 
named James Teppet in consequence of his recklessness and disregard of the rules. [Teppet 
and two others tried to ascend from the bottom using the ore bucket rather than the 
ladderway.] Teppet was standing on the rim of the bucket which stopped on its way up and 
wishing to give the signal to proceed he released his hold, lost his footing and falling to the 
bottom met an instantaneous death. It affords another proof of the adage that "familiarity 
breeds contempt." In some occupations the constant presence of danger seems to lead to a 
foolhardiness and disregard of all precaution which men in less dangerous callings rarely 
show.
51
 
 
It was something of a dilemma for the miners: they risked falling to their deaths trying to 
scale ladders and they faced similar fates in the buckets.  
Snow, heat, humidity, wind and rain did not directly affect daily production below 
ground; conditions there were always cold and wet. The air temperature at the surface did 
not have any appreciable effects beyond the first eighty or one hundred feet of depth. The 
temperature underground was a constant 38ºF to 40ºF, marginally above the freezing 
point.
52
 Water seeped in continuously from the ceilings and walls making puddles 
unavoidable. The 1897 report of the Harold Lake Gold Mine noted: “Owing to the 
inadequate pumping machinery, several of [the] shafts have become filled with water; but 
no trouble is anticipated in keeping them clear, once [a] proper pumping plant is in 
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place.”53 This reconfirms the wet, working conditions and the trouble entailed in getting the 
necessary and sufficient amounts of technology into places where ores were present in 
quantity.
54
 In the absence of good pumps, miners worked in puddled and water-soaked 
drifts. This practice contributed to chronic disorders and ill-health as physicians attributed 
conditions like phthisis (tuberculosis), black-lung, and weak constitutions to prolonged 
exposure to this kind of work environment.
55
 
The clothing of the men offered only marginal protection from the damp and the 
cold. To stay warm, constant physical exertion was required. Bodily protection was the 
responsibility of each miner; no protective gear was provided by the company although 
items could be purchased through the company “store” on site. Candles, gloves, boots, 
jackets, and eyewear were all paid for by the miners.  
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  5lb.sledge                        drill bit 
Figure 2.6 This illustrates the physical limitations faced by miners using the hand-drilling technique 
underground. http://www.goldplacer.com/hardrockgold.htm 
 
The drill twisters wore heavy leather gloves, if they were available, but crushed fingers and 
broken bones were common because the lighting was poor and accurate drill strikes 
tenuous. The work itself was “backbreaking.” The shifts were long; each one lasted 
between ten and twelve hours, six days per week. 
In these conditions miners faced a second more specific kind of occupational 
hazard: working with dangerous explosives. Prior to the 1890s, “black powder” was used to 
blast rock and debris. In 1880 when Dynamite
56
 was first introduced it was commonly 
known as “giant powder,” Cheddite 65%, Driftite 70%, Forcite 75% or CIL-gel 85% 
represented a few of the other brand names used around Ontario.
57
 Most manufacturers 
relied on trinitrotoluene (TNT) as the active ingredient until gelignite appeared in the early 
twentieth century. Explosives’ manufacturers were not required to meet any independent or 
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uniform industry or government standard; so the quality, strength, stability and reliability 
of the various explosives and fuses remained individual and unpredictable. The 1912 
explosion at the Energite Explosives Company in Haileybury reminded everyone of the 
dangers explosions continued to pose.
58
  
  
 
Figure 2.7 A commercial dynamite thawer. Cartridges were inserted  
into the opening and warm water circulated around them. 
 
 At mining sites, preparing explosives for use presented significant dangers. 
Although there were commercial dynamite thawers available, like the one shown above, in 
Ontario’s mines many deaths, blindings, and disfigurements results from thawing 
explosives. Miners’ bodies became tools – they were the thawing mechanisms as men 
frequently tucked sticks of dynamite into their armpits or put frozen cartridges inside their 
clothing, down the front of their pants, along their belts and in their pockets. Even when 
such methods ‘worked’ miners experienced dreadful headaches that occurred when trace 
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amounts of the active ingredient were absorbed into the body dermally.
59
 It was also 
common for miners to put the wax-coated cartridges into pots of warm water and monitor 
the temperature by immersing their hands in the receptacle to test for “blood warmth” or 
temperature.
60
 The practice required the miner’s body to act as a temperature gauge. If the 
water was not hot enough the sticks took too long to thaw. If, however, the water got too 
hot, a spontaneous explosion would kill or maim the miner. Fred Dela Fosse lost a friend to 
this practice. 
He invited me to spend the evening with him in his shack in the hills beyond Silver 
Current. I was unable to go and it was just as well. Some nitro-glycerine which he was 
thawing out at the stove exploded and sent him and his shack into widely scattered portions 
of the adjoining townships.
61
 
 
Similarly on January 1, 1900 at the Sultana mine there was a spontaneous explosion of 
dynamite:  
… John Olson and Charles Tonstron were killed. They were engaged in thawing powder … 
where the powder box for that level was kept. By the sudden explosion of the dynamite 
they were instantly blown to pieces.
62
  
 
On July 21, 1900 at the Sultana mine, a premature explosion claimed the life of Adolph 
Hedlund. His co-worker, Anton Johnston, who suffered a few minor injuries 
… knew nothing about dynamite or thawing cans, but Hedlund did; however, the can 
appeared to be clean, Hedlund making some remark to that effect, and he had cut all but 
about two inches when on the stroke of the hammer the nitro-glycerine exploded and broke 
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the tin into fragments, one of which entered Hedlund’s neck severing the jugular vein and 
causing him to bleed to death in a few minutes.
63
 
 
And even in camp, as men prepared for work by thawing sufficient explosives for a shift, 
there were dangerous consequences to thawing the cartridges.  
On January 15, [1897] four men [Durahme, Potreau, Duchon and Drainville] working … at 
Sawbill lake
64
(sic) … were injured by an explosion of dynamite …. The men were 
preparing to thaw out some frozen dynamite in a can or thawer which had been used for the 
purpose before. It is thought that some nitro-glycerine(sic) had run out of the dynamite 
[and] into the sawdust at the bottom of the can when previously used, and when the 
supposedly empty vessel was placed on the fire to melt some ice which was adhering to the 
bottom, an explosion took place. Drainville and Durahme had each one leg broken while 
the other two were badly shaken up, cut and bruised. They were … placed in the hospital at 
Port Arthur.
65
 
 
They were lucky to have escaped relatively unscathed. Twelve years later, accidents of a 
similar nature were still populating the government’s reports and they were still considered 
“novel” rather than predictable and avoidable.66  
Once thawed, dynamite remained dangerous. On October 19, 1895 at the Copper 
Cliff mine: 
A drill-runner named James Gilchrist … drilled a hole in the stope … in which he placed 
nine sticks of dynamite. In the top stick he inserted the exploder and was stooping over the 
hole when a spark of fire, it is surmised from the miner’s lamp which was in his cap, 
dropped into the hole, which had not been tamped. … the explosion resulted seriously for 
Gilchrist. His head was badly cut by flying pieces of rock, his left arm broken above the 
elbow, two fingers of his left hand mangled, and his right arm dislocated.
67
 
 
On April 2, 1898 at a gold mine near Rainy River three miners were injured as a result of 
some unexploded dynamite in a hole spontaneously firing: 
… having broken a drill in a hole they charged the latter with dynamite for the purpose of 
throwing out the broken steel. This they succeeded in doing without blasting the rock. Then 
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they resumed drilling in the same hole … twenty minutes [later] an explosion occurred, the 
force of which took effect upon Smith ….68 
 
In this instance Smith’s hand had to be amputated and two nearby co-workers suffered cuts 
and lacerations that required medical attention. In the Big Master Mine, near Dryden, a 
March 1902 accident involved loose bits of unexploded material scattered among the muck. 
Two miners (Archibald and St. Armand) and a couple of helpers nearby were beginning to 
sort and remove some exploded rock and ore. 
While thus engaged Archibald’s pick struck and exploded some loose dynamite; the 
resulting injuries being: to Archibald, leg broken, two fingers blown off, face and eyes cut, 
and eyesight destroyed; to St. Armand, jaw broken, face and eyes injured; to Spear, face 
and one eye cut and bruised; to Robinson, hand and face bruised and cut but not seriously. 
How the loose dynamite came to be in the bottom of the shaft could not be ascertained.
69
 
 
Working with dynamite was challenging even for experienced miners. The Bureau of 
Mines investigations of incidents and fatalities involving explosives revealed an 
understanding that it was miner carelessness or risk-taking that compromised their health. 
In 1901 at the John Sykes gold mine, Joe Greenwood and Frank Potvin were killed and 
there were no witnesses. From “circumstantial” evidence, it was found that “… the only 
inference possible is that they were drilling in the bottom of an old hole … and that the 
drilling set [the charge] off.
70
   
  Falls of rock constituted a third cause of workplace injuries and fatalities. Without 
warning, slabs of rock would spontaneously release from a shaft wall or ceiling and claim 
an unsuspecting worker or more. On October 29, 1896 David McGregor died after “… a 
piece of rock fell upon him without warning, striking him in the back and killing him at 
once.”71 At the Radnor mine on the 29th of April, 1901, Peter Larmond died after “a mass 
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of rock … tumbled down the [entrance] slope. His injuries were very severe, both legs 
being broken and internal injuries inflicted, and they resulted in his death … 32 hours after 
the accident.”72 At the Blezard Mine in 1892 fatalities were deemed to be both unpredicted 
and unpredictable. The fact that the area had been “scaled” shortly before did not bring 
scaling practices into question.    
The place where the accident occurred was in the open daylight and from all the evidence 
obtained no one of the mining men who were working around spoke of it as a place of 
danger. The general manager of the company, Mr. Cameron, in company with Mr. 
McBride, the captain of the mine, spent some time in the open workings of the mine and in 
full view of the projecting work but a short time before the accident; they were there for the 
special purpose of looking over every part of the work, and were discussing plans for future 
operations…. They did not regard the place as dangerous and indeed were congratulating 
themselves upon the safe appearance of the mine.
73
 
 
The Mine Inspector’s determination was that this was an unknowable event, utterly beyond 
the responsibilities of management. The investigation concluded: 
In the evidence taken it was shown that when any projecting rock had the appearance of 
danger a man was lowered from the surface to test or remove the rock. This had been done 
repeatedly. After the [fatal] fall of the rock it could be seen that a seam or defect existed 
behind it, but it is by no means certain that it could have been discovered before. The 
presumption is that it could not have been seen, and that the defect was inherent.
74
 
 
The conclusion was that it was simple bad luck for the dead men, two of whom had young 
families. The government did not recognize the arbitrary nature and assignment of scaling. 
While the loss of life was serious enough to require a special investigation and to generate 
a “special report,” the conclusions simply acknowledged that mining was dangerous and 
that the dead men had accepted that understanding when they agreed to work there. 
Employing a de jure and de facto binary of this sort vitiated any consideration of 
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alternatives. Ultimately, it condemned miners to continue sustaining injuries and dying in 
numbers. 
Scaling was the term used for “sounding” (probing and testing) mine walls and 
ceilings for loose materials that might suddenly collapse on workers.
75
 It was supposed to 
be performed after every blast to insure the integrity of the surroundings. It was done with a 
heavy, eight-foot-long metal pole or pry bar which was thrust vigorously against the rock 
face. The sounds produced were distinctive, indicating if the rock was “solid” or “hollow”. 
Any hollowness needed to be probed further to expose and relieve potential threats. 
Nonetheless it was impossible to know the size or depth of a weakness in advance. 
Experienced miners could usually identify a problem and would attempt to correct it. 
However, scaling was regularly assigned to new men whose abilities were incommensurate 
with the importance of the task. The results could be tragic. The idiosyncratic nature of 
scalers’ techniques, and their varying degrees of thoroughness could translate into dire 
consequences for co-workers.  
Scaling the walls and ceilings was supposed to take care of the danger, yet it was 
not always effective. As the following stanzas indicate, the work of a scaler, though 
critically important to health and safety, was one of the least liked jobs underground. 
Again, there was no standardized training and the efficacy of the scaler relied on the 
experience of the individual performing the task. 
The Scaler
76
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For I’ve been a scaler, I’ve been thro’ the mill,  
And the job I have many times curst, 
I’ve had some punk jobs in the mining game, still 
I’m positive scaling’s the worst. 
 
Try making thing’s safe when you’re two shifts behind, 
With sour looks on Safety First’s dial 
And know that no matter how safe the roof sounds 
It will loosen up after a while. 
 
 
The work of a scaler is never complete, 
The shiftboss makes sure of the fact, 
Because he’s a scaler, it don’t mean a thing, 
For often he’s told to clean track. 
 
When captains are finished, they know they are done, 
As a job I would say it was fine, 
But if you are asked you can tell them the truth 
That scaling is the worst in the mine.  
                           W.H. Thomson 
Holding the worst job in the mine meant that scalers had to be particularly vigilant about 
the danger of falling rock. 
In addition to the dangers presented by wet, dark, and damp conditions, explosions, 
and rock falls, miners had to exercise caution around the moving parts of mining 
equipment. For example, in 1898 James Shortreed was killed when the loose clothing he 
wore was snagged by a spinning shaft. He had just repaired the machine’s main drive belt 
but when he jumped down; his shirt sleeve got caught in the drive shaft. Shortreed could 
not survive the fractures of his legs, his right arm and massive internal injuries. He died a 
week later.
77
 Railcars moving ore and equipment also proved dangerous. In 1898 
Alexander McKinnon was injured when struck by a “jimmy” ore car that weighed five 
tons. He was off work for three weeks.
78
 In 1900 at the Canadian Copper Mines, James 
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Beatty was killed when a railcar he was working on ran over his back. He and a co-worker 
were performing a relatively simple repair on the underside of a railcar when it was jolted 
by another which ran over him. He died twenty minutes later.
79
 At the Belmont mine in 
1902 four miners were involved in a fatal accident while riding to the surface in the ore 
bucket. As was their custom at the end of a shift, they used ladderways to climb from the 
400 foot level to the 300 foot level at which point they hitched a ride to the surface. During 
their ascent “… something went wrong with the hoist and the skip dropped …” Three of 
the men were thrown down the shaft, and one died.
80
   
Beyond the immediate physical injuries described above, miners were also exposed 
to chronic health problems that included silicosis and phthisis.
81
 Education superintendent 
J. B. Macdougall, who travelled widely across the north at the turn of the century noted: 
In the dust-filled air human forms are outlined against the rock wall ahead - grim, grizzled 
warriors of the underground, their faces streaked with honest sweat. They have given 
themselves as hostages to fate for the fine silica-dust finds a lodgement in the recesses of 
their lungs and they are doomed to an early grave.
82
 
 
Physical constitutions were eroded by the everyday conditions, stresses and 
demands of the work. It is likely that impaired hearing and vision also contributed to the 
high mortality rates among miners. When miners could not see or hear the danger, they 
suffered injuries. Overall the circumstances of mine work were hard and the very nature of 
mine work was deleterious to the health of the men in the industry. 
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Regulations, Health and Safety 
Clearly, then, mining in northern Ontario between 1890 and 1904 was a dangerous 
occupation. How did the newly constituted Bureau of Mines respond to the occupational 
hazards facing the mining workforce? The first Annual Report (1890) of the Mines 
Inspector specified that all mines employing more than six underground workers had to 
submit an annual statement summarizing the activities of the mine, including the number 
and ages of workers. The multi-fatality accident at the Blezard Mine in 1892 prompted the 
Bureau of Mines to conduct a special inquiry. Mining inspector, Arthur Slaght, provided a 
detailed description of the accident and deaths; it was published as a Special Report of the 
Bureau the same year. By 1895, the Annual Reports included tables listing the accidents 
and deaths, accompanied by textual descriptions of these events at each of the province’s 
mines. This data comprised part of a comprehensive statistical analysis of the industry, 
including the quantity and quality of skilled miners.
83
  
The data gathered focused the Bureau’s attention on the undesirable numbers of 
accidents and fatalities in the industry. As the 1901 Annual Report acknowledged: “The list 
of mining accidents occurring year by year continues to be longer than it ought to be in 
view of the number of working miners in the Province.”84 Tracking mining accidents was 
not always easy. The 1895 report acknowledged this when it explained that the legislation 
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and regulations did not apply to operations employing fewer than six men underground 
thus many accidents went unrecorded in the official statistics.
85
   
In gathering data, inspectors relied on local managers to record and report all 
accidents. The Mines Act (1892) required mine managers – those who worked at the mines 
as opposed to owners or administrators who lived “outside” in an urban setting – to file 
workplace accident reports. It was a mine inspector’s responsibility to coordinate a fatality 
inquiry, which included the following: viewing the body, interviewing witnesses, 
determining the cause of death, and assessing blame as he saw fit. The inspectors 
developed a taxonomy that fixed mining accidents into one of three categories: Fatal, 
Serious and Slight.
86
 It fell to the inspectors, individually, to judge which of the latter two 
categories was the most appropriate in any given situation. Thus lacerations, contusions, 
concussions, burns, falls, broken legs and arms, losses of limbs or digits, deafness, and 
blindness could be determined to be either ‘Serious’ or ‘Slight’. Blindness in both eyes was 
usually Serious, while blindness in one eye was, depending on the Inspector and 
circumstances, sometimes considered Slight. Once an injury was classified it was not 
upgraded or downgraded at any future time. For example, a broken leg, or crushed toes, 
might be categorized as “Slight” at the time the report was prepared: The subsequent 
appearance of infection, like gangrene, and a later amputation – secondary problems which 
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often accompanied bad bone injuries – did not alter the original finding and there is no 
record of cases being re-adjudicated and upgraded in the 1890-1904 years. The broad 
discretion of the inspectors led to great variances in interpreting both the severity of the 
accidents as well as their causes.  
Inspectors were asked to categorize “Causes of Accidents” which were reified into 
three broad headings. The first was “Unavoidable accidents that are inherent in the nature 
of the work.” The second was “Accidents due to carelessness, negligence or incompetence 
on the part of the management.” The third was “Accidents due to carelessness, negligence 
or incompetence on the part of the workmen.”87 These categories were used explicitly 
beginning in 1896, and they structured the inspector’s reports until 1908.  
A further complication inspectors faced was that they relied on mine managers to 
report injuries and deaths and to provide much of the evidence about accidents. What some 
managers considered an “accident” others ignored completely. Inspectors’ reports from the 
period reveal that few, if any managers, reported bumps, scrapes, bruises, burns, cuts, or 
muscle strains. As Eric Tucker’s analysis of employer liability has shown, the “assumption 
of risk” philosophy was widely believed to mean that the discomforts from bruises, strains, 
general aches, and even some broken bones were just “part of the job” and not accidents 
per se.
 88
 Early in the period, even fatalities were interpreted in a discretionary manner. If, 
for instance, a miner was killed aboveground by a falling tree, a spontaneous explosion, or 
being run over, it might not have been reported to the Bureau because it was not deemed to 
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be an accident immediately associated with “mining” operations. The 1895 Annual Report 
says:  
A case of this  sort was reported in the Toronto papers by which one Brearton lost his life 
and one McCarthy was seriously injured through a premature explosion of dynamite in a 
mining prospect just east of the town of Rat Portage [in November 1894].
89
 
  
In this instance, the deceased was deemed to be culpable in his own death saying, “… if 
blame was due to any one(sic) it was doubtless the unfortunate man who paid the penalty 
for his carelessness – if careless he were – with his life.”90 
As the Rat Portage example reveals, whether inspectors were called in or not, the 
Bureau of Mines often concluded that workers were responsible for their injuries. 
Management was rarely held accountable for leaving winzes and shafts unprotected and 
workmen vulnerable. The Bureau rarely blamed the conditions of work or management for 
these incidents. It was usually the inexperience, carelessness, or defiance of the workers 
that was identified as causal. Indeed, in 1899 Inspector Bow wrote: “In some occupations 
[like mining] the constant presence of danger seems to lead to a foolhardiness and 
disregard of all precaution, which men in less dangerous callings rarely show.”91 The 
Bureau regularly commented that no blame could be assigned or that the company was not 
to blame: “… the ladders were in no way defective, and that there was no blame to be 
attached to the owner of the mine or to those in charge of it ….”92  
Examples of this can be seen in how responsibility was assigned in some of the 
accidents previously cited. In the case of James Shortreed - killed when his clothing got 
caught up in the machine he was repairing - the mine inspector concluded:  
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There is little room to doubt that Shortreed’s own carelessness brought about his death. […] 
the loose sleeves of the unfortunate workman’s jacket were just what was needed to bring 
about an accident of this particular class, which is always severe and frequently fatal.
93
 
 
James Beatty – run over by a railcar he was repairing – was found to be the author 
of his own death for failing to use the “greatest caution” when undertaking such work.94 At 
the Belmont mine – where one died and three were injured when they fell from the bucket 
they were riding on – the victims were admonished for disobeying the rules and 
regulations, notwithstanding that it had been the custom and daily practice at the mine for 
some time.
95
  
The regulatory system began as one that anticipated deaths, but, in practice often 
concluded it was the employees who authored their misfortunes. The inevitable result was 
that most often the miners were found to be complicit in their deaths and injuries. In the 
introduction to the Mining Accidents report of 1901, the Chief Inspector wrote: “…how all 
safeguards are being enforced as strictly as possible so that in cases of accident the 
responsibility may rest elsewhere than on the management” and that it was time for the 
miners to “discard some of the carelessness” born of familiarity with danger.96 Except in 
the most egregious circumstances, there was an unwillingness to look beyond the miners 
when assessing the causes and assigning responsibility for accidents and deaths. 
The general ideas, public perceptions and prejudices that informed the judgements 
of mines inspectors reveal an ingrained bias against labour, in addition to clarifying how 
the province constructed the identity of miners. The common profile derived, at least in 
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part, from the “assumption of liability” doctrine that informed labour laws of the time.97 
Eric Tucker describes the effects of that legal philosophy as: “the people who suffer[ed] the 
harm [were] seen to be the authors of their own misfortune.” Because of their class, gender, 
and the type of work they performed, miners were constructed as careless, reckless and 
incorrigible. But this idea was not new or exclusive to Ontario. It was also found in other 
provinces and in American hardrock mines as well. As Larry Lankton discovered: 
[American mine inspectors] seldom if ever condemned any part of a mine or demanded that 
companies alter their practices. The mine inspectors did, however, do a thorough job of 
recording fatal accidents. They reported what had happened and summarized the verdict of 
any coroner’s jury impaneled to rule on the accident. Also, the mine inspectors affixed fault 
when possible. When they could point to negligence they invariably pointed to the victim. 
Meanwhile, in their annual summaries, the mine inspectors often commended the local 
companies for their fine safety record[s].
98
 
 
This attitude reflected an even broader understanding of miners being prone to, and 
complicit in, their injuries and deaths. Arguments put before the 1889 Royal Commission 
on the Relations of Labor and Capital in Canada, contended that machines, in and of 
themselves, were not inherently dangerous. They only became so in the hands of careless 
operators.
99
 In most cases, the zeitgeist in mining communities presumed corporate 
interests to be absent of responsibility with respect to the nature and frequency of fatalities 
and accidents. 
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Health Care 
Despite the tendency to understand workers as authors of their own injuries, the 
Ontario government enacted legislation requiring mining and resource companies to 
provide basic medical services to these isolated northern worksites.
 100
 The 1892 Mining 
Act mandated two elements of camp medicine. The first outlines the services camp doctors 
had to provide. 
1. The physician covenants and agrees to: i) visit the camp or camps of the employer as often as 
may be necessary to give adequate medical and surgical care and treatment to every 
employee; ii) render medical and surgical care and treatment to every employee; iii) report in 
writing to the Minister of Health once a month all cases of sickness and non-industrial 
accidents suffered by employees during the previous month, and iv) notify the Minister of 
Health in writing of the name and address of any other medical practitioner engaged to 
perform any services under this contract other than consultant services.  
 
The second outlines the financial relationships: 
 
2. The employer [the company] covenants and agrees to deduct from the wages or earnings of 
each employee the sum of $____ each month in respect of all employees who have worked 
during the month for the employers or his contractors or sub-contractors and to pay the total 
amount deducted without rebate or deduction to the physician within one month after the 
money is deducted, as provided for in the regulations.
101
  
 
The contracts were negotiated between the companies and the doctors, but funded by the 
workmen through a payroll deduction system also legislated by the province.  
Correspondence between Dr. C.A Duke and Gillies Brothers of eastern Ontario, 
illustrates how these negotiations were conducted with respect to lumber camps: 
Gentlemen, 
 
My plan is this, to have all your men working in the shanties here subscribe 25cts a month 
each and that I would take a trip to the shanties every month and give them all attendance 
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required and attend to all their sickness be it in the shanties or here in the Hospital without 
extra charge even if they should be sick for the whole month provided their 25cts is paid. I 
think this plan is very feasable(sic) as it is adopted by the C.P.R. and other Railway 
companies for their employees. I wrote to Mr. Branson & West and Klock and Co on the 
same subject and think that if you all agree to this plan the men won't do [sic]any 
objections. 
 
Need not to be said that time of subscription will begin to run on the day of their arrival 
here and that a man who does not remain at least 15 days in the month will not be called to 
pay for that month. 
Hoping you will take this plan into consideration and approve it.  
I remain, 
 
Yours truly, 
 C.A. Duke    M.D.
102
 
 
 This administrative system bound the doctors to the corporations rather than to the miners.  
According to historian Brian Hogan, “…the whole method of paying for doctors and care 
on a compulsory check-off system, but without much choice of medical personnel or 
supervision of financial expenditures, was irritating to [the miners] paying for the 
service.”103 Despite payment of the fees by the men, it was management, and management 
alone, that prepared the contracts and hired the physicians.  
 Companies in the remote north had limited choices from the supply of physicians 
available. Prior to 1900 the definition of a physician in Ontario was fluid.
104
 Over time 
Thomsonians, eclectics, homeopaths and allopaths had gradually united, trained, and been 
certified and licensed by the province.
105
 And while physicians eventually came together as 
one body in the Ontario Medical Association in 1880 the quality and quantity of certified 
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doctors remained uneven.
106
 Compared to urban centres, there were precious few doctors 
living in northern Ontario.
107
 Those who did had wide-ranging practices that covered miles 
and miles of back roads amid dense, almost impenetrable, forests. Contracts with mining 
companies constituted only part of their practices. 
Dr. Edwin Gimby provides one example of how physicians were secured by mining 
companies. He was born in 1859 in Derby Township in Canada West (near present day 
Owen Sound). He passed a High School Entrance exam in 1878 and matriculated in 1886. 
He immediately registered at the University of Toronto Medical School and with the 
provincial Medical Council, which was the official licensing body. He graduated in 1889. 
At the time, the rules required four consecutive years of study before a candidate could 
receive his provincial license. Yet, Gimby, with a wink and a nod from Uxbridge council, 
began practicing without a license. As his autobiography explained: 
I went to see the Registrar of the Medical Council. I tried to convince him that I should be 
allowed to write [my license exams], as I was registered before that regulation was passed. 
The only thing [the registrar] said he would do was to keep me from paying a fine. I 
thought that pretty good and thanked him He told me to locate in some out-of-the-way 
place where I wouldn't interfere much with Licensed doctors. I went to a small village 
thirty-five miles from Toronto, in the sand hills of Uxbridge Township. There was no 
doctor there.
108
 
 
Gimby practiced for a year – eventually fined fifty dollars for practicing without a license 
despite the registrar’s assurances – before receiving his designation and being admitted as a 
Member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (MCPSO). Gimby remained 
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an itinerant practitioner who continued to seek out remote and rural settings to practice in. 
Before long: 
I was on the Road again, heading for the north end of Lake Temiscaming where the 
Government and the Settlers offered a bonus to any doctor who would take [the] chance of 
being frozen or starved to death. I would be the only doctor in Ontario between North Bay 
and the North Pole. I thought that sounded good.
109
 
 
Once in the north, physicians had to cover a good deal of territory. As a result when 
companies contracted with a doctor it did not mean the same physician would personally 
attend to the needs of the men. Clifford Smiley while still at the University of Toronto had 
a similar experience:   
… I heard of a doctor … who wanted a man to look after his lumber camps for him. He 
wasn’t sure yet how many camps there would be but he’d have a contract drawn up a little 
later.
110
 
 
These arrangements sometimes caused heated local controversies because competing 
doctors, who often lived nearby, resented being replaced by an unlicensed student. Smylie 
recalled: 
… one of the Parry Sound doctors had learned that I didn’t have my license to practice, and 
reported me to the Ontario Medical Association. But when the O.M.A. found I had passed 
the Dominion Council Examinations, they apparently decided I was legally qualified to 
practice and chose to do nothing about it.
111
 
 
Even when approved by the OMA, contractual arrangements were not always stable or 
satisfactory. For example, Smylie recalled his first contract: 
The doctor who had advertised [for a camp physician] thought I was just the man he was 
looking for…. He assured me I was quite qualified to fill the job [without a license] and 
that it would be perfectly ethical and proper for me to work under his direction and 
supervision. I was ready and anxious to believe everything he told me…. [After] I had been 
there a month, I was hoping he would give me my first pay cheque but he said the camps 
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were just getting started and no money had come in yet. None ever came and I never saw or 
heard from him again.
112
 
 
The use of unlicensed medical school students, who might be paid less than the 
face-value of the contract, meant that miners were sometimes cared for by practitioners 
with limited knowledge and experience. Dr. William Howey, who graduated from medical 
school in Toronto in 1878, moved north with his wife and subcontracted his services, 
through Dr. Girwood, to the CPR lines around Sudbury. Contract physicians were 
frequently stretched thin, and, when they were away their wives sometimes acted in their 
stead. Doctor Howey’s wife (also known as ‘madame le docteur’) noted:  
Many duties fell upon me, although I was not on the payroll. [When her husband was away 
visiting camps] … I had to see that the patients got their doses of medicine at the proper 
time, and keep tab on their temperatures. There was always a supply of simple medicines 
put up for me to dispense in his absence, if necessary; and as there was no doctor within 
ninety miles of us I was obliged to administer anaesthetics and help with minor operations 
such as amputating frozen toes or mutilated fingers.
113
 
 
Mrs. Howey was not medically qualified in any way yet her willingness to effect 
treatments, including amputations, was demanded by the circumstances.
114
 The reality of 
the medical services fell below the ideals charted in the legislation. There were few 
enforcement mechanisms because the mine inspectors were not in a position to judge the 
competence, efficacy or completeness of the care rendered. 
 The quality of healthcare varied widely and was often compromised by distance, 
weather and terrain. Indeed doctors’ records from the period dwell far more on how they 
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accessed their patients than on what they actually did when they finally got to their 
destination.
115
 Doctors’ travels commonly involved horseback or horse and wagon, canoes, 
railways, sleds, carriages, snowshoes, skates and foot. Motorized vehicles were just 
beginning to make an appearance but they were not of much use in the north where roads 
were of casual and very rough construction. The demands of weather further interfered 
with doctors’ access to patients just as it did with miners’ access to camps. Snow, floods, 
ice, fires and impassable trails regularly inhibited or denied treatment to the sick and 
injured. The Bureau of Mines Annual Report for 1899 notes that it took fourteen hours for 
Dr. Denmark to attend upon a miner who suffered a broken leg at Lower Manitou Lake, 
about 40 kilometers south of Dryden. The injury was not fatal but the remoteness of 
healthcare services was made apparent. The blast occurred at 5:30 p.m. on an October 
afternoon and two men were dispatched, by canoe, to get the physician. He arrived at 7:30 
the next morning.
116
 
Isolation could be a death sentence for minor problems if infection set in. In his 
memoir, former superintendent of schools for Northern Ontario, Macdougall recalled:  
Doctors were miles away, 20, 50, 100 miles and [the] pockets [of workers] could not afford 
the call. Life and death cases were sure to arise and then it meant a frantic dash, mile upon 
mile, over the bush trail often in the night by the dim light of the lantern. Worse still was 
the … return trip in paralyzing dread lest the advice of the remedy might prove too late....117 
 
Bleeding to death from puncture wounds was a risk faced daily so the need for immediate, 
competent, remedial services was serious. In the case of a badly frozen man named 
Campbell, it took Dr. H. Bryan 21 days to travel 250 miles to reach his patient and “apply 
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the proper dressings” then a further ten days to evacuate him to Nipigon and eventually to 
Toronto General Hospital.
118
  
In general, medical care at the turn of the century was elementary. As medical 
historian Charles Godfrey explains: “Surgical techniques … centered on amputation and 
tumour removal, with alcohol [consumed orally] to deaden the pain."
119
 In the north, 
medical care was even simpler. The obituary for Dr. Edwin Gimby notes the primitive 
conditions and tools available at that time. He was remembered for travelling the frontier 
by horse, boat, and snowshoes and more poignantly for performing “a successful mastoid 
[operation] … using a cold chisel and a heavy bolt.”120   
Camp hospitals were usually a separate tent or, at best, a lightly equipped boxcar 
that had been converted to house a couple of patients. When injured workers were taken to 
an off-site hospital, it was to the nearest one. They might then be moved to another facility 
if warranted. There was no standard as the diagnoses relied heavily on the attending 
physicians’ findings and recommendations. That decision was at the sole discretion of the 
doctor as he considered the type of injury suffered, the distance, the methods available to 
transport the patient, and the likelihood of recovery. Whereas the men wanted full value for 
their money, the doctors had a financial disincentive to render anything more than 
minimum care. The contracts the doctors agreed to required them to deliver a host of 
services at their own expense and that the range of treatments be sufficient to whatever was 
required in each instance. The vagueness of the wording left gaps in service, especially if a 
physician was not adequately qualified to perform what was called for. 
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The Mine Act 1892 did not prevent contract doctors from acting as their own 
coroners on the same case, despite the obvious conflict of interest. It was changed in 1893 
to deal with such circumstances: 
It shall not be lawful for a coroner to conduct an inquest in any case … where he may be 
employed as medical attendant by the owner or owners thereof, or by any agreement or 
understanding direct or indirect with the employés at or on such works.
121
 
 
Notwithstanding the intention of the regulation,  the paucity of doctors across the north still 
allowed for exceptions.
122
 Because of the contracts of doctors, the overlap of contract 
physicians qua coroners persisted into the twentieth century. As late as 1913 there were 
still conflicts of interest involving doctor/coroner responsibilities.
123
 
 To some doctors, like Clifford Smylie, the practice of medicine was a privilege but 
one that made little money. He said his private practice bore little extra cash: “my charges 
were small and even then … often more than people could afford or would pay.”124 
Therefore, additional opportunities to earn money were coveted. 
In these small remote resource communities across northern Ontario, doctors were 
provided. There were, however, not that many and those who were available travelled long 
distances, often under difficult circumstances.  There is no way to evaluate the skill levels 
of those in the camps against those of southern doctors but there were, categorically, fewer 
technological and treatment options available in the camps. The records of doctors who left 
behind memoirs speaks to the value they placed on their work and careers. Those who were 
more itinerant left nothing to evaluate because they had to work alone, with little 
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equipment, on men who were severely injured or sick. Because the doctors were paid by 
the company, but through deductions from men’s wages, structurally, the doctors were 
positioned as having a direct financial relationship with the company and not with the men. 
This particularly mattered with respect to doctors’ work as coroners. It speaks to why, 
during this period, doctors and coroners never seemed to find companies culpable in 
accidents and fatalities at the mine sites. 
The consequence of these inter-locking and conflicting relationships among 
doctors, companies and the bureaucracy meant that, to all intents and purposes, doctors 
were co-opted by the province to the detriment of the workers. When investigating 
fatalities doctors were reluctant to issue findings against the same companies that signed 
their cheques. Furthermore, as government agents, doctors were loathe to dispute the 
province’s assumptions or the final results of the mine inspectors: that miners were 
careless, reckless or foolhardy. When there were life-threatening injuries or deaths, the 
roles of the physicians were clearer; they had to be present. In other circumstances, the 
requirements were less distinct and open to interpretation and availability. Therefore, the 
early roles of Ontario’s contract physicians developed in ways that were sometimes 
inimical to the well-being of the very miners they were supposed to be caring for.  The 
evidence left by the doctors reveals why they aligned themselves with the companies (the 
source of the doctors’ earnings) rather than with the men (the source of the doctors’ 
expenses). 
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Masculinity and Health 
 The Bureau of Mines and contract doctors addressed issues of men’s health using a 
particular understanding of masculinity to explain many of the accidents and fatalities. 
There was a unique type of hypermasculinity that informed interpretations of brawn, risk-
taking, and foolhardiness versus what the miners themselves might have considered heroic, 
brave and skilled. 
Echoing Great Britain’s Mines and Colleries Act of 1842, which denied females any 
work underground – and limited the roles of children – Ontario’s Mine Act also required all 
mine work to be done by men.  
No boy or girl under the age of fourteen years shall be employed in or about any mine and 
no boy under the age of seventeen years shall be employed below ground in any mine.
125
  
and 
Except as stenographer, book-keeper or in some similar capacity, no girl or woman, shall 
be employed at any mining work or allowed to be for the purpose of employment at mining 
work, in or about any mine.
126
 
 
I was not able to locate any primary sources from the period that reveal how miners felt 
about the risks they faced or how gender informed their workplace practices and 
experiences. The Bureau’s accident investigations identified some lengthy tenures in the 
industry, indicating that mine workers were well-acquainted with the vagaries of the job. 
As “warriors of the underground” miners had to be unafraid of impenetrable darkness, 
confined spaces, damp and wet conditions, and, perhaps most importantly, the constant 
attendance of death.
127
 Gail Bederman’s study Manliness and Civilization examines how 
early twentieth century masculinity celebrated tough, fearless, and courageous manly 
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behaviours. Men were expected to behave according to prescriptive ideals that applied to 
their particular life and work circumstances, which recognize occupationally specific 
masculinities as well.
128
 These traits accorded with what Ava Baron identifies as class-
based: “… a hegemonic masculinity … that emphasized toughness, physical strength, 
aggressiveness, and risk taking.”129 In the mining communities of Northern Ontario we see 
a sense of shared danger among the men. It is what Karen Buckley call the “miners’ 
code”.130 This was not a published or formal schedule of behaviours or attitudes but a tacit 
understanding of shared dangers, experiences, conditions and attitudes that bifurcated the 
workplace into “us” and “them”. Buckley says “… the [miners’] code could serve as a 
basic understanding among men with different languages, cultures, training and experience: 
… when a man gets hurt, all come to do what they can. It is an unwritten law ….”131 While 
Buckley’s study does not tease out the gendered elements of the miners’ code, hegemonic 
masculinity is clearly resident. Because women were disqualified from working 
underground, the essence of mining was thoroughly and unalterably masculine. 
Comparatively, Kathryn McPherson has articulated how femininity informed nursing: “The 
performative rituals that shaped nurses’ occupational identity were re-enacted daily as 
working nurses sought to legitimate their presence in the world of work.”132 The same 
rituals were true of miners. Their daily gatherings at the entrance, their descents 
underground, their shared privations and their unshakable responsibility for one another in 
the event of an accident were manifested in what was widely-known as the “miners’ 
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code.”133 For example, immigrants like Axel Carlson were valourized for acting 
courageously in the rescue of co-workers.  
He bore the reputation of being a sober and industrious man and enjoyed the respect of his 
employer and fellow-miners. He was certainly a brave man, as his conduct showed in being 
the first to descend the Sultana shaft [in 1894] and begin the rescue of the almost suffocated 
miners … imprisoned by the burning of the shaft house….
134
       
 
Although Carlson may have been motivated by other Swedish and Finnish miners working 
at the time, the only fatality was a man named Lagier from Grenoble, France.
135
 Carlson’s 
workplace heroics were in response to workplace hazards but were also understood in 
terms of normative masculinity. He was respected for his sober, industrious, and 
courageous manner.  
There is little documentary evidence from the miners themselves in this period to 
explain how they understood their own gender identities, and how such identities 
influenced their health. Evidence from the Ontario Reading Camps Association suggests 
that working men would not accept education from instructors with soft hands – a claim 
that reflected the gendered division between soft femininity and hard masculinity. And 
while the Bureau of Mines emphasized carelessness and risk-taking by the men in order to 
inculpate them in work-related accidents, miners themselves seem to have understood risk-
taking as a necessary reality if they were to prevail over daily fears.  In the wake of his 
brother-in-law’s death by premature explosion in 1893, George Tremblay admitted to being 
“afraid” of using dynamite to blast hot ore in the roast beds of the Canadian Copper 
Company. His co-worker, Albert Lucknow, disagreed, arguing that skill helped miners 
overcome any potential fear. He claimed: “The only way to break up the ore on the 
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[roasting beds] is by blasting it. I do not regard blasting in hot ore as much more hazardous 
than in cold ore, provided due care is exercised.”136  In 1900, at the Canadian Copper 
Company Mine, James McGregor was injured when he was struck in the back by a piece of 
flying rock. McGregor had refused to take shelter during an aboveground blast. He ignored 
a personal admonition by his boss only moments before the detonation. McGregor’s 
disregard for his personal safety may have been a mistake, or may have been a 
demonstration of fearlessness or hyper-masculinity in the face of a supervisor who did not 
really know the work, or possess the appropriate bravery.
137
 Mining inspectors concluded 
that men’s unwillingness to take cover was rooted in bravado.138 Flouting danger could be 
fatal, as seen in the death of Joseph Poulin. On December 3, 1901 at the Canadian Copper 
Company Mine. This thirteen year old rock-picker, died as a result of “dancing” on the 
picking table. These antics resulted in his clothing being caught up by a revolving shaft 
which drew him into the gears of the machine and crushed his back. While the records do 
not provide details on the social context of Poulin’s play, his bravado might well have be 
motivated by his desire to prove his manliness to his older peers.
139
 Miners defended their 
bodies and their health by managing risk according to the dictates of their class and their 
masculinity. What is interesting about the available evidence for this period is that 
demonstrations of masculinity – bravery, loyalty, and fearlessness – drew less upon 
descriptions of physical strength and more on character and gender-specific personality 
traits. 
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Equally interesting is the lack of evidence about how sexuality – hetero-normative 
or otherwise – informed models of masculinity during this time. Very few miners lived 
with their wives and families in northern Ontario in these early years. There are occasional 
references to prostitutes working at northern Ontario mining communities.  Sometimes 
referred to as “Boxcar Annies” because they arrived by train and conducted their business 
aboard furnished railcars at nearby sidings, sex workers were present in American mining 
towns and may have included northern Ontario towns on their circuit.
 140
  The jointly 
authored memoir of Angus and Griffin claims: “Some of the madams who moved into 
Cobalt had followed the trail of miners through Montana, Arizona and the Yukon …. Other 
women were recruited from circuits in Montreal and Toronto.”141 They also assert that 
some of the women were sexually exploited after their husbands were killed in mine 
accidents. With their husbands dead, no savings, hungry children to look after, and no 
ongoing church presence to coordinate charity or relief benefits, these women did what 
they had to in order to make ends meet, which Angus and Griffin infer included 
prostitution: “Those days were very hard. Some women who lost men in the mines had to 
do a lot of terrible things in order to feed their families.”142 These recollections are not 
corroborated by reliable sources from the period generated at the time.   Newspapers, like 
Toronto’s dailies, occasionally reported on what they termed the debauchery of mining 
camps, but offered no specific detail of how sexuality factored in to that reputation.
143
 The 
physicians’ records that I have seen from this time do not mention sexually transmitted 
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diseases specifically. On balance, then, between 1890 and 1904, prostitution did not factor 
significantly into life at these isolated and worksites. There were too few men, with too 
little money, working at too many small, scattered mines to make prostitution a profitable 
commercial venture.
144
  There may have been conversations or boasts of sexual prowess 
but they have not survived in documentary form and so assumptions about how 
heterosexuality was used to construct masculinity remain speculative at best. Moreover, 
most sources from 1890-1904 are silent on same-sex physical or emotional relations. Adele 
Perry’s work on mining camps in British Columbia documents a vibrant same-sex social 
life. James Hillis’ study of an 1883 lumber camp offers similar evidence. No such reference 
exists or is available for northern Ontario’s camps of the turn of the century. James Hillis 
noted that on some Saturday nights “… there was a good amateur violinist in the gang and 
the boys would put on a dance, half of them wearing hats to represent the opposite sex.”145 
Although there was a common perception of mining being fundamentally about 
physical brawn, it was a practiced and learned skill that was not for the faint of heart.   
A drilling contest [circa 1900] consisted of 15 minutes of strenuous and feverish activity by 
a two man team, one hammering and the other twisting and guiding the steel [drill]. The 
two would change positions at the end of each minute during which period the striker 
would deliver from 60-70 short chopping blows and when the` minute was up the twister 
would grab his hammer and the other man would drop to this knees and twist. If the drill 
steel was free in the hole at the moment of the exchange, the team would deliver from 3 to 
4 extra blows by double hitting before the partner dropped down to twist and if they had 
good luck in keeping a free running hole, these extra blows would sometimes mean a 
couple of extra inches at the finish.
146
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In competitions experienced miners “could drill [through] as much as 35-40 inches [of 
granite per hour]”147 although when they were underground they usually managed only 
about twenty inches per hour because the conditions were darker and more confined. The 
difficulties associated with this kind of work helps define the kind of men who undertook 
it. 
~ 
 At Ontario’s mining frontier from 1890 to 1904, the primitive nature of resource 
extraction relied on the muscle power of the men who laboured in the industry. Although 
the work days were hard and physically demanding, the incidents of fatalities were low, 
less than ten a year. But industrial accelerations began to take hold, and new materials, 
equipment and techniques were put into place among men who were untrained, often 
illiterate and frequently unable to communicate clearly with co-workers. As a result mining 
became increasingly dangerous. Technologies, when combined with provincial legislation 
for remote worksites, for men who operated by a code of masculinity that sometimes 
challenged their own safety, and which was mediated by doctors and inspectors who were 
often co-opted by the government, spelled injury, dismemberment, and death among the 
workmen. 
 By contrast, Queen’s Park considered the first fifteen years of hardrock mining in 
Ontario respectable. There were few criticisms of the province, the doctors, or mine 
management. The next decade would, however, begin to challenge this record. Between 
1905 and 1914 more was done to help miners than at any time in the preceding one 
hundred years. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
Seismic Tremors: 
Breadwinner Masculinity 
in a  
Time of Change 
 
(1905 – 1915) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The expansion of Ontario’s mining frontier that occurred between 1890 and 1904 
accelerated even more dramatically in the years leading up to World War One. New strikes 
of valuable ores continued to be found across the north and the largest of these brought 
about the consolidation of many operations and the growth of attendant towns and 
regulatory agencies. According to the Bureau of Mines reports from 1905 to 1915 
Ontario’s mining operations trebled in value from $18,000,000 to $54,000,000.1 
Additionally, the Bureau’s records show that there were 11,151 miners employed in 1905 
and they were paid wages of just over $5,000,000.
2
 By 1915 those numbers increased to 
17,190 and $12,000,000 respectively. Hundreds of small places that had promised great 
wealth quickly petered out and disappeared from maps.
3
 Profitable and productive mines, 
however, began settling into new rhythms and patterns. Fewer mines operated as 
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consolidating similar operations became a business strategy.
4
 Centralized administrative 
functions exploited the economies of scale as well as the standardization of materials and 
techniques. As prospecting sites became permanent settlements, populations increased and 
diversified. Towns that did not exist at the time of the 1901 Census boasted populations of 
more than five thousand only ten years later. The volatility and mobility of resource worker 
settlements is recognized by Brian Hogan who says: “If anything these are modest figures 
indeed. If townships immediately adjacent to the town are taken into account, it is perhaps 
more accurate to accept a figure of between 10,000 and 15,000 for the Cobalt area during 
the peak years 1911-1912.”5 This chapter analyzes the effect of this economic expansion on 
the health of working men as well as the health services they received. 
 
Health Risks 
The expansion of mining across northern Ontario was tracked closely by the Bureau 
of Mines which continued to record injuries and fatalities at mine sites. While death and 
accidents increased, their frequency and inflated numbers were disproportionate to the 
growth of the industry.  The following chart reveals the steadily increasing deaths and 
injuries sustained by miners in the north, as the risks to miners’ health over this period were 
exacerbated by change. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Hogan, B. Cobalt: Year of the Strike, 1919. Cobalt. Highway Book Shop. 1978. pp. 11-12. 
5
 Tabulated from the Ontario Bureau of Mines Reports for each of the designated years. Some of the annual 
totals are also listed in subsequent charts like that from the 1918 Annual Report in which all fatalities are 
listed from 1901 to 1917. See page 79. 
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Year 
Non-fatal Mining 
Accidents Deaths 
      
1905 9 9 
1906 16 11 
1907 19 22 
1908 37 47 
1909 46 49 
1910 67 48 
1911 111 49 
1912 238 43 
1913 353 64 
1914 359 58 
1915 424 22 
Totals  1679 422 
                  Table 3.1 
6
 
The ten-fold increase in accidents reflected, in part, the growth of the workforce. The 
numbers might also have been the result of better and more vigilant reporting to the Bureau 
of Mines. The five-fold increase in the number of deaths nonetheless far outstripped the 
fifty percent increase in the number of miners working there.
7
 
A number of factors may have contributed to the rise in mining fatalities. Mine 
managers may have become increasingly careless, and willing to sacrifice safety for profits. 
As late as 1914, Bureau of Mines inspectors asserted: 
… investigations … show a non-observance of the Mining Act by some operators and many 
employees, and emphasize forcibly the need of further Government supervision. The 
Mining Act is wide in its requirements, and penalties are provided for non-observance. 
Infringements have to be proven in court on information laid by the Inspector. The policy 
so far followed has been to take action only in flagrant cases where life has been 
endangered. Thus, it is only after an accident has happened that a prosecution follows. The 
result has been that, in several instances, mine operators have taken chances with dangerous 
                                                 
6
 All figures are taken from the Annual Reports of the Bureau of Mines from 1905 to 1915 inclusive. 
7
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1914. Archives of Ontario. Government Docs M. Microfiche. 1914. 
p.58. 
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conditions, trusting that they could get through without an accident and have the work 
completed before an Inspector visited them.
8
 
 
It is unlikely however that management negligence alone could account for the dramatic 
rise in the numbers of deaths. Indeed it would have been self-defeating for so many men to 
be killed and the circumstances of each incident audited and evaluated by the Bureau. 
Therefore it is more likely that the technological changes that were made during this time 
played a pivotal role in multiplying the fatality totals.  
The process for removing valuable ore, which was established in the previous 
century, persisted through the years leading up to World War One. Technological 
innovations intensified the pace of production. Stronger pneumatic drills made boring holes 
into stopes faster, more uniform, and less physically demanding. Explosives became more 
powerful when new ingredients, like gelignite, were introduced in heavier concentrations 
and new cartridge formats.
9
 Electricity was present in all but the most remote of mines 
meaning that most of the underground workspaces were illuminated incandescently rather 
than by candles. Electrically powered hoists transporting materials up and down deeper 
shafts were conducted at faster speeds. Grouped together these new ways of mining meant 
there was a sustaining need, not only for physical strength and experience but also for 
proficiency with equipment which included: explosives, hydraulics, pneumatics and 
mechanical/electrical devices. At this point technologies began changing the physicality of 
the work. Miners still had to be strong and rugged for the underground environment was 
constant, but the improved tools delivered more materials faster than muscle power, over 
more sustained periods of time. Those who could handle a Leyner drill earned more 
                                                 
8
 Gelignite, as its prefix suggests, appeared in a dense viscous and gelatinous form which could be molded in 
some circumstances.  
9
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1911. p.79. 
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because they could produce more. Operators of pneumatic loaders and hydraulic, or 
electrically driven, trams were also paid more than a common mucker or a manual 
trammer. Because workloads often overlapped in small mines, the description of a miner’s 
job remained elastic; he did what he was told according to the requirements of the site.  
The opposite side of technological benefits was the impact new tools had on miner 
health and safety. The Bureau of Mines Annual Reports continued to narrate the causes of 
deaths and injuries occurring at northern Ontario mining camps and the same root causes 
persisted.  
Miners themselves continued to face the risks their counterparts had in earlier years. 
For example, the death of John Kinsey at the Ophir mine on September 21, 1910 saw the 
company successfully prosecuted by the Bureau for neglecting to make provision for 
protecting the sides of the shaft by means of a guard-rail.”10 Fatalities of this sort exposed 
the on-going workplace risks to miners’ bodies and health. The 1912 death of Ernest 
Edward Burley at the Rochester Mine, the result of a premature dynamite explosion, 
promoted a call that: “… the Federal Government [should] enact a law compelling the 
inspection of all explosives, fuses and caps” because one of the devices Burley handled 
exploded prematurely.
11
 The Bureau’s successful prosecution of Beaver Consolidated 
Mines for two deaths in 1909 “… to the maximum provided by the Act”12 confirmed the 
Bureau’s focus on occupational safety. The deaths of Andrew Osman and John Aha 
                                                 
10
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1910. p.73 
11
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1909. p.59 
12
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1909. p.59 
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revealed that management had not constructed or installed requisite ladderways “… thereby 
practically compelling their employees to break the law by riding the bucket ….”13 
New technologies presented new occupational dangers as well. The pace of 
production increased to the benefit of owners but even moreso to the detriment of workmen 
who had to breathe rock dust and gases created by sophisticated new devices. The 1912 
death of Albert Sullivan, who was asphyxiated by poisonous gases, saw the Temiskaming 
Mining Company fined one hundred dollars as there was no ladderway in place for him to 
exit indicating that riding on the skip was a condoned practice at that site.
14
 The shift boss, 
William Stephenson, was also fined fifty dollars.
15
 Poor lighting, deafening noise levels, 
marginal observances of safety regulations, tacit support of illegal practices, and dust-filled 
stopes, all combined to compromise the health of the men. Powerful new explosives killed 
whereas older, lighter, concentrations of black powder had usually maimed or injured. A 
failed miners’ strike at Cobalt in 1907 saw no increase in wages but there were modest 
improvements in rules for bunkhouse and boarding house conditions as well mine safety 
and sanitation.
16
 There was still a generalized “Gospel of Discontent” about the wages and 
workplace dangers miners continued to deal with.
17
 
Electricity in the workplace improved vision in and around mines, but also 
introduced new risks. The electrocution of A. Lefebvre on August 25
th
, 1910
18
 resulted in 
the censure of the Trewethey Mining Company for permitting their employees to work in 
                                                 
13
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1912. pp.94. The jury also offered an opinion that “the accident would 
not have happened” if Sullivan had had a means of escape at hand. 
14
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1912. pp.94 -95. 
15
 Solski, M. and Smaller, J. Mine Mill; The History of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers in Canada since 1895. Ottawa. Steel Rail Publishing. 1984.. pp.57-58 
16
 Solski and Smaller. Mine Mill. p.59 
17
 This same death was recorded in the Workmen’s Compensation Commission Cobalt Minutes of Evidence 
as being the death of a French man named “LePage”.  See Third Sitting. Dec. 14, 1911. p.188. The details of 
the fatality are virtually identical and the mistake in names is attributed to Mr. O’Connell. 
18
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1911. p.81. 
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close proximity to wires carrying … 11,000 volts.”19 Lefebvre’s death was particularly 
gruesome because his body lay on live wires for twenty-five minutes before the power 
could be shut off and as a result the corpse was badly burned.  
While the Meredith Commission and Bureau of Mines officials were well aware of 
the ongoing dangers and health risks directly related to mining – damaged spines, joints, 
backs, etc – they never spoke directly to any particular occupationally-related disease.20 For 
example, at the Cobalt hearings, the Meredith Commissioners heard testimony from Mr. 
Whalen who – having represented miners on coroners’ juries in the past – acknowledged 
that there were “diseases peculiar to the [mining] industry” but he did not specify what kind 
of diseases they were. Rather, Whalen focused on the difficulty of allocating blame for 
occupational disease, saying: “I think it might occasion some trouble in fixing the liability 
on the parties responsible for [a] disease.”21 
By contrast health officials were quite specific about communicable diseases 
present in both the camps and in towns that were being established nearby. As prospecting 
sites became permanent settlements, populations increased and diversified. Communities 
gradually included women and children, although it was still a minority of workmen who 
were able to have their families join them. As shown in Nancy Forestell’s and Kerry 
                                                 
19
 It was not until 1926 that the Workmen’s Compensation Board added silicosis to its coverage of mining 
diseases. It was introduced into the regulations as silicosis but was also known as: phthisis, tuberculosis, 
scrofula, and consumption. Labour Gazette.  November 1927. Pp: 1207-1208 
20
 Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Minutes of Evidence;  third sitting, Cobalt Miners, Dec. 14, 1911. 
p.194-195. 
21
 Nancy Forestell’s work “Bachelors, Boarding-Houses and Blind Pigs: Gender Construction in a Multi-
Ethnic Mining Camp 1909 – 1920” in A Nation of Immigrants, edited by Franca Iacovetta et al looks at how 
mining communities adapted to women in frontier Ontario. Guy Gaudeau’s La Mobilite des Ouvriers-
Mineurs du Nord Ontarien et Quebec 1900-1939. Laurentian University. Sudbury. 1998. also confirms the 
nature and fluidity of mine camps and settlements during this period. Abel, K. Changing Places: History, 
Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario.  Kingston. McGill-Queen’s University Press. 2006. Abel 
does not focus on the workplace exclusively. Her examination looks at the coming together of diverse 
ethnicities and how they adopted a common identity over time in a small area of north eastern Ontario only. 
Her work however does consider the transient nature of the work and the people who performed it as well as 
separating factors like language, religion, ethnic customs and competing definitions of masculinity.  
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Abel’s22 studies, only long established camps accommodated families and supporting 
businesses. The settlement process was usually slow, but a “rush” could accelerate it 
dramatically.  
The growth of some mining towns could be sudden and dramatic as the example of 
Larder Lake reveals. In 1904 the Bureau hired a University of Toronto geologist named Dr. 
W. Parks to evaluate and survey a previously unexplored area of Larder Lake near the 
Quebec border. His findings were not published until 1905 and 1906 and by the end of 
1907 more than 4000 claims were filed in this small area. 
23
 When they appeared, there was 
a “rush” to strike it rich. The Bureau reported that 145 claims were being worked, over an 
area of five thousand acres, by approximately one hundred fourteen miners. The men were 
housed in thirty new structures. Newspapers spread the word and The Toronto World 
profiled the camp in 1907.  
The town is called Larder City and presents today a very thrifty appearance. Over fifty 
[log] buildings have been erected. Larder City is the headquarters of over 400 people. 
There is a large general store, restaurant, black smith shop, drug store, photograph gallery, 
bakery, hotel and a saw mill nearly completed.
24
 
 
Despite these glowing reports, most mining towns struggled to sustain clean and healthy 
living conditions. Housing continued to be contentious as remote sites were constructed 
casually and only to the skills of the individual builders. The development of mine sites 
was seldom orderly:  
                                                 
22
 Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1905. pp.185-206 and Ontario Bureau of Mines Report for 1906. 
p.117. 
23
 Mosure, F.B. “Larder City Progressive and now a Thrift Town.” The Toronto World. October 3, 1907. p.11. 
24
 Tucker, A. Steam into Wilderness. Toronto. Fitzhenry & Whiteside. 1978. p.24. image 13. Rex Lucas 
examines the progressive stages of single industry towns, like mine camps, are constructed, populated and 
serviced. See chapters one to five of Minetown, Milltown, Railtown, Life in Canadian Communities of Single 
Industry. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1971. Lucas looks at how and why these communities were 
built in the ways they were, but as a sociologist, he was principally interested in the effects of industrial 
structures on social patterns.   
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Cobalt grew without planning, with little thought given to the nature of an urban 
community. The curved streets and crazy, haphazard construction of buildings testified that 
the town began and continued as a mining community.
25
 
 
Photographic evidence exposes the conditions of settlements with tree stumps left in and 
around buildings, a lack of organized street systems, and no sense of any uniform building 
standards or the enforcement of health and sanitary codes. Figure 3.1 is a photograph of a 
cluttered roadway in Cobalt and it reveals the conditions that people lived in. 
26
 Crowded 
accommodations for miners persisted. The 1905 Provincial Board of Health report noted 
only “60 or 70 houses, mostly shacks and as many tents” for the 600 residents of Cobalt in 
that year.  
 
Figure 3.1 Cobalt camp circa 1904.
27
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 Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1905. 
Toronto. E.L. Cameron, 1905. pp.185-188. 
26
 Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario. pp.186. 
27
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Sanitation was poor. The Board of Health inspector R. W. Bell visited Cobalt in 
1905 and found that “no sanitary precautions had been taken” in the neophyte community 
of less than 1,000.
28
 All water had to be boiled before it could be consumed. In 1905, 
Cobalt’s water supply came from a spring well which was downhill from the settlement so 
that polluted runoff from the town contaminated the “domestic supply of water.”   
For these reasons, concerns about epidemic disease remained. In 1910 the Ontario 
Provincial Board of Health was called to Cobalt because there had been over 1100 recorded 
cases of typhoid the previous year.
29
  
The water supply was bad – much of it taken from shallow, polluted wells; yards and 
streets were filthy; no proper system of sewage … Your officials had over 1200 loads of 
garbage removed and seventy-four wells closed and the Municipal council passed several 
by-laws re: scavenging system, abolition of hogpens, control of bread and meat supplies [to 
provide] cleaner and healthier conditions.
30
 
 
The presence of livestock in and around homes posed more sanitary health risks as noted 
by Health Inspectors like George Young who complained: 
I visited in July last, the foreign quarters at Coniston, outside of the Mond Nickel 
Company's property and found the usual conditions in those places, of filth, flies and 
animals running at large. Accompanied by Dr. George we again inspected this on October 
1st., and found with a few exceptions that my orders had been neglected, consequently 
yesterday, I laid informations against seven of the worst offenders, before Magistrate 
Brodie of Sudbury.
31
 
                                                 
28
 Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1910. 
Toronto. E.L. Cameron, 1911. pp.36-37. 
29
 There are a few instances of Department of Health Inspectors attending at specific mining camps where 
conditions mimicked those found in town but on a smaller scale. Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the 
Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1910. Toronto. E.L. Cameron, 1911. p.36. 
30
 An “information” was a formal, civil application for judicial intervention filed with a magistrate and 
usually acted upon within ten days. Young, George E. Provincial Health Inspector. Archives of Ontario. RG-
62 Prov. Brd of Health. Series -2-b/c/d/e  No. 462. Sent from North Bay. Heather MacDougall’s examination 
of public health between focuses principally on urban policies, practices and education. Although she 
mentions mine camps briefly it is of limited value as inspection reports concentrated on 1912-1916. They 
address food handling and preparation far more than living and working conditions. Macdougall, H. 
“Researching Public Health Services in Ontario, 1892-1930.”Archivaria. No. 10. 1980. pp. 157-172. 
31
 The province’s District Officers of Health were appointed under the authority of the 1912 Public Health 
Act. These men were full-time employees of the province. They were supposed to be “legally qualified 
medical practitioners.” For more on the introduction of Ontario’s District Health Officials, see the Special 
Report on the Work of the District Officers of Health for the Year 1912 – 1913. Toronto. L.K. Cameron and 
printed by William Briggs. 1914.  [repetition] 
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Smallpox, which was no longer the scourge it was in the nineteenth century, could still 
flare up. In February 1913 provincial Health Inspector Young learned of an outbreak in the 
mixed logging and mining communities near Hearst.
32
 George Young was made Ontario’s 
Sanitary Inspector in 1906. He promptly contacted the town Reeve and ordered the 
immediate and thorough disinfection of all homes and structures where the disease had 
been or might still reside.
33
 Diphtheria and whooping cough also persisted. The 1905 
Bureau of Health summary reported the following contagious diseases for the final three 
months of 1904: 
Board of Health Results Comparison between 1903 and 1904 
34
 
  1903 1903   1904 1904 
  cases deaths   cases deaths 
Smallpox 25 0   5 0 
Scarlatina 739 38   550 33 
Diphtheria 1491 202   992 144 
Measles --- 7   138 9 
Whooping 
cough --- 35   88 12 
Typhoid 407 37   504 145 
Tuberculosis  0 475   462 445 
  2662 854   2739 788 
 
Table 3.2 
 
 The Ministry had vaccination policies and procedures in place to contain or prevent the 
spread of confirmed cases but the remoteness of some of the sites of infection mitigated 
their effectiveness. 
Some commentators believed that, in these undesirable conditions, miners were 
responsible for their own ill health. Ontario’s Chief Health Officer J.S. McCullough said: 
                                                 
32
 Young, G.E. Provincial Board of Health Reports for 1913. Archives of Ontario. Accession Number: RG62 
Provincial Board of Health Series B2b, Series B2c, Series B2d, Series B2  No.462.2 
33
 Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1905. 
Toronto. E.L. Cameron, 1905. p8. 

 Decaying or rotting tissue that is usually associated with dentistry. 
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It is hard for those who have not seen them to appreciate the depraved condition of these 
foreign people with regard to dirty houses and defective personal hygiene. Their bodies are 
dirty to the point of filthiness; while carious

 teeth, nits in hair, body lice, enlarged tonsils, 
adenoids, and defective vision etc., are other evidences(sic) of their unsanitary life. The 
floors are black with dirt and in the spring and fall they are covered with mud. The men go 
into bed with their day-clothes and boots on. ...
35
 
 
Health Inspector Young found northern workers’ lack of hygiene offensive and said so 
bluntly:  
These foreigners are very numerous in Northern Ontario where work is very plentiful on 
railroad construction, colonization roads, mining and other camps, they find ready 
employment for say, eight months in the year at very remunerative wages such as any 
Canadian laborer or mechanic receives. 
It is common practice for these people [foreigners] to herd and overcrowd into boarding 
houses with frequently less than 200 cu.ft. per person being supplied with a dirty mattress 
and blanket with the privilege of cooking their own victuals all for a charge ranging from 
six to ten cents per day ….36 
  
Clifford Smylie’s observations mimicked others. He too complained: “The part I disliked 
most [about the living conditions] were the bedbugs which [the bunkhouse at the Casey-
Cobalt mine] never seemed to be rid of ….”37 The fact that the many miners were foreign-
born seemed further proof that miners lacked basic knowledge of hygiene. And yet such 
reports ignored the reality that even in mines themselves, tainted water was the cause of 
most infectious diseases. In 1909-10, provincial health inspectors reported: “Over 300 
typhoid cases came from the mines, and no doubt were caused by the men drinking 
polluted water from the crevices in the drifts and tunnels.”38 The contamination was made 
worse by fact that miners were unlikely to climb ladders of up to 300 feet to answer calls of 
                                                 
35
 McCullough. J.S. Chief Officer, Ontario Board of Health. Special Report on the Work of the District 
Officers of Health for the Year 1912 – 1913. Ontario Government Archives. Government  Doc. HE, Misc. 
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 Smylie, C. Northern Doctor. Cobalt. Highway Book Store. 2002. p.34. 
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 Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1910. 
Toronto. E.L. Cameron, 1911. pp.36-37. 
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nature.
39
  Inspector Bell said: “… we found in over 30 per cent of the mines that the 
workmen did not come to the surface to answer the call of nature, nor will they … where 
they have to come several hundred yards through wet tunnels and climb ladders for from 
100 to 300 or 400 feet nor in our cold winter weather.”40 This meant that raw sewage 
remained in the mines according to the habits of the men. Oftentimes empty dynamite 
boxes were used as waste receptacles that were later removed from the mine and disposed 
of. Thus while mine inspectors focused on injuries occurring at the workplace, the miners 
also had to cope with infectious diseases potentially acquired while at work.  
 
Managing Miners’ Health 
In the years after 1905, concerns over the health of miners provoked a range of 
responses from mine managers, provincial authorities and miners themselves. These 
responses included the rise of (competing) bureaucratic agencies to administer both the 
spirit of progressivism-inspired rules and regulations; the growth of legislation to address 
the mounting number of deaths and injuries; worker resistance to the status quo through 
coroners’ juries and unions; professional responses through organizations like the Ontario 
Medical Association (OMA); and, ultimately, the introduction of a new Workmen’s 
Compensation Board (WCB) on January 1, 1915.  
Until 1904, the Bureau of Mines inspectors were used to responding to reported 
accidents and injuries in the mines; they rarely acted in preventive capacities. Similarly, a 
Health Inspector would visit a mining community or camp after an infectious disease 
outbreak (especially smallpox) was reported. As mining communities grew in size, resident 
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 Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Canada for the Year 1910. 
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 Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario 1910. p.37. 
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bureaucracies were established. Provincial Health Inspectors expanded their agency’s 
presence in northern towns; they educated new inspectors (most of whom were physicians); 
they oversaw sanitation and health matters generally; and they prosecuted violators. These 
new bureaucratic layers complemented – sometimes overlapped, and even competed with – 
the duties that had previously been the dominion of inspectors from the Bureau of Mines. 
At the same time, newly established municipalities appointed their own Sanitary 
Inspectors, such as Cobalt’s George Caldbick, who was also the town’s constable. By 1914 
a complex array of provincial and municipal staff were working in mining communities -- 
private doctors, contract doctors, coroners, mine inspectors, provincial health inspectors, 
sanitary inspectors, district health liaison officers, municipal health inspectors and police. 
Additional bureaucratic layers added complexity. Sanitary inspectors were, for example, 
municipal appointees. Health inspectors acted for the province and their areas of interest 
included water supplies, which affected municipalities. Mine inspectors yielded to sanitary 
inspectors regarding boarding houses for miners and lumberjacks. Health inspectors 
stepped in when mining camps suffered smallpox or contagious outbreaks.
41
  The 
diversification and fragmentation of responsibilities related to health, labour, workplace 
safety, medicine and diseases continued into the twentieth century but because of 
jurisdictional nuances they sometimes interfered with improving the conditions of the men 
in the mines. 
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There was, at times, a tone of bonhomie among this corps which held public health 
to be a common goal despite remunerative deficiencies: 
The work done by the District Officers has been ably supplemented by the various Medical 
Officers of Health, who to the number of some 750 or more service usually for small 
remuneration the townships, villages, towns and cities of the province. It is regrettable that 
the good work done by the Medical Officers of Health in smaller communities is so little 
appreciated and poorly paid.
42
 
 
There were other problems as well. The records of Ontario’s Department of Health 
inspector George E. Young made it apparent that administrative boundaries could be 
problematic. 
Enclosed you will find several camp reports. I accompanied Doctor [Egerton] George
43
 and 
members of the Board of Health in Sudbury around town last Saturday and visited a 
number of foreign boarding houses [for miners], bakeries and one dairy of 101 cows. There 
is a good barn with modern appliances for cooling, sterilizing and bottling but the cows are 
not kept clean. The bakeshops were not clean either but we hope for better results on our 
next visit to them. The foreign boarding houses were filthy and overcrowded. Their sanitary 
inspector, who has not been alive to his duties will be put on the ground to see the cleaning 
[is] done and other provision[s] made for sleeping accomodation.(sic)
44 
 
Here, the provincial health inspector collaborated with the city’s medical official who was, 
in turn, contracted to the miners. Inspector Young pointed the finger of blame at the poor 
work being done by the third party. At Fort Francis, he met similar difficulties: 
I beg to report having visited Fort Francis meeting several of their town officials. I found 
that the local Board of Health has not been very energetic. The main industry of the town is 
Shelvin [Shevelin?] & Clark's Mills which employs a large number of men among them the 
Mayor, Dr. McKenzie and the attention of matters of health around the works have been 
very slipshod.
45
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This reveals a sometimes tenuous attention to detail by inspectors who served more than 
one master.  
The eponymous town was of single-industry and the employer wielded enormous 
influence, apparently enough to compromise the integrity of the local health authorities. 
Inspector Young picked up that thread and suggested that the employer-employee 
relationship had mitigated the industriousness of the parties and undermined health-related 
duties. Young names the mayor and physician particularly, asserting that the way they 
discharged their health care obligations was “slipshod”. His note points up how, at still-
distant sites, competing interests were unavoidable and that they negatively affected the 
observance of laws, rules and regulations designed to protect the health of local workers 
and inhabitants. From Young’s observations it is apparent that, in this instance, health and 
sanitation were being sacrificed in favour of corporate interests and personal earnings. It 
was the same in North Bay as Young reported:  
On complaint of unsanitary conditions, I visited in July last, the foreign quarters at 
Coniston, outside of the Mond Nickel Company's property and found the usual conditions 
in those places, of filth, flies and animals running at large. 
Accompanied by Dr. George we again inspected this on October 1st, and found with a few 
exceptions that my orders had been neglected, consequently yesterday, I laid informations
46
 
against seven of the worst offenders, before Magistrate Brodie of Sudbury.
47
 
 
The inspector lamented that his prior instructions to both the Sanitary Inspectors and the 
company’s officials were neglected, indicating – in this instance - a lack of cooperation 
among the integrated agencies. Earlier Young had visited the living quarters of the miners 
and cited their deficiencies in his report. He required them to be remedied. Upon his return, 
however, neither the mine managers nor the local inspector had made the corrections or 
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taken any follow up actions. In the meantime, the mine had been allowed to continue 
operating and the miner workers continued living in “filth”. 
In 1905 Department of Health inspector Bell encountered a recalcitrant manager at 
the Buffalo mine who:  
… said he had no contract with a physician and would not make one, and if {the 
Department of Health} wished to prosecute him for refusal to obey the regulations we 
could “put on the screws as quick as we liked.” He took this ground because he had some 
grievance against a physician at a mine where he had been formerly employed.
 48  
 
The relationships of government bureaucrats to the primary employer gave pause for 
concern and criticism. In his report of the abovementioned incident inspector Bell wrote:  
As the fee for medical attendance and medicine charged to each man is only fifty cents per 
month, it seemed almost incredible, that the contracting physicians would without further 
payment, provide on behalf of the mine owners, hospital accommodate and board, with 
trained nurses as was asserted.
49
 
 
His reaction to the contractual requirement suggests that it was ostensibly a sinecure and 
that little could be realistically accomplished to prevent, treat or restore miners suffering 
from injury or disease for such a nominal amount. The following year he said: “I fear in 
many cases the medical inspections and attention required for the camp is not furnished, 
and the physician is only paid a stated amount for each visit to the camp, as requested to be 
made by the employer.”50  
At the time progressivism was galvanizing social programs by informing them with 
scientific principles, formulae and measurable, quantifiable goals. The goals were many 
and recommended minimum, scientifically-based standards (cubic air volumes, square 
footages for living spaces, drinking water quality measurements and sanitation codes) for 
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living and working environments.
51
 Notwithstanding the altruism behind its ideas, the 
increased legislation, departments and numbers of provincial and municipal officials failed 
to mitigate the adverse living and working conditions to which miners were subjected. 
The federal government had little jurisdiction in these matters. It established rules 
for railway work, which was of the same type and style as mining, except for exposure to 
the elements. Ottawa was, however, frequently contacted by foreign embassies that wanted 
information regarding the deaths of foreign nationals on Canadian soil. In 1906 for 
example, after two Scandinavians were killed, the Commissioner of Immigration received 
an inquiry from a Swedish official named Hollinquist who wanted to know if,  
… the Government of Canada [could] take some means, if possible, to investigate the cause 
of so many accidents …. Many of [dead] left widows and children to be more or less a 
burden on the public for a time; and the reports in the press that so many lives are lost and 
nothing done to investigate the cause or lessen the danger of further lives being lost will 
have a bad effect on immigration to Canada.
52
  
 
Ottawa knew what was happening but could not, and did not, attempt to improve the 
situation, despite cautions about possible adverse effects on immigration. 
Correspondence between Ontario’s Deputy Minister of Labour, F.A. Acland and 
Canada’s Director of Public Health, Frederick Montizambert53 indicated a sense of 
helplessness.  
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At the present advised, it does not seem to me that the prevention of the exposure of the 
men to undue risks in connection with blasting or other work comes within the jurisdiction 
of this Department.  … it appears to me that protection for these men, under the 
circumstances recited, would have to be sought under the Criminal Code and under 
Provincial Administration.
54
 
 
Indeed, coroners’ juries began finding mine management culpable for some mining deaths. 
The Bureau of Mines Annual Reports confirm that a growing number of these quasi-
juridical bodies began criticizing management and making specific recommendations for 
change. These panels offered miners – who constituted the juries – a voice through which 
they could resist the conditions of work and protest the regulatory system’s assumptions 
and omissions. The rubber-stamping of earlier verdicts with pat phrases that protected 
management from further scrutiny or prosecution slowed. Coroners’ juries delivered 
suggestions, criticisms and even calls for the prosecution of individual managers and 
companies. In December 1908, for example, one jury called upon the Bureau’s inspectors 
to intervene more vigorously after three men were killed at the Columbus Cobalt Silver 
Mine: “We, the jury, strongly recommend that the Mining Act of Ontario be rigidly 
enforced in the matter of mining operations. We find from evidence given that the Mining 
Act is being seriously disregarded.”55 Coroners’ juries advanced their views to mine 
ownership, the medical community, and to the provincial government. 
Once these panels began issuing recommendations beyond their immediate 
mandate, the “assumed risk” caveat weakened. A jury could – and did – comment on 
tangential matters in connection with their cases. While their ideas and suggestions did not 
change the facts of the incident they were interrogating, their recommendations affected 
later ones. At the Davis Silver Mine a jury investigating the 1909 death of Pete Peterson 
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said: “… for the safety of miners, greater care should be taken with whims56 or other ways 
of hoisting when prospecting shafts are used, in the way of connecting the cable to such 
hoisting apparatus.” In 1910, at the Crown Reserve Silver Mine, the coroner’s jury 
examining the death of John Shannon said: “… that all mines in general and the Crown 
Reserve in particular, [need to] observe more closely in future the working conditions as 
presented by the Mine Act, especially as relating to reports of one shift boss to another in 
regard to missed holes.”57 The coroner’s jury at the Canadian Copper Company inquest 
into the death of J. Foley suggested: “… that all guard rails, frogs and switches be properly 
protected by blocks.” 58 And when Daniel Phillips and Felix Allard were killed at the James 
Mine, the jury demanded “… that a regulation be added to the Mining Act prohibiting the 
drilling in[to] an old hole.”59 In April 1909 another coroner’s jury insisted that “… there be 
more stringent reports made by one shift boss to another and that fully experienced men be 
engaged as shift bosses and captains.”60 This was an issue in the death of George (Watson) 
Puckett, who was killed when he drilled into the bottom of an unexploded hole. 
Information regarding that misfire was not relayed between shifts. Bosses always knew 
there were misfires from previous shifts, yet no one advised Puckett when he started work. 
The coroner’s panel who investigated the death of Ernest Edward Burley at the Rochester 
Mine said: … that the Federal Government [should] enact a law compelling the inspection 
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of all explosives, fuses and caps” because one of the devices Burley was handling exploded 
prematurely.
61
 By 1912 every one of these suggestions was incorporated in whole or in 
part, into The Mine Act of Ontario with Amendments to 1912. 
The range of the juries’ findings and the assessment of responsibilities indicated a 
move toward mine safety that was motivated by a new awareness among miners. As will be 
seen in the Frederick Jefferies case, the doctrine of “assumed risk” was being challenged. 
Injured miners and their survivors could indeed receive financial redress for workplace 
accidents. Workers’ demands for improved health and safety were also promoted through 
the newly formed union.   
Veterans from the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) first appeared in 1905 and 
they were instrumental in organizing the first miners’ union in Cobalt during that winter.62 
Local 146 of the WFM held its first meeting late that March with 150 miners present 
asking for increased wages and a shorter working day. A nascent mine managers’ 
organization rigidly opposed collective bargaining and refused to recognize the union. 
The fact that the Cobalt Miners Union was a local of the WFM and therefore associated 
with the Industrial Workers of the World, a union which supported a far too radical history 
for the comfort of the [Cobalt] managers, gave further cause for management opposition.
63
 
 
A strike involving 3,000 men and thirty Cobalt-area mines followed in 1907. While wages 
were the principal concern, the conditions of work and the length of shifts were also 
prominent in the schedule of demands. The strike fizzled and no distinct winner or loser 
was established but “… bunk and boarding house conditions and mine safety and sanitation 
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rules were improved considerably.”64 Committees were formed to continue looking into 
other areas that might benefit miners’ lives. 
In the face of this new worker militancy, mine inspectors started pressuring 
individual companies to improve their health and safety records: “… mine owners and 
managers [should take to heart that] their respective spheres contribute to the causes 
leading up to so disastrous a waste human life, and by whose cooperation only can such 
waste be reduced ….”65 The Bureau’s independent, and successful, prosecution of Beaver 
Consolidated Mines for two deaths in 1909 “to the maximum provided by the Act”66 
confirmed a renewed commitment to occupational safety. The deaths of Andrew Osman 
and John Aha revealed that management had not constructed or installed the requisite 
ladderways “… thereby practically compelling their employees to break the law by riding 
the bucket ….”67 The Bureau’s prosecution established by example that “… direct 
negligence on the part of management” that resulted in serious injury or death was 
prosecutable and that government action could be taken in addition to any civil remedies 
that might be available to the victim or his survivors.
68
 That same year, the Columbus 
Cobalt Silver Company was written up and criticized for its lack of attention to the Mines 
Act regarding the deaths of William Hamilton, Fred McNulty and Edward Martin. They fell 
out of a bucket and down 150 feet of the main shaft to their deaths. On December 3
rd
 
Inspector Corkill had warned the company to “forbid riding in the bucket.” Three weeks 
later, ignoring Corkill’s admonition, the on-going practice led to the men’s deaths.69 
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Consequently, when summing up “Shaft Accidents” for the year, the province agreed with 
the coroners’ juries that insisted companies act with greater regard for worker safety and 
the laws. Corkill argued that managements’ excuses in cases related to deaths and injuries 
related to riding the skips were “… inadmissible and merely subterfuges to shirk 
responsibility”.70 These actions by the government suggest a new way of understanding and 
protecting mine workers’ from preventable injuries. 
In 1908, in response to the findings and recommendations of various coroners’ 
juries, Ontario’s chief mine’s inspector E.T. Corkill reevaluated miners’ health and 
workplace safety as he attempted to add a sense of gravitas to the extant legislation. Corkill 
authored a “special report” on mining accidents in Ontario. It began: “The prevention of 
accidents in mines has been the subject of much discussion both among mining men and by 
commissions appointed by the governments of various countries.”71 He reviewed Ontario’s 
record but mitigated fatalities statistically by measuring them against mining deaths in 
England, Spain, and South Africa. The raw numbers did not account for disparities between 
the types of mines being operated and the different technologies employed in them.
72
 His 
findings were, ultimately, favourable from the Ontario government’s point of view. For the 
first time however, the Chief Inspector included poignant criticisms of mine managements’ 
roles in occupational safety. Change was discernible in the ways the provincial government 
considered hardrock mining companies, the conditions of work and the miners’ putative 
complicity in accidents and fatalities. Corkill said that Ontario needed to assume 
responsibility for safety-related issues in its mines, metalliferous or otherwise. He wrote:  
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In metalliferous [hardrock] mining an accident seldom occurs in which a considerable 
number of men are killed … though in the course of a year they may [accumulate] to a 
large total. Public opinion is therefore not aroused; the management of the mine is not so 
much impressed with the importance of careful supervision; the miners are awakened for a 
few days and then forget and the same conditions prevail as before.
73
 
 
He sought to attenuate the rising number of deaths but seemed at a loss to overcome the 
perceived apathy of the workplace, because there were no calamities or catastrophic events 
that claimed dozens of lives at a time. The singularity of most mining deaths was local 
which usually minimized the attention they received. 
Nonetheless, the steady increase in fatalities continued. Increased legislation, new 
layers of bureaucracy, advancing mining technologies and medical treatments did not slow 
the annual toll; deaths more than doubled between 1907 and 1908. The Bureau was stymied 
and said so: 
It is not apparent what further aid can be rendered by legislation; the regulations embodied 
in the Mining Act, if carried out with strictness, probably being sufficient to eliminate 
nearly all causes of accident which can be foreseen or guarded against. A heavy 
responsibility rests upon managers, superintendents and foremen … to insist upon the 
utmost possible care being taken by those under them…. Example is better than precept … 
human life is precious and … nothing should be left undone to rob the business of mining 
of as much of its hazard as possible.
74
 
 
This recognized the ongoing disconnect between the theory that legislation and regulations 
could ameliorate the situation and the fact that they did not on a practical basis. More than 
forty miners were killed annually so it became necessary to look for alternatives. Corkill’s 
1908 analysis was motivated in part by the belief that “An important part of the Inspector’s 
duties is to see that proper precautions as required by law are taken to protect the lives and 
safety of mining employees ….”75 The failure of the existing procedures was confirmed 
quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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Corkill reviewed the three classifications of mining accident causes in Ontario. 
They were: 1) dangers inherent in the nature of the work; 2) accidents caused by 
management; 3) accidents caused by workmen. It remained the role of the mine inspectors 
to determine which category applied to a given incident, and there was still no uniformity 
among the inspectors. Falls from ladders, for instance, could be blamed on the company or 
the miner. Accidents from riding on the skip - a practice that was tacitly sanctioned by most 
companies - might be blamed on the injured party or management. Each inspector acted 
autonomously. He used his discretion not a normative rule or guideline. Corkill compared 
Ontario’s classifications to those in Germany, which had four: 1) dangers inherent in the 
nature of the work = 69.31% of injuries and fatalities; 2) defects in mine workings = 0.78% 
of injuries and fatalities; 3) fault of fellow workmen = 3.24% of injuries and fatalities; 4) 
fault of the injured person = 26.67% of injuries and fatalities. Corkill focused on the second 
one: 
This table shows a most satisfactory state of affairs in the case of the German mines, since 
.78 per cent only of the accidents resulted from defects in the workings [of the mine]. It is a 
condition which might quite readily be attained in our mines in Ontario but only through 
the active co-operation of all the mine managers in the Province.
76
 
 
Corkill’s comment suggested that the managers of Ontario’s mines could, and should, 
realize a comparable level of safety to Germany’s; owners and managers in Ontario needed 
to provide safer conditions for employees working above and below ground.  
The rapidly increasing number of deaths in Ontario prompted a reassessment of the 
Bureau’s accident and fatality taxonomies. The discretion used by a Mine Inspector for 
determining the seriousness of an injury changed almost overnight. New regulations 
stipulated that ““Serious personal injury” shall mean such an injury as in the opinion of the 
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attending physician [emphasis added] may result in the injured person being incapacitated 
for work for at least seven days.”77 Any bone fracture or dislocation was deemed “serious” 
without further interpretation. The Bureau’s understanding of accidents was surrendered to 
the medical community. The contract doctor alone determined the classification of an 
injury. These responsibilities were in keeping with workplace practices in Europe and the 
western United States and, as will be shown in the following pages, began a subtle change 
in the relationship between the companies and the contracted physicians.
78
 As a result of 
the new rules, the Statistical Review of 1909 revealed a revised assignment of blame for the 
forty-seven men killed that year.  
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Causes of Mining Fatalities in Ontario, 1908
79
 
Cause of Fatality Number of deaths Percentage of Total 
Unknown or inherent in the 
nature of the work 
21 44.7% 
Through the neglect or 
carelessness of the 
management 
15 31.9% 
Through the fault a fellow 
worker 
4 8.5% 
Through the fault of the 
injured miner only 
7 14.9% 
Table 3.3 
 
The burden of blame shifted to the companies and mine managers and away from the men. 
The dead and injured, either directly or in combination with co-workers, were only held 
responsible for eleven deaths (23.4% of the total) while the companies were responsible for 
fifteen (31.9% of the time). Prior to this, the fixing of blame in fatalities was not reported in 
this these terms. The result of the reclassifications was that workplace conditions were seen 
as mutable rather than fixed or immanent. 
The concluding paragraph of the 1908 report on Mining Accidents exhorted 
managers, superintendents and foremen “… to set an example of prudence and 
determination to avoid all risks or dangerous practices. Example is better than precept 
….”80 Instead of relying on old bromides about miners being careless and disposed to 
acting foolishly, Chief Inspector Corkill focused on management. He said: 
When we consider that 32.6 per cent. of the accidents which resulted in fatalities in 1908 in 
Ontario, were caused by neglect, carelessness or incompetence of mine managers, we are 
presented with a condition of affairs obviously requiring radical improvement. A lack of 
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discipline and supervision, besides increasing the danger of the work, indicates a lack of 
mine efficiency and so influences detrimentally the cost of the output.
81
 
 
By framing his comments in economic terms, Corkill argued that attention to occupational 
heath and safety concerns was both responsible and profitable. He included the following 
admonition to the managers: 
In a number of [accident] cases it is to be feared that shift bosses spend too much of their 
time inspecting a soft seat in the boiler house, or a warm spot alongside the pump, to 
properly supervise the work in a mine. It is not alleged that [Ontario’s] mines do not have 
enough officials, as in some cases there are possibly too many and the work is shifted from 
one to the other until no one does it properly, but it is contended that the managers in a 
number of cases do not personally see that the mining work is properly looked after by their 
assistants.
82
 
 
This expression of dissatisfaction with management, rather than workers, signaled a shift in 
the analysis of miner health and safety. The assessment of responsibility would be broader 
than before and there would be new opportunities for prevention. 
Workmen’s Compensation Legislation 
 Concerns arising from the annual death totals in the mining sector - and industry 
generally - prompted a lobby for new worker compensation legislation. The likelihood of 
more and more litigation was manifestly troubling to business owners and managers. It was 
not a coincidence that the loudest call for change resided with them. As an ongoing cost of 
business - that would be shared with the men they employed - management sought 
universal compensation to defray whatever potential liabilities might occur over as broad a 
base as possible. England had already updated its legislation as had many other European 
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countries.
83
 The questions being asked by Ontario’s miners had already been answered 
across most of Europe where “tacit moral obligation,” requiring financial redress for 
workplace accidents, was already practiced. Indeed immigrants from Great Britain were 
aware that this legislation was in place and it is likely that they expected similar coverage 
in Ontario. Through the Western Miners’ Union fairer compensation for dead and injured 
miners in America had been negotiated in the 1890s.
84
 The protection of miners, and the 
equitable treatment of their survivors and caregivers, was at the heart of some of the 
earliest union negotiations across the border.
85
 European legislation, however, was at the 
vanguard of change in compensation. 
England passed its first workers’ compensation legislation in 1880; it was called the 
Employer’s Liability Act. Ontario copied large sections of it sequaciously and enacted it as 
Lord Campbell’s Act in 1887. While it purported to provide compensation to injured 
workers, it followed the legal precedent of assumed risk. This has been researched and 
examined by scholars like Michael Piva, R.C.B. Risk and Eric Tucker. Their work reveals 
that worker protections were largely theoretical. To Ontario’s miners the law stated:   
(1) because a worker is free to refuse to work in hazardous conditions, an employee who 
continues to work alongside a negligent fellow servant is deemed to have contractually 
assumed the risk of injury resulting from such negligence; and (2) because workers are in a 
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position as good as, or better than, the employer to detect negligence in their fellow 
servants, they are better able to protect themselves from the risk of injury by reporting the 
misconduct to the employer for appropriate action. There was also a general apprehension 
towards expanding liability “to an alarming extent”. Therefore the employee should bear 
the risk of injury.
86
 
 
This required the miners to know in advance that their co-worker(s) was/were careless or 
negligent. Accountability resided with the workers who were supposed to be better 
informed about the circumstances of their workplace than the corporations who hired them. 
This was particularly onerous on foreign-speaking immigrant workers. 
In 1892, coincident with the passage of the first Mine Act of Ontario, the province 
revised its workplace legislation with The Workmen’s Compensation for Injuries Act. It 
was revised and updated again in 1897. The 1892 revisions applied new definitions that 
identified miners as labourers. A labourer was considered to be, “… a man who digs and 
does other work of that kind with his hands … not requiring the exercise of any 
extraordinary skill ….”87  Because the law forbade women and children from working in 
Ontario mining, the definition articulated a priori masculinity in the industry. Despite 
differences in the types of mines, the kinds of minerals being extracted and advances in 
technologies, the mimetic nature of the 1892 legislation held that Ontario’s miners did not 
evidence any specialization(s) in the discharge of their duties. Labourers were suppliers of 
muscle power.  
Germany, England, Spain and Belgium developed programs that provided relief to 
miners in particular – and other workers generally – while saving companies harmless from 
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financial penalties.
88
 The principal corporate advantage was the “no fault” nature of the 
claims. Collectively they would all absorb small costs associated with injuries and fatalities 
according to predetermined government formulae. Circumstances similar to those in 
Ontario had already been analyzed and acted upon elsewhere. The answers formulated in 
Europe and America bore directly on how Ontario adjudicated the future claims of its 
workers.
89
  
Ontario’s mine managers were anxious to shield themselves from financial 
liabilities.
90
  
In Ontario no substantial change in the law has been made for nearly twenty-five years. A 
consideration of the systems of other countries should therefore not only prove suggestive, 
but should assist materially in avoiding their defects and in devising a measure for this 
Province which shall be economically sound as well as practicable.
91
 
 
Hearings related to the establishment of a new compensation agency were handled by the 
Meredith Commission.
92
 There were twenty-seven sittings of the Commission beginning in 
October 1911.
93
 Notably the third one was held in Cobalt and it was devoted exclusively to 
mining. Testimonies were taken from both managers and miners. The first was Mr. Ware 
representing local unions and they submitted a thirteen point proposal that sought, “The 
doctrine of negligence on the part of employees, or employer fellow servant or otherwise 
                                                 
88
 “Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers.” Sir W.R. Meredith. Toronto. L.K. 
Cameron. 1913. 
89
 By 1910 most of the other seven Canadian provinces had already adopted new worker compensation laws: 
British Columbia (1902); Alberta (1905); New Brunswick (1908); Manitoba (1910) and Saskatchewan 
(1911). All were based on the new “professional risk” philosophy which did away with guilt associated with 
assumed risk, contributory negligence and common employment.   
90
 See Wegenast, F.W. Workmen’s Compensation for Injuries. A Sketch of the Present Law in Ontario and a 
Comparison of the Systems of Some Other Countries. Canadian Manufacturers Association. Toronto. 1911. 
91
 Wegenast, F.W. Workmen’s Compensation for Injuries. 1911. preface. 
92
 It was named after The Honourable Sir William Ralph Meredith CJ, CP. He was a former leader of the 
Ontario Conservative party and a former Chief Justice of Ontario. In 1910 he was appointed by Premier 
Whitney to investigate changes in worker compensation legislation. 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/meredith_william_ralph_15E.html 
93
 Only four sittings of the Meredith Commission were held outside of Toronto. The other sites were Cobalt, 
London, Berlin (now Kitchener), and Hamilton. 
117 
 
shall have no place in the new [WCB] legislation.”94 This focused attention on the health of 
the worker rather than the cause of the harm. Moreover, there were preliminary discussions 
of occupationally related conditions that affected men’s health.95 This was well before 
mining diseases like silicosis became the cause celebres they were in the 1930s.
96
 The 
concern of the Commission in 1911 however, was more about how to assign or apportion 
responsibility for a chronic illness than on how to effect physical and financial remedies.
97
 
The specific nature of mine-related diseases was not mentioned. The Meredith Commission 
eventually recommended that a new government operated agency be established which 
would oversee compensation claims for all of the province’s workers.98 
When the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Ontario took effect on January 1, 1915 
it revealed a top-down understanding of miners and mining as well as of occupational 
health and safety.
99
 The new Board did not act solely or specifically in the interests of 
miners; its mandate covered most workers in the province among a schedule of 
industries.
100
 Instead of seeing miners as brutish and reckless, they were viewed with some 
measure of sensitivity.
101
 This is not meant to convey the idea that the profile of mining 
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men was transformed overnight; rather it indicates when accidents and fatalities ceased 
being explained as intrinsic to a miner’s nature. Mine conditions including noise, 
temperature, dampness, dust, lighting, the presence or absence of electricity, lengths of 
shifts and air quality were considered anew. Equipment, including drills, picks, shovels, 
trams, skips, hoists, explosives, timbering, wiring, alarm systems and training, boots, 
helmets and even ear protection, were also re-evaluated to address the efficacy and safety 
of the work. As a result, and coupled with the renewed enforcement of extant rules and 
regulations, fatalities began to decline. The highest number of fatalities recorded in a single 
year, during the time period under study, peaked at sixty-four in 1913.
102
  
 The format by which mining deaths were reported also changed when the new 
WCB legislation took effect. For more than twenty years the province had consistently 
included a quarter or half page report – two to three paragraphs – on each incident. Mine 
inspectors noted the name, age, ethnicity, marital status and circumstance surrounding each 
fatality. Work conditions were written up alongside collateral details. Then the coroner’s 
findings were added – if a coroner had been called – and blame located. Beginning in 1915 
the annual reports quit that format in favour of charts. Whereas annual “Mining Accidents” 
had regularly occupied thirty to fifty pages – sometimes as many as seventy – it was 
immediately reduced to six or seven.
103
 Full paragraphs were culled to only one line. New 
Chief Inspector of Mines, T. F. Sutherland, may have been responsible for the new 
presentation format.  
                                                 
102
 In 1928 there were eighty-five men killed in Ontario’s mines. This study, however, ends in 1925. In 1914 
there were fifty-eight men killed but the numbers were consistently below forty otherwise. Fatalities did not 
fall below twenty deaths per year until after World War Two.  See annual Bulletins and Reports on the 
Mining Accidents in Ontario. 1915-1950. 
103
 In the 1912 Annual Report, Mining Accidents were found from pages 55 to 99. In 1914, they covered 
pages 53 – 109. For the year 1916 they only ran from pages 67 – 73 inclusive.  
119 
 
 
Contract Doctors 
What roles did physicians occupy in this new approach to miners’ health? There 
were frontier doctors before 1905 but little is known about them. Sources involving 
individual workers between 1905 and 1915 offer a few insights into their relationships with 
contract doctors. More by circumstance than design, physicians mediated the labour-
management-government link. Mine doctors had to service their contracts as best they 
could, according to their abilities and the location of the sites. Dr. Herman Bryan, for 
example, continued to travel by dogsled to practice what he called “snowshoe medicine.”104  
Dr. Bryan worked out of Nipigon for three years beginning in 1905. In his first year 
he logged a tremendous distance: “… over 4000 miles in a canoe and 1100 miles on show-
shoes covering every canoe route of the North to the Trans-Continental Railway between 
Nipigon and Missinabie and then cross country in the winter time with dogs.”105 It remains 
clear that although sophisticated medical techniques were taking place in urban centres, 
like Toronto, they remained largely unavailable to mining communities across the north.
106
 
In his memoir Dr. Clifford Smylie recalled: “It was a great thrill to be on my own to 
practice ‘medicine, surgery and midwifery’ but more than a little terrifying at times to be so 
far from more experienced advice, and the facilities of a hospital.”107  
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The terms of doctors’ contracts were extensive. Each doctor was required to attend 
at the mines “as often as necessary” and not less than one a month; he was required to 
deliver “adequate medical and surgical care”; and also to file detailed reports with the 
Minister of Health, and the Bureau of Mines, that related to deaths and diseases 
encountered through the contracting employer. Doctors were paid the gross amounts 
deducted from the employees’ wages during the previous month.108 “Adequate” was a 
subjective word that each doctor addressed in terms of his personal competencies. “As 
often as necessary” was equally vague and malleable. Notwithstanding the expansiveness 
of the regulations, the interpretations of them in the field were narrower and personal. For 
example, near Trenton, Dr. Robertson was asked to inspect several camps following 
complaints of sore throats. He said the camps were well-built, well-ventilated, and clean, 
and that the provisions were of the best kind, “both as to quantity, quality, everything 
necessary to a healthy diet being supplied as well as many of the luxuries.”109 There was no 
explanation or treatment for the sore throats, the matter ended with the doctor’s exoneration 
of the facilities. It is possible that another doctor could have made another determination 
but Dr. Robertson worked only according to his expertise; no independent standard existed 
for him to adhere to. 
The quality and administration of camp medicines did not change much between 
1905 and 1915. Camp doctors, as noted by Dr. Bryan’s example, continued to ply their 
services in much the same ways as they had earlier. Some doctors were valorized and 
constructed as heroic personalities, especially considering the efforts they made to attend 
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upon a sick or injured patient under difficult, even dire, circumstances. Consequently, a 
doctor’s masculinity derived in part from a willingness to take personal risks or endure 
hardships attending upon patients. Newspaper articles like that reported in the Sault Star 
said: “Dr. J.E. Gimby Made 100 Mile Trip to Batchewana … to Attend Sick Guide; 
Perilous but Interesting Journey.”110 News stories trumpeted the adventures of medical 
men. Significantly the doctors’ reports offered minimal amounts of information about how 
they intervened. The treatment - the success or failure of the call - paled when compared to 
the seemingly superhuman efforts made by doctors to reach their destinations. A cult of 
heroism grew up around some physicians. Admiration was fuelled by accounts of 
selflessness and courage, rather than technical abilities, sophisticated diagnoses or complex 
interventions. Algoma physician Dr. H.M. Ross’ ninety-fifth birthday was remembered in 
the community of Richard’s Landing (outside present-day Thunder Bay) by recalling that 
he never refused to see a patient, regardless of how perilous the travel conditions.
111
 By 
comparison, doctors who lived and worked in urban communities were lauded more for the 
depth and breadth of their educations, their medical accomplishments, and their 
professional associations. For example, Dr. R.J. Gibson of Sault Ste. Marie was 
posthumously remembered for being president of the Ontario Medical Council, his 
extensive practice, his community leadership and his church affiliations.
112
 There were no 
legendary exploits to praise, so different qualities were valued in cities than in mining 
communities. 
The nature of quotidian duties outlined in doctors’ contracts justified the payments 
but the work did not require a lot of technical sophistication. Travel was the ever-present 
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encumbrance. Seldom could eight or nine camp visits be accommodated in a single day.
113
 
The distances between stops, the modes of transportation – rivers, bridges, corduroy roads, 
tote paths and confederation highways – breakdowns and unpredictable weather conditions 
in winter and summer, conspired to deny even the most diligent of practitioners a route that 
included more than three, perhaps four, sites in a day.  
The corollary to this was that doctors believed “real miners” should not bother them 
with trifling complaints. Physicians did not want to be called out for what they regarded as 
minor conditions: an ache, a discomfort, or an irritation.
114
 If there was an emergency call, 
then the condition of the patient ought to be commensurate with the effort to reach him.  
Men were supposed to tolerate, and work stoically, through strains, aches, bruises, minor 
lacerations, discomforts and ailments that did not render them prostrate. These matters 
could be attended to on one of the doctor’s regularly scheduled camp visits; they certainly 
did not merit an emergency call. Dr. Clifford Smylie vividly recalled his reaction to a mid-
winter, middle-of-the-night journey to a camp he was contracted to:  
[messages] were often so vague … I never knew what to expect so [I] always took plenty of 
equipment including maternity kit, an assortment of pills and medicine and a well 
stocked(sic) emergency kit and dental forceps. One cold night I don’t forget, we had one of 
these trips to a camp about fifteen miles away. Arriving about 2 a.m. half frozen, I was 
disgusted to find the patient sitting beside the stove nursing a toothache. I took the tooth out 
but was almost provoked enough to yank his whole head off, even though I realized a 
toothache can be painful. He was paying a dollar a month for medical care, so [the patient] 
could see no reason why he should make the trip to me on a cold night. After all, what else 
are doctors for[?]
115
 
 
Dr. Smylie’s inclination to want to yank the patient’s “whole head off” indicated feeling ill-
used on that call. Doctors took steps to deter malingerers; there are accounts of some who 
applied poultices with heavy adhesive tapes on hirsute men, then tore them off and 
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reapplied them at each visit until the patient felt well again. It usually only took one 
treatment to distinguish the counterfeiters.
116
 There was a separation rather than an 
alignment of interests between doctors and patients. The type of medicine being contracted 
was little more than first aid. They associated minor complaints with shamming. Smylie’s 
sarcastic comment about what doctors were for, privileged the physician’s time rather than 
the patient’s discomfort. He did not see himself as a paid employee in the same way that 
miners were. His remark reveals a distance between doctors and their charges. But one area 
of universal concern was contagious diseases. 
 In February 1913 provincial Health Inspector George Young
117
 learned of an 
outbreak of smallpox in the mixed logging and mining interests near Hearst. He promptly 
contacted the town Reeve and ordered the immediate and thorough disinfection of all 
homes and structures where the disease had been or might still reside. The source was “… 
an Italian and Spanish boarding house.”118 The workforce – a combination of miners and 
loggers – was quarantined for fourteen days until the danger passed. The Provincial Board 
of Health also published and distributed a variety of pamphlets, photographs and papers on 
diseases like smallpox, diphtheria, scarlet fever, consumption and typhoid, not just 
schedules of regulations like the Bureau of Mines.
119
 Mine inspectors were ill-equipped to 
deal with health matters related to diseases, infections and sanitation beyond rudimentary 
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stipulations in the Mine Act. The province adopted a bifurcated approach to monitoring 
mining environments: the Bureau of Health looked after diseases and sanitation in the 
camps, while the Bureau of Mines attended to work-related or occupational health. 
Doctors, however, were the link as they were often cross-appointed and filled multiple 
roles. Licensed physicians accepted contracts with the province as contract doctors, 
coroners and with municipalities as District Health Officers but they were not guardians of 
workplace safety.  
Dr. Thos. S.T. Smellie
120
 (1849 – 1925) maintained a diverse and widespread 
practice in Port Arthur/Fort William; he owned several drug stores and a newspaper in 
addition to his private patients and contracts with Canadian Pacific and local mines. He was 
the archetypal frontier physician; he was not only well-educated but a physical force:  
… he stood six foot three in his stockings and weighed some two hundred and forty 
pounds. His ample arms were fashioned to wield a mighty pike or claymore. His massive 
neck and head … bespoke a Viking inheritance.
121
  
 
The reverential nature of this description is typical of the esteem some rural doctors 
claimed. Dr. Smellie’s reputation grew because he selflessly contracted smallpox while 
treating infected miners. The doctor recovered and resumed his work with renewed vigor, 
encouraged by his resistance to future infections. When the disease returned to camps in the 
Lakehead area two years later, Smellie, as the District Health Officer, quarantined the 
camps but went to live among sufferers for more than a month. He did not return until the 
danger had completely passed. His actions were celebrated in a civic ceremony: “On his 
return to town … he was given a public reception and presented with an address in 
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appreciation of his services.”122 All of the attention was focused on his effort and courage 
rather than the success of his mission. 
To miners and their families Dr. Smellie embodied everything a doctor was 
supposed to be: solicitous, considerate, indefatigable, knowledgeable and fearless. To him, 
the affected men were transparently in need of continuing medical intervention. His 
presence was not about minor lacerations, bruises or personal aches and discomforts but 
about saving lives. The men admired his example. He did not discriminate or comment on 
the ethnicities of smallpox victims. He made himself available day and night to all who 
were afflicted and this won him great approbation.   
Doctors were a breed apart from trammers, muckers and the like. When physicians, 
like Dr. Smellie, voluntarily put themselves into harm’s way (like miners did also) either 
by subjecting themselves to the hazards of travel, the perils of weather, exposure to 
diseases or the elements of a disaster, the miners accepted them. Physicians who engaged 
in behaviours of commensurate risk, although not the same as those faced by miners, 
exemplified a sense of masculinity that testified to their manhood. In such circumstances 
doctors were perceived as being with the men, if not of the men.
123
 Under those conditions 
doctors were not adversaries or corporate officers, they were viewed more paternally. 
Furthermore, the physicians who undertook dangerous missions demonstrated 
characteristics that mine owners and shareholders did not. Although a doctor’s 
comportment did not evidence the rugged muscular masculinity that informed the camps
124
, 
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bravery and selflessness spoke volumes about their manliness. A doctor’s bearing implied a 
level of caring that elevated them above their contracts or the need for a paycheque. The 
courage present in doctors’ actions was valourous. This was what made the previously 
mentioned Dr. Smellie so heroic: he persistently ministered to smallpox patients even after 
being personally afflicted by the disease. Following his recovery he stayed with the men 
until the last case was dealt with. It was an extraordinary demonstration of courage.   
Commensurate risk masculinity demonstrated a parallel level of masculine courage 
to a group of men identified by rugged masculinity. For example, an educated man with 
soft-hands – like a physician – who risked his personal safety by traversing a dangerous 
landscape or entering a life threatening environment, like a collapsed mine, would be 
understood benignly. Doctors were, of course, breadwinners for their families. They 
worked to provide the best lifestyles they could for their wives and children. It was, 
therefore, a doctor’s willingness to leave his family in the middle of the night, in difficult 
                                                                                                                                                    
With trolley cars and pavements hard 
And theatres where you go, 
You have your little auto 
And carriages so fine 
But it’s hobnail boots and a flannel shirt 
In Cobalt town for mine 
 
We’ve got the only Lang Street 
There’s blind pigs everywhere 
Old Cobalt Lake’s a dirty place 
There’s mud all over the square 
We’ve got the darndest railroad 
That never runs on time 
But it’s hobnail boots and flannel shirt 
In Cobalt town for mine. 
 
The song appears in many different publications usually without attribution. In his autobiography Dr. Clifford 
Smylie credits the words to “Steenman”. See Northern Doctor. Cobalt. Highway Book Store. 2002. pp.38-39 
There are other verses to this song but they all speak to the rough atmosphere that real mining men embraced. 
They tolerated, then overcame their hardships. In fact they celebrated their abilities to bear all manner of 
insects, cold, heat, mud, loneliness and isolation, poor food, low wages, adverse working conditions and 
much more.  
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weather, to preserve a miner’s breadwinner status, which spoke to his masculinity. Being 
called out for a toothache in the dead of winter, as seen with Dr. Smylie, meant that the 
patient’s masculinity failed to meet the doctor’s threshold. Even more highly valued was a 
doctor’s willingness to treat the members of a miner’s family if present, even when not 
covered by the contract.
125
  Deductions from paycheques were solely for the employee’s 
medical and occupational health. Families were not included. 
The policy was that the hospital was for the workers only – not for their wives or children. 
Accordingly, payment of dependents’ medical expenses and securing medical and hospital 
care for them were burdens for the men alone. This meant that some very sick women and 
children … were required to travel the five miles to Haileybury to secure hospital 
services.
126
 
  
Pregnant wives, sick and injured children fell beyond the purview of the contracts. 
Sometimes, especially during crises and epidemics (like smallpox) family members were 
denied admittance by the companies, not the doctors.
127
  They could not override the 
company when it came to deciding who would and would not be allowed access because it 
was a private facility. Mine owners claimed it was a business decision, not a medical or 
social one. Nonetheless, doctors were loathe to deny treatment to someone in need so it was 
common for them to quietly and privately see the patient at a different location. Miners 
valued doctors who extended these services, usually for foodstuffs or a prescribed amount 
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of labour.
128
 Contract physicians found a quiet middle ground which companies might 
influence but not control. Under the umbrella of the Ontario Medical Association, contract 
doctors gradually began asserting some autonomy. 
Notwithstanding the shared aspects of masculinity that have been described, there 
was no implied or practiced sense of equality between miners and physicians. Class kept 
them apart and mediated another form of masculinity. Doctors carved out social positions, 
never fully transcending their middle-class status but distinguishing themselves from mine 
owners. Across the industry, educated upper-class physicians were not expected to 
demonstrate physical, rugged, masculinity like working-class men. Masculinity was as 
stratified as the society in which it was found. Physicians in Toronto and legislators at 
Queen’s Park were measured by educational, social or financial mores. To be deemed 
unskilled, and perceived only as muscle power, essentially meant being socially devalued. 
The all-male provincial legislature consistently supported a discrete philosophical and 
social separation from those who toiled; this was demonstrated by the lack of alarm, 
funding and prosecutions in the Annual Reports of the Bureau of Mines up to 1904.  
Northern physicians were evaluated more by their willingness, or readiness, to brave 
threatening environments. An example of this was the way similar behaviours were 
interpreted differently between social classes. 
Miner illiteracy
129
 continued to cause risk-laden actions to be characterized as 
careless, stupid or reckless.
130
 Doctors were known to be educated and licensed. Therefore 
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it followed that a university-educated doctor knew enough to weigh the conditions, 
appreciate the dangers, and act in an intelligent manner. Consequently, doctors did not have 
to justify their decisions; their backgrounds testified to the worthiness of their choices. 
Second, that doctors acted in the service of others to save, protect and restore lives and 
health. The altruistic nature of their work meant that their decisions were born of 
compassion not recklessness. Doctors who exposed themselves to dangers, like Gimby and 
Bryan, were celebrated in local papers. Miners who worked with decrepit ladderways, dust-
saturated workspaces and faulty explosive charges were their own worst enemies as 
evidenced by the comments of mine inspectors. 
Urban practitioners were also exposed to perils related to contagions but they were 
able to operate as private, personal doctors in addition to holding contracts, like those for 
fraternal societies. Their opportunities were far broader than those across the frontier. City 
doctors, who often held social and political influence, were less a part of the nascent 
socialized medicine legislated in the camps. City doctors were individuated. They were 
obligated only to the patients who chose them voluntarily; there was no obligation to see a 
patient unless they were invited to and wanted to.
131
 Most urban physicians were not under 
the same kinds of blanket contracts to companies with rosters of anonymous (immigrant) 
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the City’s Health. The subtitle, “Guardians of the City’s Health” suggested a protective role rather than one 
predicated on a business contract. They were therefore more philanthropic than their counterparts in the north. 
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employees. So although city doctors might have been equally heroic, they were not usually 
interpreted as valuably as those who worked in the shadow of mines. Essentially, private 
doctors were their own men and did not have to exert their independence or demonstrate 
their impartiality; it was a given. 
Finally, as the mining industry lobbied for a blame-free compensation bureau, 
doctors slowly gained an independent voice. This meant that physicians could act 
impartially, favouring neither the company nor the miners. What emerged was a new, 
autonomous, medical perspective.  
The new compensation legislation not only framed the relationship between 
masculinity, medicine and miners, it also structured a new understanding between miners 
and the local medical community. Physicians began to play more independent roles. This 
meant that the WCB Act could be as effective as the doctors’ findings. There was enough 
room for interpretation that contract doctors could regard miners independently of the 
contracts that were signed with the companies. The new bureau provided a buffer between 
the three parties and allowed the circumstances to be tested rather than the miners.  
 
Breadwinner Mentality among Miners 
 New camps were mostly populated by single men. They were either bachelors or 
married men whose families remained absent until the work and local services were well 
established.
132
  While there are widely held perceptions of raucous behaviours, the 
breadwinner mentality – though largely unarticulated and under-reported – seems to have 
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 For a fuller look at the significance of single men in this environment see Nancy Forestell. “Bachelors, 
Boarding Houses and Blind Pigs.” pp.251-290. Anthony Chan. “Bachelor Workers”. A Nation of Immigrants. 
edited by Franca Iacovetta. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1998. pp. 231-250. Robert F. Harney. “Men 
Without Women: Italian Immigrants in Canada 1885-1930.” A Nation of Immigrants. edited by Franca 
Iacovetta. Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 1998. pp.206 - 230 
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been common, if not pervasive. Newspaper stories of drunkenness and rough behaviours 
belie the quieter comportment of most miners. The following example is illustrative. 
Frederick Jeffries was killed in a dynamite explosion on June 21, 1908. He was 
employed by the City of Fort William while working in the Loch Lomond tunnel; it was 
part of the new water supply system for the city. Technically, Jeffries was not a miner – he 
was not harvesting valuable ores – but a comparison of his lifestyle and workplace 
conditions to those of hardrock miners proves the two indistinguishable; the type and style 
of work and the equipment and materials used were identical, only the purpose differed. 
The Jeffries’ case provides a rich source of documents for analysis, including: 
correspondence between his widow and his employer; letters from opposing lawyers; 
insurance companies; and witnesses to the fatality.  
Frederick Jeffries was born in England in 1874. At the time of his death, in 1908, he 
had a wife, Beatrice, and three children, ages ten, eight and six.
133
 Jeffries was hired as a 
labourer by the City of Fort William in April 1908. Specifically he was a “helper”; the 
scope of his work was not at all specialized; he was muscle power. At 12:30 a.m. on 
Sunday, June 21
st
, Jeffries was working with Jim Crowley: a twenty-seven year old, single, 
machine operator and the shift supervisor, with William Jack, a forty-year-old trammer, 
arried with two children
134
 and with David Suter who filed the following eyewitness 
account of how the fatality occurred.  
[William] Jack was picking [and] found a piece of dynamite about 1” sq.(one inch square) – 
[He] showed it to Jim Crowley who immediately stopped his machine – saying “You want to 
be very careful picking here” and proceeded to investigate with the pick (which he took from 
Jack) raking the rocks over to see if there was any more dynamite. At the second rake the 
explosion occurred – Jeffries [who] was standing by the machine – fell fd. dd [fell forward 
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 The names of the children are not present in any of the correspondence. 
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 In the explosion, William Jack lost both eyes and was maimed for life. The City recognized his injuries as 
being more severe – “his case is worse than yours” in their letter to Mrs. Jeffries dated November 24, 1908.  
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dead]. Jack stooped and was looking over [the] spot. Suter stepped behind [the] car out of 
Jim’s way. Suter made his way out of tunnel in the smoke and darkness and aroused(sic) the 
camp.
135
 
 
 The coroner empanelled a jury and investigated. The verdict was “that no blame 
could be attached to anyone.”136 Nonetheless the widow Jeffries, still in England, asked 
what could be done for her and her three children; she could not work because she was 
being trained as a nurse/midwife, while looking after three children and her dependent, 
sixty-five year old mother.
137
 The city demurred: “As you know [Mrs. Jeffries] blasting is 
always dangerous work, and any man who follows this work for a livelihood knows that 
there is always danger notwithstanding the exercise of the utmost care.”138 Although it was 
formally relying on its legal position, the City of Fort William was, nonetheless, prepared 
to pay something to the surviving members of Jeffries’ family.  Mr. Hancock, the city’s 
engineer and the man in charge of the case, asked after Mrs. Jeffries’ circumstances on 
August 6
th
 and hinted that some financial consideration might be forthcoming.  
… the City of Fort William does not consider that it is legally responsible in the 
circumstances which unfortunately caused your husband’s death, but they recognize that 
there was a moral obligation to do something for you …139 
 
Nonetheless, her suggestion that £300 was the appropriate amount was derided. In related 
correspondence officials commented that “… [Mrs. Jeffries’] ideas are a bit large”.140  
Interestingly, the city used Mr. Jacks, who was permanently maimed and blinded in the 
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 Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society. City of Fort William fonds. Unmarked copy of David Suter’s 
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 Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society. City of Fort William fonds. Unmarked. Letter from City 
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of Fort William to Beatrice Jeffries dated August 11, 1908. 
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 Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society. Excerpted from a letter to Mrs. Jeffries in late August or early 
September 1908. 
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 Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society. See letter from The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation 
to Beatrice Jeffries dated September 17, 1908. 
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incident, as the barometer of reasonableness. Mr. Jack’s willingness to “…take a 
reasonable settlement and not go to law about it” was considered strong evidence against 
Mrs. Jeffries’ position.141 She was reminded that Mr. Jack’s case was worse than hers as his 
disabilities would make him a burden on his family for the rest of his life. The city 
presumed that the comparatively clean break brought about by Fred’s instantaneous death 
would somehow be easier for her to bear, both emotionally and financially. And while this 
may have had some merit in emotional terms it utterly denied the sudden and unforeseen 
financial burden his loss imposed. Ostensibly Fred Jeffries had had five people relying on 
his income. Beatrice had no viable or sustaining source of revenue. Likely the City 
expected her to remarry. Although Fort William identified a “moral responsibility,” Mrs. 
Jeffries was neither local, nor was she a voting citizen, so it did not feel a need to act 
expediently. There was no local uproar over her circumstances. 
Over the following months however the City began to relent; in November it 
offered Mrs. Jeffries £100
142
 as “settlement in full for both yourself and your children”.143 
Hancock acknowledged: 
In England … where a man is injured or killed under such circumstances, he or his widow 
is entitled to compensation as a matter of course according to a certain Schedule laid down 
by Law, but in this Country it is only where the Employer is [legally] to blame for the 
accident that he is obliged to pay for anything, the employee being obliged to run the 
ordinary risks of employment.
144
 
 
Mrs. Jeffries retained legal counsel. 
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 During renewed negotiations the City forwarded the remaining personal effects of 
Mr. Jeffries together with a promise to send a photograph of his grave to comfort her. 
Additionally, townsfolk in Fort William contributed voluntarily to a “public subscription” 
fund for the accident victims’ families. It grew to about £60 which was split evenly 
between the Jeffries’ and the Jacks’ families.  
On November 13, 1908 Beatrice Jeffries wrote to the City again. She said that she 
had received about £11.0.0 in outstanding wages that were owed to her husband on the day 
he was killed. She lamented the paucity of the sum and explained that Fred was “a good 
man”; he had regularly sent her £8.10s per month to support their family and pay for her 
training as a nurse/midwife. Notably then, Fred Jeffries’ monthly remittance to England 
was over and above his personal maintenance in Fort William. From these small references 
it becomes apparent that Jeffries in particular, but certainly many other immigrant miners 
as well, was responsible for maintaining the lifestyle and living conditions of his family 
“back home.”  
Further evidence of the breadwinner ethic is found in the records of Frontier 
College. Using what they called a “Cross-Section of an “average” Canadian Camp”, 
eighty-one students, varying in ages from sixteen to fifty-seven, were asked if they saved 
portions of their wages. Only twenty-one percent (seventeen men) said they had no savings 
whatever. Almost eighty percent, (sixty-four men), said they saved between “some” and 
“very much”.145 Although the categories were subjectively interpreted, the indication is that 
                                                 
145
 All three Poles, between ages 30 – 40, who had been in camp over a month had savings. Similarly all four 
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the majority of Frontier College students (miners and loggers) were building nest-eggs; 
they saved in order to send for their families or take the savings home to help buy a home 
or farm. The numbers and the mentality that informed these numbers also suggests that 
most married men indulged in few extravagances or great creature comforts while working 
in Ontario’s Northland.  
Most of these workers preferred to save their wages. Savings were a source of great 
pride. They symbolized how much a man cared for his family. Savings testified to the 
discipline and masculinity of miners and loggers. Fred Jeffries had a savings account with 
the Bank of Montreal in which he had accumulated ₤36:12:11. This money was conveyed 
to his family in November 1908. Mrs. Jeffries praised the caring nature of her husband and 
his diligence in support of their home: “… if my husband had lived, my children would not 
have wanted for food, now I have to screw and pinch to make the money last ….”146 She 
then admonished the City of Fort William’s apathy saying, “We don’t treat people like that 
in England.”147  
Her letters maintained an urgent tone and repeated that her kids faced imminent 
starvation if help was not quickly forthcoming: “… they are all delicate children.”148 She 
said the remaining members of Jeffries’ family were on the verge of having to “apply to the 
gardiens [sic] of the parish”149 for food and shelter. The loss of their breadwinner 
represented an intense hardship for the surviving family. This was true of immigrants and 
Canadians alike. The other victim, William Jack, remained totally dependent on his family 
for the rest of his life.  
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Frederick Jefferies was not unique. The circumstances that followed his death 
exemplify the breadwinner mentality among Ontario’s miners. There were far more 
breadwinners than the disproportionate few – compared to the whole – who were arrested 
or reported to have acted in violation of local or provincial ordinances. Breadwinner 
masculinity was especially recognizable in immigrant miners, who arrived from Europe to 
find new opportunities to support their families back in Europe. The men in Ontario’s work 
camps placed a high priority on family obligations. Payroll records from the 1890s and 
through to 1915 show that both miners and lumberjacks preferred to keep very little money 
on hand for personal use, preferring instead to have employers remit the bulk of their 
earnings home.
150
 Typically a lumberjack or miner would have only minor deductions 
made for tobacco, tools, articles of clothing or other minor personal items. Besides which, 
cash often attracted unwanted attention in the camps; it was safer to have wages paid by 
cheque to wives and parents through the employer rather than to risk losing it in the bush 
accidentally, gaming, theft or otherwise. 
Mrs. Jeffries persistence, either through her increasingly desperate references to her 
“poor” children, or her retention of the law firm of Sarjeant and Cosling, eventually moved 
the City to raise its offer. By early December the City’s insurer, The Railway Passengers 
Assurance Company of London England, together with The Employers’ Liability 
Assurance Corporation Limited of London England recommended that one thousand 
Canadian dollars ($1000 Cdn) be paid in full settlement of Fred Jeffries’ death.  
On March 22
nd
, 1909, the last piece of correspondence from the file confirmed that 
a final payment of $1200 (£246) – more than double the original offer - was remitted to 
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Beatrice Jeffries, (the same amount received by William Jack): six hundred dollars each 
from the City of Fort William and The Railway Passengers Assurance Company. Jim 
Crowley, the shift foreman and alleged author of the explosion, was deemed to have been 
culpable in his own death and, as a result, there was no compensation provided to his 
successors or assigns. Although Crowley was single, his marital status did not appear to 
have played any role in the City of Fort William’s consideration of him, morally or 
financially. Nothing was ever paid to his family.  
Fred Jeffries’ workplace death was contested because he was the principal wage 
earner for his family. The Jeffries case reveals that by 1908 employers were beginning to 
recognize a tacit but implied moral obligation to some of the dead and injured miners. This 
was particularly true in instances among those who suffered death or permanent disability 
simply because they were present at the wrong time and place. The coincidence of time and 
place did not exempt employers from delivering some redress (compensation) to the 
innocents who were made vulnerable because of their fathers’ or husbands’ deaths. 
In the Jeffries’ matter, it is significant that the coroner’s jury did not assign any 
blame to the City of Fort William. Even more noticeable, and evidence of a shift toward a 
new attitude about workplace safety, was that the jury did not assign any blame to Jeffries 
either. By 1908 some juries were beginning to turn away from the shield of assumed risk. 
They favoured having corporations shoulder a larger share of the burden. Beatrice Jeffries 
was able to seek compensation, not only because her husband was absent of complicity but 
also because he was a “good man” and a reliable provider.  
  
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Striking a Balance: 
 
The Great War, Unions, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act  
 
(1915 -1925) 
 
 The political economy of mining changed dramatically with the outbreak of war. 
Demand for recruits and for minerals created new strains on the industry as well as on the 
bodies of the men who remained working in northern mines. After the war, the economy 
stabilized and miners occupied a slightly improved position regarding occupation health, 
injuries, and health care. This chapter examines how new challenges – including World 
War One and a new Workmen’s Compensation agency – affected not only mine workers 
but also the demands of the revived unions that represented them. The changes that took 
place encouraged union leaders to seek benefits that pushed the Bureau of Mines and mine 
owners to value occupational health and safety in new ways. This chapter follows the 
effects of complex, interwoven and overlapping forces through to 1925.  
 
The Mining Economy 1915-1925 
World War One was a boon to the mining economy of Ontario. Initially, markets 
reacted cautiously to the June 1914 assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo. In the short term, uncertainty caused the prices of precious metals and minerals to 
fall.
1
 International global warfare – and total war – was a new phenomenon and Canada’s 
role was unspecified beyond unbridled support for Great Britain.  
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 Precious metals were distinct from minerals like salt, gypsum and talc, as well as sand and gravel although 
they were all administered by the Bureau of Mines. 
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A worldwide depression in 1913 had depressed ore prices and hardrock mining in 
Northern Ontario had plateaued.
2
 In 1915 there were twenty-five percent fewer mining 
companies incorporated: fifty-nine compared to eighty the previous year. The Bureau of 
Mines report for 1915 recorded seventy-nine operating mines, sixty-two (78%) of which 
were profitable.
3
  The consolidation that had taken place in the mining industry had 
produced an overall contraction.
4
 There were 20,530 miners employed across Ontario in 
1914 but the following year those numbers were down to 17,190, a sixteen per cent drop.
5
 
Taxation streams and new claims also declined. The revenues the provincial government 
derived from that sector declined more than thirty percent to $342,986 from $503,668 the 
year before.
6
 The 25% royalty on ores at the collar of the shaft was changed to five percent 
of the net profits. This arrangement confirms that the provincial government was a partner 
of business in the resource economy.
7
  
As World War One took hold, explorations of remote northern regions of Ontario 
slowed.
8
 New approaches and methods for locating ore bodies and evaluating underground 
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 Production of Ontario’s mines in 1914 was already 13% lower than what it had been in 1913. Twenty-Fifth 
Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines. 1916. p.1. 
3
 Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1916. p. 1. The mining industry as a whole reported 
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 For a discussion of how and why mines began to merge see Chapter 12 in Michael Bliss’ Northern 
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6
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Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1916. p. 46. 
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of Development: forests, mines and hydro-electric power in Ontario 1849-1941. Second Edition. Kingston. 
McGill-Queens University Press. 2005. In particular see chapters eleven and twelve, “Politics as Business” 
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8
 Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines. See pages 68-69 of the 1918 Annual Report.   
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lodes began replacing traditional ones.
9
 In situ prospecting was still limited to the late 
spring, summer and early fall seasons; winter weather conditions continued to make access 
problematic. In some instances it was more economical to exploit extant sites rather than 
initiate new ones. In the Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Ontario Bureau of Mines, 
the provincial recorder at Port Arthur noted that the war had taken off so many prospectors 
there would likely be no new discoveries made for years.  
… the war is telling against the mining industry. Assiduous and intelligent prospecting for 
new mineral areas and ore bodies is essential to the maintenance, not to say the progress of 
mining. Now, very many of the best and most capable prospectors have gone overseas to 
fight the King’s enemies and their absence is being felt. ….10 
 
By early 1915, when the Canadian government understood the breadth and depth of 
the conflict, mining operations resumed apace. Metals were the discourse of battles in 
World War One. Armaments and weaponry were fundamental to success and Ontario’s 
mines were critically important in provisioning the armed services. Tanks, trucks, bullets, 
rifles, cannons, machine guns, planes, rifles, pistols, shovels, utensils and cans for food 
were all forged from natural resources, many of which came from Ontario. It is not 
necessary to enumerate all of the applications that nickel, copper, lead, zinc, silver, cobalt, 
molybdenum
11
, iron pyrites, pig iron and gold were used in; they were virtually limitless. 
Needless to say, miners occupied important roles in the supply chain. The industry 
boomed. 
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 Geologists played greater roles in determining sources of ores. The Bureau of Mines used some of 
their own staff to scout possible ore sites and some new scientific detection devices were introduced. 
Richard Henry Stretch examines some of these changes in his book Prospecting Locating And Valuing 
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 Molybdenum, previously unrecorded as a metal, took on a new significance during wartime because it was 
an alloy of steel. It substantially improved the efficiency of metals that were used in high-speed tools, like 
continuous-fire machine guns and the drills used to manufacture weaponry. 
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After the initial drop in demand for metals and minerals
12
 companies retooled for 
war and mining rebounded. Early in 1915 there were 17,190 “persons employed at 
metallurgical works and producing mines”.13 The 1916 Bureau of Mines Report claimed 
that northern Ontario mines “were worked with feverish activity….to supply the abnormal 
demand for metals….”14 The Imperial Munitions Board, which was responsible for all war-
related production in Canada, was centered in Toronto and run by Joe Flavelle, a local 
business baron.
15
 Ontario’s mines soon profited from contracts let to ordinance and 
armament manufacturers. Nickel and copper mines employed the largest bloc of men at 
4,178 or almost twenty-five per cent of the province’s miners. By comparison only 392 
worked in the three producing iron mines, well below one per cent.
16
 The use of nickel in 
the plating of armour was new and heralded opportunities to expand those markets as well. 
[The] Industrial depression which set in after the declaration of war in August, 1914, 
continued to some extent in the early part of 1915, but in the latter part of the year a revival 
in business was well under way. The mines were worked with feverish activity in order to 
supply the abnormal demand for metals, particularly nickel and copper. Prices, which are 
dependent on supply and demand, rapidly advanced.
17
 
 
In 1914 the gross value of nickel-copper matte was $7,000,000; it soared to $21,000,000 in 
1915. The “fortunes of war” bore both a literal and a figurative application: “So 
unprecedented an increase in the production of nickel, owing to the higher prices prevailing 
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and the unusual demand for nickel-steel for armament and munition purposes, is a direct 
result of the great war now raging.”18 
Predictably, the end of the war resulted in a drop in demand and prices sagged. The 
record $72,093,832 total output
19
 in 1917, however, represented the increased value of the 
ores more than the tonnages extracted. The increase reflected higher prices and expanded 
applications. Except for gold, which remained steady, most other minerals and metals saw 
dramatic increases during the four years of fighting. Silver from the Cobalt area provides a 
particularly strong example of what happened.  
In 1916 the Cobalt camps produced about 20,000,000 ounces of silver; they sold for 
slightly more than twelve million dollars. In 1917, silver production slipped to 19,000,000 
ounces but sold for more than sixteen million dollars; a five percent decrease in production 
netted a thirty percent dollar value increase.
20
 Other metals that gained similarly included 
cobalt, iron ore, nickel and molybdenite.
21
 The latter two offered properties that improved 
the performance of steel, which cause their prices to increase fastest. Non-metals like 
arsenic, feldspar, fluorspar, and quartz rose in value by almost fifty percent to five million 
dollars. Nonetheless, it was a limited window of opportunity. 
Marginal mines closed quickly after the war. Businessmen focused once again on 
profits. Low-yield ore bodies were no longer viable. Employment figures reveal that the 
number of working miners dropped precipitously. The high of 16,791 miners in 1916 fell to 
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 Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1916. p.15. 
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 This figure rose to a record above $80,000,000 in 1918 before quickly falling back to $58,000,000 in 1919. 
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 Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1918. p.xiii. 
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 Nickel sales in 1913 were $5,000,000 and in 1917 they were more than $21,000,000. Cobalt over the same 
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1917 sales had already eclipsed the $100,000 mark. In the 1920 annual report molybdenite no longer 
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11,926 in 1919, a decline of more than twenty-eight percent.
 22
 By 1921 it was at 8,436, 
half of the wartime peak. Bureau records show that by 1925 total shipments from silver 
mines, smelters and refineries was below ten million ounces and it was a relatively small 
amount of revenue at $6.7 million dollars.
23
  
 
The Changing Workforce 
In twentieth century wars, men fought battles while governments mobilized 
materials and resources that funded military activities. This was true for the federal and 
provincial governments in Canada as World War One got underway. A coordinated effort 
was needed to meet national and international obligations: providing money, men, and 
materiel. The value of the miners’ contributions increased accordingly. It was not simply a 
matter of their numbers; it was their skill sets as well. 
When Canada declared war in September 1914, the nation was flush with patriotism 
and, as Carl Berger noted, imperialism was just one form of Canadian nationalism.
24
 
Accordingly, Prime Minister Borden made a “sacred promise” to England that Canada 
would, initially, provide 50,000 soldiers for the cause.
25
  
The need was urgent but the quota was quickly filled. Newspaper headlines bruited 
the need for everyone to do their share. Ontario’s miners responded enthusiastically. 
Across the north, enlistments were high, which cut back the numbers of experienced miners 
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available for work underground.
26
 In fact, Ontario’s miners enlisted in such overwhelming 
numbers that some worksites had to close: “… many of the best [mining men] … have 
gone overseas to fight the King’s enemies and their absence is being felt [in Ontario].”27 
The call to arms was answered so robustly by miners that limits were placed on the 
numbers accepted at northern recruiting stations.
28
 At the Lakehead, on November 2, 1915 
the Port Arthur News Chronicle confirmed an oversubscription of recruits. It said, “100 
men surplus to 52nd Battalion needs offered to [new] unit.” On November 10th the Kenora 
Miner and News reported: “Men are enlisting in Port Arthur as fast as the Medical Officer 
can handle them.” On November 12, 1915 the Fort William Daily Times Journal said: “100 
men from Fort William have enlisted to date and [military] drilling has begun in earnest. A 
new recruiting office has been opened in the John King Building on Victoria Ave.”29 
Lineups were long, as men across the country feared the fighting would be over before they 
could claim a role in it. 
In the Larder Lake area, the managers of some mines complained that they had lost 
forty percent of their workforce to the demands of war.
30
 At the Coniagas mine, eighty-
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three men – about one-third of the labour force – signed up for active service within the 
first ten months.
31
 In August 1914 there were eighty-five miners employed at the Keeley 
silver mine in Silver Centre (north of Cobalt). By the end of September 1914 there were 
only six left; the rest had enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
32
 The mine closed. 
It reopened the following spring and for the duration of the war held to a May through 
October operating schedule.  
A.L. Sharpe, a long time superintendent of the Garson Mine, left the mine in late 
1916 to join the CEF’s Tunnellers.33 For the duration of the war, it was common practice 
for mining concerns, unlike other enterprises, to “guarantee” the job of every miner who 
signed up for active duty. Some companies went a little further: 
All the mine managers of the Porcupine camp have guaranteed the men who leave with this 
corps [the Pioneer regiment] their positions back when they return and the Hollinger 
[company] further continue their Loyal [Service]Bonus service pay to go on as if they were 
in their place.
34
 
 
Due to a labour shortage, the silver mine at Bessemer closed in 1915.
35
 The Magpie 
Mine, owned by Algoma Steel, closed in the fall of 1914 because there were not enough 
workers available; “conditions of war” was the term used to describe the closings.36  
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The abovenoted examples reveal the enthusiasm many English-speaking miners felt 
for the War. Nevertheless, the experiences of miners deemed “enemy aliens” were 
markedly different. The Northern Miner claimed that as of October 1915 most mining 
companies had started to “tabulate their men according to nationalities.”37 Shortly 
afterward many workers of German, Austrian or Bulgarian backgrounds were targeted for 
dismissal by British-owned mining companies. The following month dramatic steps were 
taken.  
All employees of the Mining Corporation of Canada of nationalities belonging to enemies 
of the Queen … have been discharged. This is in accordance with orders received from 
head office off the company in England. The policy of the company has been not to take on 
any further Austrians or Germans in the place of their fellow countrymen who left or were 
discharged.
38
  
 
This action affected approximately fifty men in and around the Cobalt area alone. The 
cosmopolitan nature of the mining population reveals a range of challenges among the 
various ethnicities. Wartime experiences in the mining camps of northern Ontario were far 
from uniform. 
 
Working Conditions, Living Conditions, and Health 
Overseas, enlisted men faced unprecedented injuries but on the northern Ontario 
homefront fewer miners meant fewer injuries and fatalities. A comparison of mining deaths 
listed in the Bureau of Mines Annual Reports reveals that in the five years following the 
war (1919-1923 inclusive) there were 152 deaths: a statistical average of 30.4 deaths per 
year, or about 2.5 per month.
39
 This represented an important reduction from the 262 
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fatalities which occurred in the five years preceding the war: a statistical average of 52.4 
deaths per year or about four men per month.  This decline in the fatality rate was due in 
part to the shrinking workforce but it also reflects a sustaining enforcement ethic that 
insured adherence to the regulations would deliver in a safer workplace. 
Year 
Fatalities @ 
Active Mines 
 
Total Employed @ 
Active Mines 
 
Fatal Accidents 
per 1000 employed 
           
1901 13   4135   2.77 
1902 10   4426   2.05 
1903 7   3499   1.79 
1904 7   3475   1.80 
1905 9   4415   1.83 
1906 11   4017   1.90 
1907 22   6305   2.93 
1908 47   7435   5.11 
1909 49   8505   4.66 
1910 48   10862   3.73 
1911 49   12543   3.37 
1912 43   13108   2.84 
1913 64   14293   3.93 
1914 58   14361   3.60 
1915 22   13114   1.51 
1916 51   14624   3.07 
1917 36   16791   2.02 
1918 32   14726   2.10 
1919 39  12926  3.00 
1920 29  11486  2.61 
1921 24  9436  2.54 
1922 30  11000  2.72 
1923 30  12000  2.50 
1924 40  12500  3.20 
1925 42  13000  3.23 
      
Table 4.1 
40
 
 
                                                 
40
 All of the data for this table is taken from the Department of Mines Annual Report for 1926. Ontario 
Department of Mines, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report. Toronto. Queen’s Park. 1926. p.63. 
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As Table 4.1 shows, over the four full years of fighting, ostensibly 1915 to 1918, mining 
deaths in Ontario declined significantly in real numbers compared to the four years 
immediately prior. In fact thirty-four percent fewer lives were lost which meant seventy-
three fewer miners died in work-related accidents, notwithstanding frenzied production 
levels. The statistical increase in “Fatal Accidents per 1000 Workers” is due to a sharp 
decrease in the number of miners at work immediately after the war. This reduction in the 
workforce caused the statistical average per thousand to increase, despite the actual number 
of deaths declining. Between 1916 and 1925 there were 353 Ontario workers killed in 
mine-related incidents. While the number remained egregiously high, it was still sixty-nine 
fewer than had occurred between 1904 and 1915 when 422 lives were lost.  
Workplace processes and conditions were largely unchanged during this time 
although there were refinements to existing mining methods (drill bits and pneumatics) and 
materials (better explosives). To avoid charges of profiteering – like those levied against 
Joe Flavelle – mine owners reinvested in their businesses by adding safety features like 
approved cages for transporting men to and from the surface. There were also new 
ventilation systems installed and lighting was almost universally electrical.
41
  
Living conditions in the camps improved as better structures were erected and 
cleaner water was supplied.
42
 Before the war the mining companies owned all the land on 
which shacks/bunkhouses were erected. During the war, however, some mines exempted 
the families of men in service from ground rents and where there were labour shortages, 
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 Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1919. p. 104. The Northern Pyrites Mine ceased 
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of the Strike, 1919. pp.51 - 60.   
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rents were eliminated entirely. At the Tip Top mine in Keewatin in 1917 the inspector 
commented on the cleanliness of both the boarding house and the water supply.
43
 All of 
these changes contributed to safer conditions for miners during the war and they continued 
afterward as well. Better road and rail systems improved access to mining towns.   
 Although the cause of Empire superseded all else, there were frictions and 
challenges inside the mining industry. These, however, were leavened by a broader 
patriotism that needed production. The machineries of war required raw ores from the 
mining sector. Records reveal that there were significant wage increases realized by 
Ontario’s miners between the beginning of the war and the end - as much as 30% - 40% in 
Cobalt and Sudbury where cobalt and nickel were in high demand. The less publicized 
costs-of-living that attended those increases – and made them necessary – ranged from 60% 
to 75%, especially on items like food and clothing.
44
 There were, in fact, complaints in The 
Northern Miner about the real, net loss of purchasing power being experienced by miners 
who had received a fifty-percent salary hike over the preceding years.  
 
                     Cost of Living Increases in Cobalt 1914-1916
45
 
  1914   1916   
Beef $11.00   $17.00 per/cwt 
Pork $12.00   $18.00 per/cwt 
Cheese $0.15   $0.21 p/lb. 
Butter $0.28   $0.38 p/lb. 
Sugar $4.85   $7.85 per/cwt 
Flour $2.82   $4.20 per/cwt 
Beans $1.95   $5.00 p/bushel 
Potatoes $1.00   $2.25 p/lb.
46
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Table 4.2 
 
While income in some cases moved up from $20 to $30 a week, based on a sliding bonus 
structure, purchasing power fell. As a result, there was little or no appreciable difference in 
the quality of life or standard of living for miners and their families.  
By 1916 the miners were getting fed up with the inequities of the system.
47
 In 1913 
the Kerr Lake Mining Company declared a dividend of $5.2 million dollars and in 1916 it 
rose to $7.1 million an increase of thirty-six percent. At the LaRose mine for the same 
period the dividends were $4.6 million in 1913 and $6.1 million in 1916 a jump of thirty-
two percent.
48
 “Soaring profits” did not result in benefits to workers whose “real wages 
declined due to an inexorable rise in the cost of living.”49 There were increasing profits and 
dividends for owners but increasing financial hardship in the workforce as revealed by the 
cost of work-related clothing. Prior to the war “it was possible to get over-alls for $1.50 
and $2.00  [a pair] in 1914… but [in 1916] the common over-alls … cost $7.00 … and a 
pair of short rubber boots that used to cost $6.00 two or three years ago would cost $10.75 
[in 1916].”50 The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) was enacted by the Laurier 
government in 1907 to ameliorate conflicts between labour and management and to broker 
arrangements or settlements for both sides. In August 1916, in the spirit of the IDIA, a 
Royal Commission
51
 was appointed by the federal government to investigate labour 
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conditions in the Cobalt mining community where there was a move to reduce the length of 
the working day. This had been opposed by the Temiskaming Mine Managers Association 
and tensions were increasing. The commission was struck at the behest of the British 
government which was worried that critical supplies of silver could be interrupted by 
labour unrest.
52
 While the miners were anxious to get their grievances aired, mine owners 
and management were more reticent. They had to be coaxed into attending and testifying in 
their own cause. Eventually eighty-seven witnesses gave testimony: seventy-nine were 
employees, only eight were employers. The crux of the matter was that living expenses had 
soared more than thirty per cent since the beginning of the war and miners wanted – at a 
minimum – to keep pace with those increases. In an attempt to avoid a walkout, the Cobalt 
mine owners, under a hastily formed umbrella group, the Mine Managers Association, gave 
all underground workers a twenty-five cent per day increase in March. They promised the 
same amount again if, or when, the price of silver rose above seventy cents an ounce.
53
 
There was silence about safety and the conditions of work.  
With regard to grievances of the men, they were limited to two; one, a demand for 
increased wages; two, a demand that the employers recognize and confer with a 
committee appointed by the men …[regarding] all other conditions of working in 
the mine[s] … the miners express their satisfaction….54 
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Why only wages and the recognition of a collective committee alone? Because the Cobalt 
area was well established and miners now had families to feed; a growing breadwinner 
masculinity seemed to fuel the wage demands because wives and children needed to be 
cared for. As previously noted, the miners were concerned with how quickly inflation was 
outpacing wage increases. Because of the need for materiel and the key role miners played 
in the supply of ores, complaints were muted.  
 In the post-war period, living conditions at successful mines slowly improved, 
though the work underground remained dangerous. Nancy Forestell’s work on the 
Porcupine gold camp between 1920 and 1950 reveals that injuries and disabilities remained 
widespread. The injured men were usually cared for at home by their wives, if they were 
married. The community, however, had to share in the responsibility if as sick or injured 
miner was an immigrant.
55
 Forestell’s study reveals that beginning in the early 1920s a 
greater amount of attention was being paid to the conditions of work and especially those 
that resulted in chronic illnesses like silicosis. Silicosis was first studied by Ontario 
Ministry of Health 1921 although it was not addressed by the Department of Mines until 
1925 when a section of the Annual Report introduced the term and an explanation of it 
Report on the Mining Accidents in Ontario in 1925. A more intensive study of this mine-
related disease was undertaken in the 1930s when it was brought to national attention. 
Rosner and Marcowitz provided the first comprehensive study of silicosis and argued that 
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interest in it peaked during the Great Depression especially in and around coal mining, 
rather than in hardrock districts.
56
   
### 
 
Government Interventions: The WCB 
The improved safety record in Ontario mines during World War One was 
attributable in part to a more active enforcement of extant laws and regulations by the 
Bureau’s inspectors. Changes to the Mine Act between 1915 and 1918 were nominal. The 
techniques involved in hardrock mining were the same, notwithstanding minor refinements 
to explosives, pneumatics and electrical devices. The existing regulations and rules only 
needed consistent enforcement to save more lives, especially in an era when so many new 
and inexperienced workers had replaced the more experienced miners who had enlisted.   
The new Workmen’s Compensation Act, long in the making, took effect on January 
1, 1915. The new Board took over responsibility for all Ontario workers injured on the job. 
Its mandate was, ostensibly, to restore the health and function of workers as much as 
possible and also to provide financial compensation – according to predetermined formulae 
– for physical losses and injuries, or in the case of fatalities, to provide moneys to surviving 
family members. In the mining sector, the regulations further provided for chronic illnesses 
like phthisis
57
 and black lung
58
, as well for the more acute conditions occasioned by 
explosions and falls of rock. As the 1916 Bureau of Miners report explained: 
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 This was a chronic condition that saw victims “waste away.” The term is no longer in use having been 
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 Black lung disease is usually associated with coal mining, not metalliferous extractions. It is also a chronic 
lung condition found in miners caused by inhaling particulate dust which slowly builds up and inhibits 
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It vests in a Government-appointed Board, the adjustment of compensation for employees 
[in mining and other industrial operations] who may meet with injuries or be killed in the 
pursuit of their work.
59
 
 
Any general concerns that miners were going to either act with wanton recklessness or file 
claims for trivial bumps and bruises do not appear in the archives. In fact, during the first 
full year of its implementation, there was a sharp reduction in the number of fatalities. The 
Northern Miner said that deaths in 1915 were down by forty-five per cent.
60
 It noted 
however, that there was an increase of twenty-one per cent in minor accidents. Because of 
the no-fault nature of the new legislation, the increase was anticipated.
61
 Nonetheless, at the 
end of its first full year, the WCB Act was declared to have “worked smoothly”.62 Certainly 
the majority of mine managers were “… well content that the distasteful wrangling as to 
compensation [had been] taken off their hands even if it … cost them a little more.”63  
The agency received and administered the funds it received from businesses. In the 
mining sector, the initial rate for 1915 was set at three percent of base payroll earnings, but 
this figure fluctuated – it was adjusted annually – according to the number of compensation 
claims made and paid out over the previous twelve-month period.
64
 As touched on earlier, 
the philosophy that motivated collective compensation shared responsibility across like 
businesses, mine owners among them. Costs were spread across the mining industry of the 
province, rather than liabilities and litigation being borne directly and individually by 
companies whose workers met with injuries or deaths.   
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The WCB’s appearance was written up in the Mine Bureau’s 1915 Annual Report 
which anticipated a new age of cooperation between labour and capital. It went so far as to 
repudiate the demonization of businessmen by labour: 
… the relations between capital and labour will [as a result of the 1915 WCB Act] no 
longer be disturbed by a system under which the employer was often made the unwilling 
instrument in denying compensation when an employee was killed or Injured, and which 
frequently led to the still further impoverishment of the victim or his beneficiary by ill-
advised and expensive litigation.
65
 
 
The new legislation suggested a detached objectivity would inform its raison d’etre. This 
was manifested in its tariff of compensation payments to workers that were not predicated 
on the assignment of guilt or blame. Monetizing the amounts paid for injuries and deaths 
sustained on the job could only be withheld from victims (or survivors) for two reasons: if 
the disability was minor and continued for less than seven days, or, if the accident was 
solely the consequence of “serious and wilful(sic) misconduct of the workman and does not 
result in death or serious disablement.”66  
The involvement of the WCB in mining work indicated that the community of mine 
owners and managers anticipated that it would be a panacea of sorts. The Workmen’s 
Compensation Act was supposed to eliminate what mine owners and managers saw as 
needless annoyances, protracted proceedings and the unnecessary expense of litigation. The 
Bureau of Mines endorsed this point of view as it maintained a pro-business profile after 
the WCB’s first year. 
One result of the [Workmen’s Compensation] Act has been the speedy settlement of claims 
without expensive litigation. The rate paid by mine operators was 3 per cent. of the pay roll 
(sic) [in 1915]. This has been reduced to 2 ½ per cent. for 1916.
67
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 Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1916. p. 5. The reduction in the contribution 
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The reduction of the employer contribution was the sine qua non of the Act at this point. Its 
success was evaluated in terms of dollars and cents. Notably, there was no corresponding 
recognition of the benefits (or their adequacy) that accrued to injured workers or their 
survivors. To the Bureau of Mines it appeared that the Compensation Act was a workplace 
expedient. For businessmen it was a litigation-saving device. For inspectors it was a release 
from the responsibilities that attached them to possible court actions.  
From the Bureau’s perspective, the impact of the new WCB regulations reduced 
litigation. The mine inspectors were not required to assign blame or fault any more. The 
Annual Reports do not comment on how the new agency shaped the attitudes of 
rehabilitated men to their work.   
The “no blame” nature of compensation legislation, mentioned in Chapter Two, 
produced the unanticipated side-effect of improving mine safety. The Bureau’s inspectors 
focused on the incidents alone. The responsibility for assessing blame or culpability, 
resided with the WCB. Mine inspectors and physicians submitted reports on the 
circumstances and injuries. The victims were not assumed to be careless or injury prone; 
neither were they repeatedly defined as reckless. The death of Dalton Boomer provides a 
case in point. 
Dalton Boomer was killed at the Jupiter shaft, McIntyre mines, August 22
nd 
[1917]. Boomer 
was one of a sinking crew and he had returned to the bottom after personally cleaning down 
the last three sets after a blast. He was an exceptionally careful miner, but in some way a 
small block of timber, used for wedging wall places, had been loosely placed behind the 
lagging and became dislodged when the crosshead struck the stop blocks.
68 
 
The comment “he was an exceptionally careful miner” was a new and rare indication by the 
Bureau that some of the workers were reputed to exercise caution on the job. Furthermore, 
in the absence of evidence, the inspector did not speculate otherwise about the occurrence. 
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There was no suggestion of any culpability on the miner’s part and there was recognition of 
workplace safety practices among the workforce.  
I attribute the reason for the reduction, at least in part, was that the Province – in the 
form of provincial mine inspectors – became more involved in the processes of mining than 
ever before. Law and labour historians Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker maintain that during 
World War One there was “an unprecedented level of state intervention in the economy.”69 
One immediate consequence of the new WCB was a proliferation of company-
sponsored safety committees and campaigns throughout the industry. At the Coniston mine 
in 1916: “A permanent safety committee … was organized in December to act in 
conjunction with a changing safety committee, chosen from the employees. This committee 
has been very active in endeavouring to make working conditions as safe as possible ….”70 
In this instance, not only was the introduction of a safety committee new, it was permanent. 
Its utility survived the war. And the fact that it was constituted by miners themselves was 
an important change. Further evidence of the government’s attentiveness is found in 1915, 
when, for the first time, the Bureau of Mines began prosecuting foremen and mine 
managers – as opposed to the miners – for improperly transporting men up and down shafts 
in a skip.
71
 The onus for worksite safety ceased to reside exclusively in assumed risks; 
responsibilities were shared and the government of Ontario led the changes. The 
regulations began to be applied preventively. 
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Although the volume of mining regulations and legislation had increased 
continuously since 1892, the province’s de facto or “hands-on” involvement and 
enforcement was always less strenuous than its rules, regulations and rhetoric. Between 
1914 and 1918, however, the Province engaged in safety and workplace processes directly 
and determinedly to insure that the supply of ores remained uninterrupted. The Annual 
Reports reflected this as two new sections appeared: “The War and the Mineral Industry” 
and the previously mentioned “Prosecutions.”72  
Coincident with the introduction of the 1915 WCB regulations were new sections of 
practical recommendations in the Annual Reports. Under the “Mining Accidents” heading 
in 1916, for instance, Chief Inspector Sutherland included a set of “Rules of the Canadian 
Copper Company” to model guidelines for winding ropes as well as the correct procedures 
for operating skips and cages in main shafts. Such exemplars - operational templates - had 
never been presented before. In the same volume, fixed signaling codes for hoists were 
recommended in order to establish industry-wide uniformity. The government looked to 
introduce norms for workers covered by the Mining Act. The system used by Canadian 
Copper was almost immediately and universally adopted. The data reveal that safety issues 
and changes to the conditions of work were actively pursued by the Bureau.  
The Compensation Act contributed to the introduction of alternatives to replace 
unsafe conditions. New ideas and recommendations were no longer the preserve of 
coroners’ juries or other (quasi) judicial bodies. “The Crean Hill accident, on October 3rd, 
[1917] was due entirely to the use of a grab hook with a chain sling in lowering material, 
and this [activity] should be universally forbidden.”73 The inspector, independently, offered 
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a new idea, a revision that likely saved lives. Once the element of blame was absented from 
inspectors’ duties they were able to develop or identify new solutions that benefited the 
miners and, ultimately, employers also.  
The Bureau also increased scrutiny of mine management and workplace operating 
styles. The following example reveals an emerging perception of the workers as accident 
victims. During the previous ten years miners had regularly been admonished for riding 
skips up and down shafts. When accidents resulted, they alone were, usually, found 
culpable. Management was almost always exempted from liability. This changed in 1916. 
A foreman named L. Mazzutto, at Dome Mines, was fined one hundred dollars and 
assessed court costs for violating the regulations governing the proper use of the device by 
sending [or allowing] his men to ride the skip.
74
 This was a new understanding of 
management’s responsibilities on site. Perhaps even more notable was that Mazzutto’s fine 
was not levied as the result of an accident, injuries or a fatality: it was a procedural and 
operational penalty alone. The sentence, rather than the size of the fine, was a statement 
about occupational health practices and conditions. The procedure was not dealt with 
retrospectively through coroners. This sent a clear message: safety in the ways that mines 
were operated would be subject to greater scrutiny and enforcement by the Bureau.  
In 1918 a miner was sentenced to three month’s imprisonment for tampering with 
bell signals.
75
 This incident was also not the result of a fatality or injury. The penalty was 
prescriptive. And, as mine safety gained momentum, the size of the fines increased. Jail-
time for offences committed under the Mines Act - though articulated in the legislation – 
was virtually unheard of up to that time. In 1918, however, a cage tender was fined fifty 
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dollars and ninety days incarceration for actions that were “… calculated to endanger the 
safety of those employed in or about the mine ….”76  An Austrian miner was fined twenty-
five dollars, sentenced to thirty days in jail with hard labour
77
 because he had an open 
flame near a box of explosives.
78
 The offender also had to pay court costs or spend a 
second month in jail. Never before had the regulations – on the books since 1908 – been 
enforced with such rigor. Jail time, in addition to fines, set new benchmarks that sustained 
the effort to improve occupational health and safety underground. These actions were in 
part attributable to the WCB regulations which moved provincial administrators away from 
assessing blame and toward establishing safer working environments. 
Another change that coincided with the advent of the WCB was the absence of 
admonitions to miners in the government’s annual accounts of accidents and fatalities. In 
1917, for example, there were thirty-four accidents that resulted in thirty-six fatalities. 
Criticisms of the miners were reduced and speculations – rampant in earlier times – were 
avoided. The death of Harry Yates speaks to this:  
Yates was employed as an underground hoistman [who] had stepped out on a plank to 
shake the cable and attract the attention of the men below. In returning to the station he in 
some manner slipped from the plank and fell to the bottom.
79
 
 
Previously, slips and falls like this were often attributed to miner inattention; sometimes 
there were (unsubstantiated) allegations of intoxication. The Yates account provides a more 
benign understanding. The phrase “in some manner” did not make any assumptions; it 
simply left the cause undetermined.  
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 Accompanying the less-accusatory tone was a marked reduction in the details 
offered within inspectors’ accounts of annual fatalities. Whereas the Accident section of the 
Annual Reports usually occupied many pages – in 1913 it was thirty-six pages – by the end 
of the war it was only five or six. Instead of chronicling each incident in several 
paragraphs, fatalities were reduced to a single line on a chart.  
In the 1919 Annual Report, the examination of 1918’s “Table of Fatal Accidents in 
or about the [Ontario] Mines” provided only skeletal information about the losses.  
Full details of the incidents might exist within WCB reports, but those archives are not yet 
open or available for study. 
 Another consequence of the new Workmen’s Compensation Board was its focus on 
accidents, not just the fatalities that the Bureau had concentrated on to that time. In 1916 
for example, the WCB cited 1,349 claims for compensation among Schedule 5 
employees
80
; eighty-seven of them (six percent) suffered permanent disabilities. More 
importantly, in terms of raw numbers, the accidents were enumerated as follows:  
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For the first time the Annual Report charted myriad other injuries and “industrial diseases” 
that miners sustained. The WCB did not limit its interest or influence to annual fatalities. 
They were mandated to inquire into a panoply of other conditions as well as the causes that 
brought them about. 
The Bureau of Mines continued supporting occupational safety measures. In 1919, 
for instance, the Bureau prosecuted three offences directly. They did not defer to alternative 
judicial bodies or jurisdictions. The first was against Robert Wright – a miner – who was 
fined $15.00 and costs for violating the statute that required: “… such care and precaution 
for the avoidance of accident or injury to any person in or about the mine as the particular 
circumstances of the case require….”81 This example augured for preventive strategies to 
be enforced. The other two offences were against the Kingdon Lead Mine at Galetta and 
the White Reserve Mining Company near Haileybury for raising and lowering miners in 
cages not properly equipped with safety devices. Both companies were fined one hundred 
dollars plus costs. The penalties assessed were significantly higher than previous corporate 
fines. All three offences related to occupational safety. They were not part of a coroner’s 
inquiry or WCB interests. All were about the prevention of accidents and safety on the job. 
In 1920 all five “Prosecutions” by the Department were against companies and/or 
management; none were filed against miners either individually or collectively.
82
 In four of 
the actions, dynamite was used or housed in violation of The Mines Act and in the final 
instance there was no proper barrier erected to limit entry into an active blasting area. 
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Whereas corporate fines in prewar years had been in the neighbourhood of fifty to one 
hundred dollars, after the war they increased to between one hundred and two hundred 
dollars per occasion.
83
 Fines of this nature were not onerous for companies with healthy 
balance sheets and income statements but they sent the message that regulations and safety 
practices were being monitored and enforced. The legislation - which had been at hand for 
thirty years - was applied with consistency. The bureaucratic will and resources that had 
flagged for many years were revived and sustained. Miners’ health and safety were, in 
practice as well as theory, being protected. In the post-war workplace, occupational health 
and safety were supported by a diligent mines inspection department.
84
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Changes in Medical Care 
As was the case with miners, the outbreak of war in Europe exacerbated the 
shortage of physicians across Northern Ontario. A single, Canadian, field-hospital in 
France required thirty-five doctors, plus nurses and medical staff (students) additionally.
85
 
Like miners, doctors volunteered for overseas service also. Dr. Smylie could not resist the 
lure of the battlefield. He enlisted recalling: “I transferred … to the Overseas Training 
Corp. I would have to get into this war and help get it over.”86 The enlistment fervor 
depleted the corps of doctors, and “qualified” medical practitioners especially at resource 
extraction sites. Undergraduate medical students filled the vacancies and the contracts on 
ad hoc bases.
87
 The province’s professional licensing body, the Ontario Medical 
Association (OMA) understood the pressures facing doctors at home during the war year.
88
 
At the 1915 annual meeting, the OMA passed a resolution applauding enlisted doctors’ 
service and acknowledged that physicians on the home front were helping to sustain their 
military colleagues’ practices: 
… [we] wish to express our deep appreciation for the loyalty and self-sacrifice of our 
fellow [doctors] … who have offered themselves and are now serving the Empire and its 
allies at the front …. In thus serving the cause of freedom, many will come back under 
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conditions which will practically mean beginning their professional life (sic) again. …[we] 
assure them that … we shall see that their old clientele awaits them on their return to civil 
practice …
89
 
 
With diminished support and reduced access to supplies – many medicines were rationed – 
doctors who remained in the north had to serve ever-broader patient populations over ever-
greater geographical areas. Medical care across the north was stretched thin.  
 A further challenge that affected healthcare matters was northern travel. Road 
improvements were limited during the war. The resource sector was criss-crossed by a lot 
of “summer roads.” Many camps were, once again, almost inaccessible during heavy 
winters. Horses returned as reliable conveyances. These conditions persisted after the war 
also. Despite the construction of some new roads and railways, designed to connect 
northern communities and integrate the north into the provincial economy, the reality was 
that many roads remained impassible in winter and gasoline shortages persisted through the 
early 1920s.
90
  Doctors like Clifford Smylie continued to rely on horses as their principal 
means of winter transportation into the 1930s because roads and gas stations were not 
maintained at regular intervals across the north. 
91
  
 Medical care was enhanced slightly by the establishment of Red Cross “hospital” 
facilities across rural Ontario. Historians Jayne Elliott and Sarah Glassford both document 
the role of the Red Cross in providing elementary facilities. These were not “contract 
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hospitals” per se because they were available to miners and their families. Between 1915 
and 1918 medical facilities in Quibel, Nakina and Jellicoe closed or were staffed only by 
nurses. They operated on irregular schedules because of war-related personnel shortages.  
Concerns about the paucity of health services persisted after the war as well. Meryn Stuart 
has shown how Ontario sent nurses into northern resource communities like Kenora, to 
staff or support local medical facilities.
92
 Between 1920 and 1925 the dearth of licensed 
medical professionals, especially at resource extraction sites, led to the use of public health 
nurses to supplement treatment and care initiatives. Motivated by the “Health Speech” of 
British MP Lloyd George which called for a “… constant and more intelligent interest in 
the health and fitness of [post war] people”93 the Board of Health of Ontario designated 
seven nurses to educate the general public on matters that affected the health of families 
and individuals. Professional boundaries were contested as doctors wanted “control” over 
the nurses to see that they did not overstep their accreditations.
94
 The situation demanded a 
working accord that allowed for a cooperative relationship that would serve these remote 
locations. Unlike the restrictions against women in mining, the medical community 
expanded how women could help in health-related matters. 
The spread of the 1919 influenza epidemic meant that worries about health were 
alive in the population generally and in closely-quartered mining communities particularly.  
The concern for hospital service, for compensation from injuries suffered in the line of duty 
and for proper and prompt referral to city centres where more expert facilities were 
available, was evident in the remarks made by men from every mining camp.
95
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Conditions across mining camps remained far from uniform. The facilities in Gowganda, 
for instance, were not as sophisticated as those in larger camps like Cobalt, which boasted a 
population about double its size.
96
 There were hospitals – referred to as medical outposts – 
in both locations but the size of the staffs and the quality of the technologies available in 
each was different.
97
 There was not a single, mining camp hospital that was anywhere near 
as sophisticated or competent as those found in large urban centres like Toronto. 
Occupational health relied on more than hospitals. 
 After the war, doctors were gradually drawn back to the north to serve single-
industry communities despite the still-rugged nature of the country. Professional leaders 
encouraged returning physicians across the country to recast their relationships with their 
male patients. A 1917 Canadian Medical Association Journal article by a CAMC Major 
claimed; “Canadian physicians and surgeons come in contact with returning soldiers in 
many ways. They met, not only as physicians and patients, but as fellow-soldiers, fellow-
citizens, and friends.”98 While they had always been prominent as educated gentlemen 
deserving, in most cases, of deference and privilege, their professional associations began 
urging public leadership on its members.  
The physician, if he is to retain his status in society, must be more and more a cultured 
gentleman. He must be more than “a dispenser of pills and powders.” He must be a leader 
in the community, with high ideals. His aim should be “how much can I contribute[?]” 
rather than, “how much can I get out of this community[?].” The study of the development 
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and evolution of medicine can play a prominent part in stimulating such an altruistic 
attitude of mind.
99
 
 
The degree to which this attitude was embraced by northern doctors is difficult to assess, 
but there is no doubt that the OMA sought to reposition medicine’s relationships with 
corporations, employers and the provincial government. The OMA began speaking against 
deficiencies in the (1915) Workmen’s Compensation Act, targeting the inequities faced by 
miners.  
 Up to 1915 the medical community was only marginally involved in establishing 
the WCB. The orientation of the new agency was bureaucratic. It resisted how medical 
science and physiological treatments might affect its functions. It was, by design, a 
bureaucratic office, not a medical one. Precious few doctors were included in its 
administration. In fact physicians were commissioned only when needed. Moreover, no 
doctors sat on the board or advised it. Their opinions were sought – even required – in 
order to substantiate injury claims and noteworthy causal factors but they played no 
continuing roles in the WCB itself. Ontario’s doctors believed, however, there was 
insufficient competence among WCB staff to properly assess the reports delivered to them. 
Doctors wanted to be involved in the agency and claims directly. They protested their lack 
of representation and continued to complain about it for the next ten years.   
Dr. Marlow states that it was thought opportune to make some representation to the 
[Ontario] provincial government, with the view of bringing about some changes whereby 
medical services performed for the [workmen’s compensation] board might be placed on a 
better basis and be accorded more fitting recognition: the committee, he further stated had 
considered … that there should be at least one medical member on the Workmen’s 
Compensation Board [and] that there should be a thorough reorganization of the medical 
services of the board.
100
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The OMA wanted “at least one” representative from among its membership appointed to 
the Board on a continuing basis. Moreover the OMA wanted to participate in the selection 
of that doctor. They resolved that: “His [the not-yet-appointed Board doctor’s] professional 
standing and ethical integrity should be of such a high degree as to command the 
confidence and cooperation of the medical profession of Ontario.”101 The doctors did not 
want the appointee to be political for it might impugn or compromise the integrity of the 
association. One result of the OMA’s claim for autonomy was an agreement in 1919 that 
the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario would set the “schedule of medical and 
surgical fees to be used as a guide in fixing medical aid allowances.” 102 
In this revised context, some physicians began locating the blame for workplace 
accidents squarely on the shoulders of mine owners. 
So-called accidents are the result of placing an inadequate employee on a job. The job may 
even be so difficult that no employee could be competent for the work. The one who places 
the employee is the foreman … and there is the crux of the situation. Automatically, 
accidents will indicate the incompetent foreman, and the greater part of the loss lies with 
the employer.
103
 
 
Dr. Addison, the author of this Canadian Medical Association Journal article, pointed up 
deficiencies in the compensation system from the standpoint of the worker. Addison’s 
argument is that the reduction of the individual employers’ liability dulled the owners’ 
(general) willingness to improve workplace safety. “Whatever the intention of the 
[Compensation] Act may have been, the policy of the Compensation Board has acted as an 
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efficient bromide to initiative in cutting the loss by industrial accident.”104 Doctors believed 
that spreading the financial responsibility for deaths and injuries across the whole of the 
industry meant that individual companies did not have to be as diligent about their personal 
exposure to litigation or court-ordered assessments. It was speculated this might lead to 
continuing workplace dangers. Overall litigation costs were attenuated as a result of the 
Act. The strength of the medical profession as an independent body, beholden to neither 
business, nor government nor labour, meant that it could articulate and advocate for what it 
considered fair and reasonable occupational health practices to all parties. 
One of those supporting workplace safety and accident prevention was a Fort 
William physician Dr. R.J. Manion. By 1904, at the age of twenty-three he held four 
medical degrees and operated a busy practice.
105
 In 1915 he enlisted in the Canadian Army 
Medical Corps and earned the Military Cross at Vimy Ridge. In his memoirs, he recalled 
the difficulties that he had faced in rural practice. “[Doctors] are called out at irregular 
hours; a good deal of their work is of a repulsive character; and they are subjected at all 
times to the charge of ignorant patients that they were maltreated.”106 Manion became 
politically active.
107
 A similar course was taken by Dr. Herbert Bruce, who later became 
Ontario’s lieutenant governor.108 Through the OMA, doctors exercised more autonomy and 
                                                 
104
 W.L.T. Addison.  “Some Disadvantages of the Workmen’s Compensation Act which Lead the Employer 
to be Less Interested in the Health of the Employee.” The Canadian Medical Association Journal. Vol. 15(7). 
July 1925. pp.728-729 
105
 At the end of the nineteenth century, medical school lasted only four years. Internships or residency terms 
were not required to obtain a medical license or “shingle”. As a result there were a lot of graduates opening 
practices while still quite young. 
106
 Jack, D. Rogues, Rebels and Geniuses, The Story of Canadian Medicine. Toronto. Doubleday Canada. 
1981. p. 366. 
107
 Before the war, Manion was a local alderman but after his return from France he won a federal seat and 
eventually became the leader of the Conservative party after R.B. Bennett’s defeat. 
108
 http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=b7586ae8-2255-4662-8bba-
fa77a642d956&Language=E&Section=ALL 
 171 
improvements in occupational health followed. For miners, they were no longer 
automatically assumed to culpable in, or predisposed to, injury.
109
   
 
UNIONS 
Ontario doctors and mining authorities began redefining the standards of 
occupational health in response to the demands of organized labour in the large camps. 
Following the war, Ontario’s miners – and labour generally – felt they had been held in 
check long enough. A growing sense of brotherhood and solidarity took hold as evidenced 
by increases in union memberships. According to Brian Hogan’s analysis of Cobalt in the 
post-war era, in April 1916 there were about 500 members in the Western Federation of 
Miners’ Cobalt branch; by September that had climbed to more than 1500, mostly unskilled 
below-ground workers. In August 1919, 86% of the membership voted to strike.
110
 They 
stepped out of the shadows and demanded more.
111
  
The strike was long and bitter; it lasted more than two months and was riddled with 
violence. Cobalt’s mine managers collaborated and formed the Temiskaming Mine 
Managers Association which put up formidable resistance to collective bargaining. The 
failure of the owners to even recognize the committee of local representatives was 
criticized. Management excuses were seen as hypocritical. As Hogan noted:  
… decades of tension in Cobalt really reflect[ed] a transition phenomenon occurring more 
or less simultaneously in industrialized nations and particularly in the North American area, 
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where a new relationship between manager and worker was slowly and painfully 
emerging.
112 
 
Eventually the union was recognized and it succeeded in getting some of its demands met. 
There were recommendations for raises; wages were pegged to the price of ore. For every 
ten-cent increase in the price of silver the miners received a bonus.  
Occupational health was also on the table. A key element of the settlement was the 
“… election of an Employees Committee from employees of [each] mine, to discuss … 
questions concerning that [site].”113 This concession is what helped the men to address on-
going health and safety issues that were specific to their daily workspaces. Sickness 
insurance was high on the list of complaints that was dealt with over the following decade. 
Shorter shifts reduced fatigue as well as accidents and fatalities. In this vein, the men also 
wanted new equipment or techniques that would decrease the amount of dust they 
breathed.
114
 They also lobbied for improved lighting and ventilation and these were 
expected to lead to safer workspaces as vision would be markedly improved. 
As a result of war-time cooperation and the importance of delivering uninterrupted 
quantities of ore to arms manufacturers, the government supported some union requests. 
Behind the scenes, politicians or their designates quietly set about persuading owners and 
managers to relent. Although the initial gains were modest – mostly promises, not 
guarantees – the precedent for collective bargaining was set. Occupational health and safety 
demands were front and centre in all future negotiations. The Annual Reports of the 
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Department of Mines in the post-war years look at the demands for and improvements in 
health and safety conditions.
115
   
 Mine management and ownership responded to union militancy around 
occupational safety as it adopted new programs geared to attracting and maintaining a 
stable workforce. In keeping with a broad move toward “corporate welfarism,”116 in 
January 1919, the International Nickel Company (INCO) voluntarily introduced a group 
insurance package: 
Each employee who has completed one year of continuous service with the company is 
insured for $500. This insurance is increased to $800 at the end of two years’ service; 
$1,200 at the end of three years’ service; $1,600 at the end of four years’ service; and the 
maximum of $2,000 at the end of five years’ continuous service. Past service is to be 
counted. These amounts [which did not limit, degrade or replace WBC payments] are 
payable in the event of death or total disability to the beneficiary named by the employee, 
The initial [benefit] payment is 20 per cent; the remainder is paid [to the named 
beneficiary] in 24 semi-monthly instalments.
117
(sic) 
 
The abovementioned incentives were available to company’s employees in February 1920. 
They reveal a measurable sense of paternalistic responsibility that extended beyond the 
worker to include his family and the funds were provided in addition to WCB payments. 
Long-term employees were valued in dollars and cents which indicated an interest in their 
long-term health and welfare. Moreover, INCO also implemented a corporately funded 
“pension plan” at the same time. Unlike modern day pensions, this one was for “employees 
who have become incapacitated after twenty years of continuous service …. Pensions are 
paid monthly … at a figure based on the average full-time earnings for the last year 
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worked.”118 While not many would have qualified - and the terms need to be interpreted 
cautiously because they were at the sole discretion of the “executive of the company” - the 
pension program nonetheless marked a new threshold for miners. Only a healthy, able-
bodied miner could work continuously for the company and in order to do that a safe 
environment had to be available. At the time INCO had more than 1,700 employees who 
qualified, at least potentially, for this coverage.  
 And the company went a step further. It made university scholarships
119
 available 
“… for a course in applied science at McGill, Queen’s or Toronto University for a certain 
number of the sons of employees, or of apprentices under 21 years of age.”120 
Notwithstanding the explicit gender distinction, INCO revealed a willingness to promote 
post-secondary education opportunities among the families of its employees. Three young 
men won the scholarships in September 1919 after being examined and qualified by a 
Sudbury High School Staff committee.
121
  
Singly or collectively, these kinds of largesse encouraged the idea of job stability 
among the men and their families who settled permanently. Although the mining workforce 
declined quickly after the war, there were new compensation packages introduced that 
improved the palatability and safety of the work conditions.    
 
### 
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Masculinity 
Between 1915 and 1925 medical and government authorities shifted their 
allegiances and alliances away from what had previously been a supportive relationship 
with mine owners and mine managers. The new approach was one that featured greater 
understanding of the risks miners faced when working in dangerous and unpredictable 
conditions. Over the same period, miners themselves began to recast their masculine 
identities, not only by making a stronger claim to breadwinner masculinity but also by 
reframing the older hypermasculine image into one that integrated a new patriotic or 
militarized masculinity made possible by the war.  
Notwithstanding the exigencies of war, mining remained steadfastly male. Women 
were not integrated into the mining workforce, as they were in other areas, including 
munitions factories and ambulance driving. By contrast urban factories had to adopt war 
footings – changing their product applications and increasing their capacities – which 
required female participation. Women took up the tasks willingly, skillfully, and in great 
numbers. They were more than competent at discharging their work assignments in a 
plethora of industries, yet no women were admitted underground.
122
 My research did not 
uncover any evidence of women demanding to work underground. 
 Rather, breadwinner masculinity flourished before, during and after the war. Nancy 
Forestell’s studies of gold mining communities in northern Ontario, most notably Timmins, 
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confirm that breadwinner masculinity emerged as camps grew into settled towns.
123
 After 
World War One the Bureau of Mines’ reports began to include the marital status of miners. 
For example, the 1925 report said: 
Hollinger Mine: Thomas Fox, English, married, with six children, aged forty-two years, 
was caught in a cave-in of broken rock in a stope 91 east of 14 crosscut on the 550-foot 
level of the Hollinger mine at 5.00 p.m. on March 18
th 
and [he] was buried for twelve 
hours.
124
 
 
This recognized not only the circumstances of the injury but also the marital status and 
virility of the miner.  
Alongside breadwinner masculinity, a new model of masculinity evolved; it was 
one that grew out of the contributions made by miners to the Allied war efforts. 
Throughout the war northern Ontario mining communities and the mining industry – as 
was with the case with Canada more generally – valorized support for the war in a number 
of ways. In Ontario, mining was considered essential by the Bureau. Its 1918 Annual 
Report said: “The mining industry [in Ontario] is essential to the carrying on of the war 
since it provides the raw materials for the weapons, and munitions and the metals required 
for financing the struggle.”125 The Bureau of Mines recognized the wartime enlistments of 
their own staff. For example, in the report for 1916, Deputy Minister T.W. Gibson said: 
… the staff of the Bureau of Mines, which has not been laggard in the defence of the cause 
of freedom and justice at stake in the present tremendous conflict. [Nine members of the 
Bureau volunteered and one had been killed.] They have one and all worthily maintained 
the honour of Canada.
126
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Some members of the mining community thought still more could be done. At 
Larder Lake, the Harris Maxwell Gold Mine operated on a limited schedule in 1915. Only a 
skeleton crew kept it going. It closed during the summer of 1916 but reopened in the fall 
following protests from miners themselves. John Shafer, a local miner, wrote a letter that 
was published in the Northern Miner.
127
 He was sharply critical of Harris Maxwell for not 
doing more to exploit proven assays at that site. Shafer’s criticism sparked activity. By the 
spring of 1918 the mine flourished once again. A new shaft was sunk two hundred feet and 
forty men were hired. A year later there were plans afoot to invest more than a million 
dollars and expand the operation. Miners saw patriotism in their war-work and advocated 
it. 
Mining communities offered not only their labour but also their financial support 
for the fight abroad, notwithstanding their personal struggles to make ends meet at home. 
The Northern Miner reported that “… a well attended gathering of the citizens of Coniston 
… [which] unanimously decided to give one day’s pay each month during the continuation 
of the war and [for] six months thereafter to be devoted to the Red Cross and various other 
patriotic purposes.”128 Pledges were consistent with one by the employees at the nearby 
Mond Nickel Company who donated two machine guns. This was a tangible expression of 
solidarity with the troops “… in the cause of liberty and humanity”.129  The unanimity of 
these expressions reflected a willingness to share in the war effort.   
Support for the Allied cause was also reflected in ethnic prejudices at mine sites. 
One report announced that a hundred men had been fired: fifty-five Germans and forty-six 
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Austrians.
130
 To those “enemy aliens” who remained, their nationalities affected them in 
different ways. In the pre-war years, fatally injured miners were usually referred to by 
name but from 1915 to 1919 the deaths of German-speaking miners, or those of enemy 
origin, were only identified by their nationalities.
 131
 In 1917, for example, twenty English-
speaking miners were killed. The Bureau named them individually. During the same year 
there were seven Austrians, two Bulgarians and one German killed on the job. Not one was 
named: “… an Austrian fell about 25 feet”132; “… an Austrian walked into a blast”133; “… 
the Bulgarian blockholer … walked into the third blast.”134 In spite of the dead men’s work 
in support of Ontario’s mines and their ultimate sacrifice contributing to the Canadian war 
effort, they were not personalized or identified by anything except nationality. 
By contrast, miner/soldiers who enlisted for the Allies were recognized. The newly 
constituted Department of Mines identified war veterans and returning soldiers in its 
reports and statistics.
135
 For example, the Annual Report for 1920 recorded twenty-nine 
fatalities and included the recognition: “Six war veterans were among those killed.”136 War 
service was a new way of identifying some of the dead. None of the victims was alleged to 
be careless, reckless, dangerous, drunk or incompetent. Their characters and work habits 
were not impugned because their war efforts had re-established and reconstituted their 
natures as heroic and valourous. 
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Communities, too, celebrated enlisted men. The image published by the Chapleau 
Public Library depicts the 227
th
 Battalion, “Men of the North.” The photo taken in 
Chapeleau, Ontario in 1916 captured a group of enlisted men leaving for service amid 
community celebrations.  
 
Figure 4.2 Chapleau, Ontario in August 1916.
137
 
 
One of New Liskeard’s local historians, Maude Groom, lived through the Great War and 
recalled that because northern recruitment stations were oversubscribed initially, quotas 
were established to limit the numbers of volunteers. At the first call in Cobalt in late 1914, 
only twenty men were admitted though more than two hundred applied. Some of those who 
were denied enlistment travelled to other recruiting stations – in Haileybury or Sudbury – 
such was the fear that the fighting would be over before they could get there. The 
willingness of miners to volunteer for service was conspicuous. Groom recalled a parade 
song celebrating the contributions of “New Ontario”:  
Our Battalion Number is a Hundred and Fifty-nine 
Away from New Ontario, the backwoods and the mine 
We’ll dress you up in Kahki,(sic) if you’ll only come and sign 
And we’ll all go marching along.
138
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 One officer from northern Ontario, Colonel Davis, was explicit about wanting to 
form a Pioneer Regiment comprised exclusively of miners. He argued that miners brought 
special talents to the Front. Davis called for “… men who can handle power and steel, dig 
trenches, fix up barb wire entanglement[s] and … miners and prospectors, men who can set 
off a charge, swing a pick or an axe with knowledge and skill.”139 Davis’ recruiting 
campaign raises an intriguing possibility that miners had particularly useful skill-sets for 
trench warfare especially if compared with, for example, a shoe salesman or an office 
manager. Conditions at the Front and in mining had some similarities. Both environments 
were dangerous, wet, cold, uncomfortable and dark. They were underground and plagued 
by unforeseen collapses, toxic gases, incessant noise, dirt, discomfort, darkness, and 
explosions. Miners were used to dangerous circumstances, where death was never far 
away. Although men did not die in Ontario’s mines daily, there was a tacit understanding 
that death and injury attended underground work. Enlisted miners on the battlefields of 
Europe were certainly at risk. Given these risks, as the Northern Miner reported in 
September 1915, “Col. Davis could get a thousand men tomorrow from the recruited men: 
but he wants miners and prospectors….”140 
The strength, bravery and valour that miners in the armed forces displayed overseas 
shaped a new patriotic masculinity among miners at home. This was particularly evident in 
the post-war years when unions were active. Led by “returned men” in Cobalt, in the late 
spring of 1919, union men sang: 
The working class is poor 
Will be forever more 
‘Till we unite to gain our right 
If they resist we’ll use our might 
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There must be no middle ground 
This fight is all one round 
From slavery to victory 
As we go marching on.
141
 
 
The militaristic tone of the chant was obvious. Their action was a “fight” against “slavery” 
and “victory” was the only option. The vocabulary of war informed the miners’ language.  
Men who did not join the Cobalt strike were publicly shamed by being marched 
down the camps’ main streets in aprons.142 The message was clear: miners were masculine 
and united; anything less was effeminate. In this context, union leaders were celebrated for 
their physical size. Nicknames like: “Big Jim” McGuire, “Big Bill” Haywood, reflected a 
way of identifying masculinity in the company of other men. The breadwinner masculinity 
that had informed their prewar identity was joined by a soldier/warrior masculinity in the 
post-war period.
143
 The masculine ideal of the warrior offered a more positive version of 
the hypermasculinity that once cast miners in a negative light. 
The characterization of medical professionals stood in contrast to miners. Like 
miners, doctors were valorized for their service in the war.  
Members of the medical profession, civil and military, in Canada occupy a position of great 
responsibility since it is through them that the physical condition of Canadian soldiers is 
established; consequently, physicians and surgeons are constantly called upon to express 
their professional opinion concerning the physical condition of men, not only to decide 
their fitness for service, but also in connexion[sic] with the awarding of pensions. The 
responsibilities of the medical profession … are then of great public importance. Medical 
men must realize the responsibilities added to their positions by the war.
144
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Their work was equivalent to that of the men in the trenches. “The heroism of the troops in 
battle has been equaled [sic] by that shown in the hospitals and the wounded have been 
attended with courage, assiduity and success, often under the most trying 
circumstances.”145 Doctors at the Front were valorized for their life-saving work. 
Physicians across Ontario became agents in the government’s prosecution of the war by 
covering off doctor shortages, especially in the north where doctors were scarce during the 
war.  
At the University of Toronto, third and fourth year students in medicine were 
awarded their degrees after returning from the war because the need was so great.
146
 
Doctors were committed to the war. In February 1915 the Senate of the University of 
Toronto resolved that third and fourth year men who volunteered for active service 
overseas would be granted their “year in full.”147 This enticement did not apply to 
conscripts or other undergraduates or to any women who volunteered. 
The January 1919 edition of the CMAJ proudly acknowledged: “Of our 
membership of five hundred and five, there have been one hundred and thirty-two [26%] 
on active service, of whom one hundred and eight have served overseas. Of those … there 
have been three killed in action or died while on service.”148 The doctors who worked at the 
Front were claimed to have had “good fortune” because of their patriotic work.149 From 
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shared experiences in the war doctors and miners gained a measure of autonomy in their 
work. Both had new opportunities to self-identify and to advocate a newfound masculinity.  
   
CONCLUSIONS 
The confluence of World War One and the introduction of the WCB legislations 
provided the possibility of doctors and miners meeting as equals, as war veterans. But by 
the early 1920s this possibility had evaporated. Doctors reverted to a professional 
masculinity, and miners celebrated a respectable patriotic masculinity alongside their 
breadwinner masculinity. Risk-taking itself, as an individual act, might not have been 
diminished from the point of view of observers but this is challenged by other forms of 
masculinity that oriented more toward respectability and patriotism.  
Within the Bureau of Mines the effects of these perspectives were found in 
inspectors who looked for and remedied the causes behind deaths and injuries. 
… the payments made to the … Board were looked upon by employers as a cost of doing 
business since it was publicly believed that industry was largely to blame for accidents 
even though many were the result of worker negligence.
150
 
 
Inspectors turned away from “assumed risk” and the innate characteristics of miners. This 
brought about upgrades in the conditions of the workspace as well as the expansion and 
enforcement of extant regulations.  
World War One was the single most critical element in reshaping the public profile 
and masculinity of miners. Their work conditions mimicked some of the battlefield 
conditions more closely than most other types of civilian labour. This equivalency meant 
that characteristics of courage replaced carelessness in popular representations of miners 
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who had worked hard for the interests of the country. Some were piqued if owners did not 
keep mines operating to help the war effort. Everyone had to do his share for country and 
empire not self-aggrandizement.151 Miners met these qualifications immediately. The 
importance of keeping Ontario’s mines open and producing could not be overstated. The 
after-effects were seen in the Department of Mines’ report for 1919 which read:  
… the energies of the world which had been so long and so intensely organized for 
slaughter, could not at once be diverted into their wonted channels of production and 
manufacture. Moreover, in some of its aspects the old order has been changed, and to all 
appearances permanently. Labour insists upon less onerous conditions and a larger share in 
the fruits of production.
152
  
 
 The newly found independence of the medical community also produced gains for 
miners. The reach and influence of the OMA brought contract physicians out from under 
corporate affiliations and provided a sense of independence. Patients became the new 
focus, as physicians looked for causal factors contributing to ill-health and injuries. This 
gave contract doctors more autonomy. 
In spite of the gains, however, there was still a great deal that needed to be done. 
The annual death toll spiked periodically
153
 which once again drew political attention and 
fired public concern. It was not until well after World War Two that concerted labour 
activism effected sustaining changes in occupational health and improved mining in the 
province.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151
 The Northern Miner. October 20, 1917. p.5. 
152
 Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Ontario Department of Mines, p.1. 
153
 The Hollinger Disaster of February 1928 killed thirty-nine men in a single incident. There was a great hue 
and cry about the loss of life and the WCB’s treatment of the families left behind. See “Bulletin No. 67”. 
Report on the Mining Accidents in Ontario in 1928. pp.20-23.   
  
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Aftershocks 
 
 
 After 1925, health and safety issues in Ontario’s hardrock mines continued to be 
shaped by deaths and injuries. One of the most tragic of these was the underground fire at 
the Hollinger mine in 1928. It resulted in thirty-nine fatalities and remains the worst, single, 
disaster in Ontario’s hardrock mining history. The numbers of fatalities indicate how large 
the workforce was at that mine: more than 900 men were on shift at Hollinger that day, 
some beyond the 2,500 feet level. An inquiry into the incident found that a pile of 
flammable waste, stored in an unused space, spontaneously burst into flames filling the 
drifts, stopes and chambers with choking smoke and poisonous gases.
1
 The Department of 
Mines said: “… it is perhaps fortunate that not more than 39 men were suffocated.”2 The 
tragedy sparked more regulatory changes including the establishment of safe locations that 
could be retreated to in case of an unforeseen event. Other stipulations called for the 
improvement of (exhaust) ventilation systems. The “Hollinger Disaster,” as it came to be 
known, revealed better ways of understanding and addressing the health and safety of men 
working underground. One of the salient comments concerning the deaths at Hollinger was: 
“The Compensation Committee [of the WCB] advises that the [tariff] figure for 1928 … 
includes $156,000, which was the cost of the Hollinger disaster ….”3 This figure indicates 
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a mathematical average of $4,000.00 for each of the deceased miners, although the specific 
formula for the calculation is unknown. 
 Reporting procedures of deaths and accidents after 1925 regularly included the 
marital status of the deceased and the numbers of children they left behind. This was new 
and there is no explanation for why marital status became a statistical preference. The 
inclusion of offspring in the report from 1929 recounts: “Rudolph Fluvian, Italian, aged 43 
years, married, with wife and six children…”4 and “Teemu Maki, driller, Finn, aged 31 
years, married with a wife and two children…”5 and Mike Lubera, 29, Pole, with a wife 
and three children….”6 At a minimum, this information acknowledges miners as family 
men, or breadwinners rather than as boisterous, frontier brawlers.  
 This dissertation explores a period during which breadwinner masculinity is not 
known to be the norm. It is a time of flux and of new formations. While the frontier labour 
force was known about, it was little studied because of its remote locations and scattered 
numbers. My study has attempted to reveal more about the circumstances of mining 
workplaces in order to understand the nature of the risks they faced every day. It was, in 
fact, the nature of the work – especially in terms of occupational risks – that impacted 
miners’ health and safety. Few scholars have examined the nuances of hardrock mining and 
how it affected the health of the men involved, preferring instead to understand mining’s 
economic and political effects. 
I have acknowledged the legislation that recognized the workforce as well as the 
regulatory protections that were in place and regularly revised and updated. My evidence 
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reveals that there was never a shortage of regulations in the mining sector. Nevertheless, I 
have also demonstrated that the protections bruited in the various incarnations of The Mine 
Act were largely ineffective because they were weakly enforced. However, as mines, and 
the communities that built up around them, became more firmly established, and as 
workers evolved into citizens and voters with families, their political value increased. 
Therefore, as the number of on-the-job fatalities increased, no longer were the characters of 
miners automatically impugned as causal, reckless or careless. World War One made it 
clear that they were valuable and patriotic. The product of their work produced the metals 
needed to defend God and Empire. Therefore, with only the occasional exception, mining 
improved. While not “safe” per se, the machines, explosives, methods, and the work itself 
became less dangerous than it was thirty years earlier. Consequently the number of 
fatalities declined. While I use statistical data showing declining death and injury rates to 
prove that safety got better, I do not suggest that mining was a safe occupation. The 
addition of new electrical and mechanical devices certainly provided better conditions yet 
being underground amid loud drilling and explosions was still dangerous. Data from 1926 
to 1945 reveal an average of 43 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries in the industry each 
year.
7
 The numbers indicate that, in spite of improvements, the work remained fraught with 
danger. 
 My work accords with Larry Lankton’s analysis of hardrock mining communities.8 
In northern Ontario, the work was different from coal mining and from American methods 
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as well. Some of the differences relate to the unionization or non-unionization of the 
workforce. Extending the scholarship of Brian Hogan, I explore how and why the Meredith 
Commission intervened in order to determine the necessity and the motivations that argued 
for new worker compensation legislation which further identified the deleterious effects of 
mine work on the bodies of men.  
I have argued that the conditions of work persisted for a long time because, from 
the outset, accidents were small and involved only one or two men. Seldom was there an 
accident that caused more than one or two deaths. My study helps understand remote, early 
resource extraction in Canada and especially the lot of hardrock miners. It is a unique field 
that is too-often surrounded by hyperbolic popular histories. The work of Edmund 
Bradwin
9
 and Wallace Clement
10
 are notable for their examinations of the men and the 
historical techniques that evolved over time. There was a well-established bureaucracy at 
Queen’s Park that was aware of the men in the mines. The paternalistic attitude of the law-
makers was reflected in well-documented reports initiated and written by mine inspectors. 
They saw first-hand what happened to victims of accidents underground.  
Part of my investigations into fatalities included the convening of coroners’ juries. I 
include the findings of those panels, which, after a time, took issue with mine owners, 
operators, and the regulations. I have used some of their rather sharp comments about the 
need for much greater protections for the men. Their obiter dicta recommendations reveal 
how miners themselves felt about their conditions of work. Their findings point up some of 
the issues and silences in the government’s own records. Using Bureau of Mines data and 
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statistics, I show how important mining was to the province’s revenues as well as to how its 
administration reflected political interests. My findings support the arguments of H.V. 
Nelles
11
, but mine reveal the effects of policies on the lives and health of workers rather 
than on Ontario’s economy or on the processes that informed political thought of the time.  
Workplace fatalities in mines were in single digits every year from 1890 until 1899, 
when fourteen men died over twelve months. Between 1891 and 1904 the cumulative total 
was reported at ninety-four, an average of seven per year or about one every second month. 
While some of these statistics have been developed in the secondary literature, like Bernie 
Jaworsky’s Lamps Forever Lit, my analysis of annual fatalities opens up resource 
extraction to closer scrutiny that addresses both the qualitative and quantitative dangers of 
that work and its remoteness.
12
 Being at a frontier site meant little access to medical 
treatment which led to greater health risks even for minor incidents. It seems clear that an 
infection or broken bone at a difficult site to access posed additional threats to the well-
being of those involved. 
I also try to explain how the tacit acceptance of dangerous work privileged the legal 
precedent of “assumed risk.” The concept was widely known but my use of the Frederick 
Jeffries case examines how its consequences left family members vulnerable. My 
conclusions coincide with those of historians Eric Fudge and Judy Tucker who detail the 
types and styles of laws that were enacted.
13
 While I agree with their explanations, I 
attempt to show how the legislation applied directly to the men to determine how it 
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impacted the health, and indeed the lives, of workers. Using the Annual Reports of the 
Bureau of Mines, I documented a broad spectrum of findings by mine inspectors that 
illuminate how regulations were interpreted over time, if in fact they were interpreted at all. 
Early on, the evidence suggests that laws were weak because they were seldom enforced. 
This contributed to ever-higher death and injury rates year-after-year. My conclusions 
speak to a nuanced understanding of the regulations and how they responded to the 
vicissitudes of social and political events. They reveal a good deal about the paternalistic 
legislators who passed them and more about the workers who were governed by them. 
There are yet more studies needed to unpack and explain the effects of laws on labour 
forces. When the Workmen’s Compensation archives become available, there will be much 
to learn about occupational health and safety and how they interacted, especially in 
industries that were heavily regulated.   
 My dissertation also examines the history of health and how it was negotiated. At 
the moment, Canadian scholarship in this field has maintained an urban focus that tends to 
examine women, children, and public health matters such as pandemics. Health historians 
that have examined women’s health have argued that it was shaped by sexuality and 
childbirth. Wendy Mitchinson’s comprehensive study, The Nature of Their Bodies14 is the 
most influential of those works. Men, by contrast, have their health defined mostly by their 
work. The industrial accidents and injuries documented in this dissertation suggest that 
more research is need on how men navigated workplace dangers, especially in the early 
part of the twentieth century. There is considerable scholarship about later decades but my 
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research highlights some of the problems and issues that informed work and health at the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
My research demonstrates how the relationship between work and occupational 
health shaped understandings of the ways in which men’s bodies were influenced on and 
off the job. The frontier workplace, with its rudimentary living conditions, affected men’s 
bodies to the greatest degree. The circumstances of both work and habitation were always 
demanding and oftentimes severely detrimental to health outcomes. I show the links 
between the two as well as how the proximity of co-workers meant that mistakes, or errors 
of judgement, caused injuries or death. Off the job, close living quarters were susceptible to 
the spread of germs and diseases. Once taken ill, a miner had virtually no one to look after 
him. While the later arrival of women and families offered some improvements in 
community and personal care, they did not mitigate or interrupt any of the actual workplace 
risks.
15
 Before that, however, health circumstances were extraordinarily demanding. From 
the crude structures they lived in, to premature explosions, and spontaneous falls of ground, 
the physical constitutions of men were always under pressure and at risk. My detailed 
analysis of the occupational risks miners faced and the resultant injuries and deaths 
constitutes one of the few Canadian studies in the history of occupational health. 
 In this regard, my work is one of the few that studies the history of medical 
practices in the north. Most academic research centres on the southern part of Ontario and 
on heroic, urban doctors who contributed remarkably to the development of the medical 
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profession as well as to the treatment of diseases.
16
 While I acknowledge that socialized 
medicine was present in urban communities and that urban doctors “contracted” to serve 
particular groups of people, I also point up the unique challenges faced by frontier 
physicians. More clarifications of the differences between North and South have to be 
provided lest there be a misunderstanding that medicine was practiced uniformly across the 
province. My research contributes to the small body of scholarship on contract physicians 
who are only ever referenced tangentially. I say that these doctors practiced within a 
coercive system that co-opted their loyalties. In focusing on contract doctors in the north, 
my dissertation also adds depth to Canadian medical history that has been oriented 
primarily to southern, urban doctors and hospitals.  
I join a small group of scholars investigating frontier workspaces and their 
relationship to medical practices. Like Sasha Mullally, I look at rank and file physicians 
and the hardships they faced traveling to their patients and working under conditions that 
were at best adequate and sometimes primitive.
17
 Frontier doctors developed different 
kinds of relationships than those featured in urban practices. “Contract doctors” faced 
unique challenges. This influenced how medicine at the frontier was practiced, paid for and 
even moreso, how physicians perceived their patients. While social medicine was practiced 
in urban environments like Toronto, Ottawa, and Hamilton, it was not mediated as 
intensely by commercial interests as it was in the north. I agree with Mike Corbett’s 
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observations flowing from the history of education that: “Canadian historiography is shot 
through with a fundamental urban bias.”18 This is evident in medical history as well. My 
work questions the interactions of contracted physicians with corporations, with 
bureaucrats and with competing physicians. I am able to show how outside influences 
generated tensions that acted pejoratively on patients. My conclusions are drawn from 
evidence that confirms the physicians were hired by companies rather than the workmen. 
This effectively coerced the doctors into being more loyal to the companies that paid their 
invoices than to the men who funded them through payroll deductions. In this regard, I rely 
on autobiographical materials from contract doctors like doctors Clifford Smylie, Herman 
Bryan and Edwin Gimby. Their memoirs speak of the troubled finances faced by northern 
doctors and how much they coveted work contracts that paid in cash. There is much more 
work yet to be done on the urban/rural separation and how it acted upon those responsible 
for healthcare.  
While I locate my research on a few doctors in northern Ontario, there is still much 
more to be gleaned about supplementary healthcare and how it was addressed. Scholars 
like Jayne Elliott have studied medical outposts – they were not hospitals in any modern 
sense of the word – and the people who staffed them.19 My work predates hers and tries to 
understand the complex nature of the company-doctor-client relationships that operated on 
and off the job. There are more analyses to be done of specific doctors and how they 
negotiated the circumstances of their work. 
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 One of the most challenging aspects of my dissertation has been the study of 
masculinity. Early on, I could see its subtle influences on the daily behaviours and 
workplace practices of miners. My findings confirm the ideas and work of both Nancy 
Forestell and Karen Dubinsky concerning the numbers of women who resided in what had 
previous been exclusively male and masculine environments. Like Gail Bederman and Ava 
Baron assert, late nineteenth century miners exhibited a rugged masculinity that was rooted 
in physical risk-taking.
20
 That was essentially true of the early miners but that kind of 
masculinity was quietly overtaken by a breadwinner masculinity that sought to provide for 
families nearby or abroad.  
The onset of World War One complicated breadwinner masculinity with a new 
patriotic, warrior-like masculinity. Northern Ontario’s masculine ethos was reshaped in the 
aftermath of World War One. Over time, there were multiple masculinities at play that 
were subject to marital, racial, ethnic, age, and workplace interpretations. There was a 
distance and a divide between the “rugged masculinity” of risk-taking, frequently revealed 
by single men, and the quieter, more widespread “breadwinner masculinity” of married 
men who cared for families. Accessing the voices of the men proved difficult and I met 
with only limited success ion documenting miner’s own attitudes, but I did find clear 
examples of men putting themselves in harm’s way to demonstrate fearlessness to their co-
workers. My research builds on Nancy Forestell’s important work, expanding both the 
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timeframe back to consider the decades before World War One. In small camps far beyond 
Timmins, men worked hard and lived sparingly in order to support families who lived 
away. On the other hand, the death of Frederick Jefferies exemplifies the almost invisible 
life of a breadwinner who worked hard, saved hard, and lived modestly in order to support 
a family of five in England. Quantitatively, I show that the names on police blotters and in 
newspaper headlines were a minority of aberrant, usually, single males. They made big 
headlines and sold newspapers but did not represent the majority of anonymous family men 
who plied their trade underground or on a timber limit or laying track. The distance 
between these two masculinities in the same space is considerable. I also point up a new 
“warrior” or “military masculinity” that took hold during wartime. Miners enlisted in such 
extraordinary numbers that recruiting stations and worksites had to close because they 
could not accommodate all those who wanted to join the fight. As I look at those who 
remained in the mines during the fighting I find evidence of them embracing the fighting 
spirit and developing a more militant attitude and identity that helps their union activities in 
the post-war years. This builds on wartime literature like that of Jonathan Vance to reveal 
how the masculinity of war – domestic and foreign – was quickly reconfigured around 
models of patriotism which included the resource workers whose contributions were 
essentially, the discourse of war: armaments.  
The masculinities involved in this study reflect on doctors also. Their masculinity 
was different but of equal importance, just as it was for those who wanted to educate men 
at the frontier. Understandings were developed that accommodated different masculinities: 
although doctors had “soft hands” they nonetheless exposed themselves to dangers when 
traveling to or treating miners at dangerous sites. These multiple masculinities are 
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important to the history of the north and will benefit from additional studies or the 
examination of micro-histories of doctor/patient relationships. While my findings agree 
with the presence of rugged and breadwinner masculinities, I reveal their complexities and 
the challenges they produced at work. I argue that workplace masculinities are amalgams 
of different masculinity streams and that they forged something of a lingua franca which 
adapted and adopted characteristics according to the needs of the work and the men 
performing it. 
 Finally, the history of work is a key element in my thesis. My study is situated in 
resource extraction and adds to the work of Brian Hogan, Ian Radforth and Jeremy 
Mouat.
21
 After examining hardrock mining, I agree with the idea of workplace danger but I 
focus on occupational health rather than on mining and especially the work that has been 
done on coal mining. My examination complements the work of Karen Buckley
22
 as I point 
up the “petty” dangers that plagued Canadian labour forces as well as the ever-increasing 
numbers of deaths and severe injuries occasioned by labourers. I extend the knowledge in 
this field with statistical data that follows how the danger of work was negotiated by the 
men, their employers, and the government. Rather than following H.V. Nelles’ example of 
researching policy making, I looked at the effects of policies on the workers and this has 
broadened the ways in which work is studied.  
Up to 1904 mining work was unsophisticated. It clearly relied on muscle power; the 
vein and the active stope were probed by twisting a steel drill bit which was struck by a 
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second man using a sledgehammer. These spaces were demonstrably small, cramped and 
poorly lit. The men faced icy or poorly constructed ladderways; the release of toxic gases; 
and the spontaneous collapse of walls and ceilings on unsuspecting workers. These 
elements conspired against the workman, notwithstanding the paternal attitudes that 
informed the legislation and the regulations. 
  As extraction industries consolidated and matured, camps became hamlets, villages 
and service, politically active towns. They were populated by men, women and children 
and so the breadwinner masculinity began to compete with the traditional rugged 
masculinity of earlier times. Immigrants swelled the ranks of the resource sector as the 
effects of the National Policy put more and more foreigners into mining and lumbering. 
The results of all of these have produced a fascinating and compelling site for more 
historical studies which this dissertation addresses.  
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